AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Honourable Mr. Justice K. Chandru
The petitioners are having the second round of litigation. In the earlier round of litigation, they filed writ petitions before the Principal Seat in the year 2002 seeking to challenge the acquisition proceedings taken by the State Government acquiring the petitioners'' land in favour of Small Industries Development Corporation. Those writ petitions came to be dismissed by this Court. At that time, the petitioners contended that they were owners of the land holding Cowle patta and possession was not taken over. But the seventh respondent therein, Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO), the second respondent herein appeared before this Court and informed that major portions of the land were utilized and as per the Government Policy, trees have been planted and as and when necessary, such lands shall be utilized. The counter affidavit filed by the SIDCO, the 7th respondent therein asserted that since they are the requisitioning body and compensation was paid and the writ petitions having been filed after a long period, the writ petitions were not maintainable. This Court after recording the same held that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the impugned acquisition made in favour of the SIDCO. However, it was stated that if the land was not utilized, it is open to the petitioners to approach the State Government by filing appropriate application u/s 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 16 of 1997.
It was pursuant to the observation made by the learned Judge, the petitioners sent representations to the Small Industries Department seeking for the return of the land. They also stated in the representation that the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, Sivangai District have recommended their cases.
Learned counsel for the petitioners produced a copy of an office note stating that the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, Sivangai District have recommended their cases. But it is unfortunate such a recommendation furnished by unauthorized authorities, for the purpose exercising of power u/s 48-B is being produced. It is very clear that if the requisitioning body was not using the land for the purpose for which it was acquired and if such authority returned the land to the State Government and the State Government on taking a decision in respect of the utilisation of the land for any other public purpose, then, if it is considered that the land should be returned to the original owners it may do so after recovering the compensation paid as well as the interest on the said amount. The Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, Sivangai District have no right over the said land as it had already given to SIDCO.
When the matter came up on 01.04.2011, notice of motion was ordered in the writ petitions. On behalf of the second respondent Ms. T. Kaviya, representing for Mr. K. Mahendran, learned counsel appeared and she stated that their clients are utilizing the lands. In the earlier round of litigation, their stand was recorded by the learned Judge in the Principal Seat at Paragraph No.3 of the said order and it reads as follows:
The contentions raised by the petitioners have been resisted by the learned counsels appearing for the State Government as well as appearing for the Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO). It is contended by them that possession had been taken earlier and major portion of the land had been utilized and in respect of other portion, as per the Government policy, trees have been planted and as and when necessary, such lands would be utilized. It is also been indicated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the contesting respondent/SIDCO that compensation had been paid and at any rate, the writ petition having been filed after a long gap of about four decades, it should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Therefore, there cannot be any second round of litigation to invoke the power u/s 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act 1984.
In this context, it is necessary to refer certain decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. Keeravani Ammal and Others, in paragraph 11 had observed as follows:
...Section 48-B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here.
The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran and Others, , dealt with the scope of Section 48-B and has considered all the cases arising out of reconveyance. In paragraphs 28 and 29, it was observed as follows:
It need no emphasis that in exercise of power u/s 48-B of the Act, the Government can release the acquired land only till the same continues to vest in it and that too if it is satisfied that the acquired land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose. To put it differently, if the acquired land has already been transferred to other agency, the Government cannot exercise power u/s 48-B of the Act and re-convey the same to the original owner. In any case, the Government cannot be compelled to re-convey the land to the original owner if the same can be utilized for any public purpose other than the one for which it was acquired.
(Emphasis added)
Before concluding, we may notice the judgment of this Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal (supra). The question considered in that case was whether the Division Bench of the High Court could direct release of the acquired land which had been transferred to the appellant-Board. While setting aside the impugned order, this Court observed: (SCC pp.261-62, paras 13-16)
It is clearly pleaded by the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board that the scheme had not been suspended or abandoned and that the lands acquired are very much needed for the implementation of the scheme and the steps in that regard have already been taken. In the light of this position, it is not open to the Court to assume that the project has been abandoned merely because another piece of land in the adjacent village had been released from acquisition in the light of orders of the Court. It could not be assumed that the whole of the project had been abandoned or has become unworkable. It depends upon the purpose for which the land is acquired. As we see it, we find no impediment in the lands in question being utilised for the purpose of putting up a multi-storied building containing small flats, intended as the public purpose when the acquisition was notified. Therefore, the High Court clearly erred in proceeding as if the scheme stood abandoned. This was an unwarranted assumption on the part of the Court, which has no foundation in the pleadings and the materials produced in the case. The Court should have at least insisted on production of materials to substantiate a claim of abandonment.
We have already noticed that in the writ petition, there are no sufficient allegations justifying interference by the Court. Mere claim of possession by the writ petitioners is not a foundation on which the relief now granted could have been rested either by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench of the High Court. On the materials, no right to relief has been established by the writ petitioners.
We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. The State can dispose of the property thereafter or convey it to anyone, if the land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired, only for the market value that may be fetched for the property as on the date of conveyance. The doctrine of public trust would disable the State from giving back the property for anything less than the market value. In State of Kerala and others Vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and another, in a similar situation, this Court observed : (SCC p.433, para 4)
4....The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value.
Section 48-B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here.
In view of the above, there is no case made out to entertain the writ petitions. Hence, these writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs.