Quiet Corner India vs Hameedulla Khan and Another

A.V. Srinivasa Reddy, J.—As common questions of law and facts are involved in these revision petitions, they are taken up together for disposal.

For the sake of convenience the parties in these petitions will be referred to in the course of this order by their rank and position before the Court-below.

The Petitioners Hameedulla Khan and Najiba Khanum purchased the petition schedule property from the previous owners Edmund Joseph and Evelyn Joseph. Subsequent to the said purchase, the Khata of the said property was transferred to the Petitioners'' name and they are also paying Corporation taxes thereon. The petition premises consisted of two portions viz., a garage portion and a residential portion. Respondent-Quiet Corner India was the tenant in respect of the garage portion and Abraham was the tenant in respect of the residential portion of the premises. The Petitioners filed eviction petitions against the respective tenants in respect of both portions. HRC 10277 of 1996 was filed under 21(1)(a), (h) and (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (''the repealed Act'' for short) against the tenant of the garage portion and HRC 10277 of 2002 was filed u/s 21(1) and (h) of the Act in respect of the residential portion. The Court-below tried the eviction petitions separately and passed separate orders. In H.R.C. 10277 of 1996 the Court-below allowed the eviction petition under Clauses (a) and (r) of Section 27(2) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (''the present Act'' for short) as by then it had come into force. In H.R.C. No. 10276 of 1996 the Court-below allowed the eviction petition u/s 21(1)(h) of the repealed Act but dismissed the petition u/s 21(1)(p) of the Act. HRRP 410 of 2000 is filed by the Petitioners being aggrieved by the dismissal of their petition u/s 21(1)(p) of the present Act.

I have heard the learned Counsel appearing on the sides.

HRRPs 370 and 410 of 2000 :

The need propounded by the Petitioners in H.R.C. 10276 of 1996 is that they require the petition premises for their own use and occupation on the ground that they require garage premises for parking their car and two wheelers as there is no proper parking space in their present rented accommodation and their vehicles are left in the open and are exposed to the vagaries of nature. The Respondent disputed the ownership of the Petitioners on the ground that their ownership of the premises is under challenge in O.S. No. 1160 of 1996. The Court-below relying on the sale deed executed by the previous owner and the khata of the property which stood transferred in the name of the Petitioners, has rightly held that the Petitioners are the owners of the property. The Court-below has also taken note of the fact that the Respondents have been sending letters and rents to the Petitioners treating them as the landlords. In the said facts and circumstances it is not now open for the Respondents to deny either the ownership of the Petitioners over the premises or the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. The finding recorded by the Court-below regarding the relationship of landlord and tenants, therefore, does not call for any interference.

The main ground on which eviction is sought by the Petitioners is that they are residing in a rented premises and they have purchased the petition premises for their own use and occupation. It is also stated by them that there is not car shed in the premises presently in their occupation and the vehicles are being parked in the open and there have been thefts of the music system installed in the car two or three times. The Petitioners also produced the rent receipts to evidence the fact that they are residing in some other premises as tenants. The claim of the Petitioners was challenged by the Respondents on the ground that greater hardship would be caused to them if they are asked to vacate the petition premises. Under the provisions of the present Act such a plea is no defence against the claim of a landlord for requirement of the premises on the ground of self-occupation. Comparative hardship as a concept is no longer required to be essentially gone into by a Court determining the relative merits of the contentions of the landlord and tenant in an eviction proceedings. The Court-below was right in refusing to take note of the submission made on behalf of the Respondents that the Petitioner is under no threat of eviction. It is well-settled principle of law that the right of the landlord does not depend on the action of this landlord, if he happens to be a tenant under some one. The landlord''s right to stay in his own house is purely incidental to his proprietary right. Further, it would be illogical and fallacious to state that unless the owner is under threat of eviction, he cannot seek eviction of his tenant. In this fact situation it cannot be said that the Petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought by them u/s 21(1)(h) of the repealed Act, more so in the light of the explanation I to Section 27(2)(r) of the present Act wherein the Court is required to draw a presumption that the requirement pleaded by the landlord is in fact true.

This Court in Smt. K.N. Saraswathamma v. Smt. Sarala had occasion to deal with Section 27(2)(r) of the Act and while interpreting the said provision made the following pertinent observations:

From a conjoint reading of Section 27(2)(r) and Explanation 1, it becomes clear that the Act creates a legal presumption in favour of the landlord that the premises is in fact required by him for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. In the light of the presumption that is available to a landlord under Explanation-1 to Section 27 of the Act, there could be no challenge to the requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own use and occupation or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof.

A fact which by virtue of a legal presumption is deemed by law to exist, whether it exists or not, is said in the technical language of the law to exist constructively or by construction of law. Such a legal presumption is conclusive and irrebuttable. Thus, constructive fraud or constructive notice means fraud or notice which is deemed to exist by virtue of an authoritative rule of law, whether it exists in truth or not. We also have the other kind of legal presumption where the Court is required to draw an inference even though there is no sufficient evidence to support it, provided only that there is no sufficient evidence to establish the contrary inference. Thus, a negotiable instrument is presumed to be given for value and an accused person is presumed to be innocent but only so long as it is rebutted by satisfactory evidence. These are rebuttable presumptions. Thus, both on facts and in law, the Petitioners have established that they require the petition premises for their own bonafide use and occupation.

So far as the rejection of the claim of the Petitioners under Clause (p) of Section 21(1) of the Act is concerned, the Court-below was right in declining to grant relief to the Petitioners on the ground that it was not shown to its satisfaction that the accomodation available in the premises in possession of the Respondent was sufficient for the purpose of parking the vehicles that were owned by the Respondent-trust. In order to get an order u/s 27(2)(j) of the present Act, it is not enough to merely show that the tenant has acquired an alternative accomodation but it should be further shown that such accomodation will be sufficient to meet the need that is being fulfilled by the petition premises. It has come in evidence that the accomodation that has come into the possession of the Respondents are residential and official accomodation which cannot be utilised for parking of vehicles. Therefore, the rejection of the claim of the Petitioners u/s 27(2)(j) of the present Act by the Court-below is well-founded and does not call for any interference. Therefore, the revision petition preferred by the Petitioners in HRRP 410 of 2000 is liable to be dismissed.

HRRP 426 of 2002 is by the tenant of the residential portion of the petition premises. The tenant has not only disputed the ownership of the Respondents over the petition premises but he has also challenged the same in O.S. 1160 of 1996 before the Civil Court. He has also denied the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. The Court-below has rightly rejected the contention urged by the tenant regarding the ownership of the Petitioners. It is the case of the tenant himself that he was inducted into the premises by Miss. M. John in March 1964. By letter of administration obtained by Mr. Edmund Joseph and Mrs. Evelyn Joseph on the Will executed by Miss. M. John, they had become the owners of the property. The Petitioners have purchased the property from Mr. Edmund Joseph and Mrs. Evelyn Joseph under a registered sale deed for valuable consideration. The notice of attornment had also been served on him. In these circumstances the Court-below was right in disbelieving the case putforth by the tenant that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to the eviction petition. A mere challenge in a suit by the tenant to a sale effected by his landlord in favour of the Petitioners, which is supported by a registered lease deed, cannot have the effect in law of upsetting the status of the Petitioners as owners and landlords of the tenanted premises. The Petitioners claimed to have purchased the petition premises for their own self-occupation as they are staying in a rented house. It is pleaded by them that the accomodation available in the rented house is insufficient. The very fact that the Petitioners are compelled to live in a rented premises which has insufficient accomodation to meet their requirements is sufficient grounder u/s 27(2)(r) of the present Act to entitle them to an order of eviction against the tenant. The Court-below having passed such an order, it does not call for any interference in this revision. Learned Counsel for the tenant relied on the observation of this Court in Saraswathamma v. Smt. Sarala, ILR 2003 Kar. 1717 that, it is for the landlord to show that he does not possess a more suitable accomodation for his occupation. It is the definite case of the landlord that he does not own any other premises in this city and there is nothing on record to come to a contrary conclusion. The case putforth by the landlord throughout is that he is a residing as a tenant under some other owner and that the accomodation available to him in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to meet his requirement. The decision, therefore, is of no assistance to the tenant. So far as the order passed under Clause (a), the same has to be set aside as it has come on record that the tenant has paid rents up to June 2002. More over, under the present Clause (a) of Section 27(2) of the present Act the landlord will be entitled to an order of eviction only if the tenant fails to pay or deposit into Court the rents within one month after the Court makes an order directing payment of arrears of rent to the landlord. As it is not shown in these proceedings that the tenant has continued to commit default in the payment of rents, this Court cannot pass an order under Clause (a) of Section 27(2) of the Act.

In the result, for the reasons stated above, I find no merit in these revision petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. The Respondents-tenants are given three months time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord.