AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
M. Chockalingam, J.—An order of the VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, affirming an order of eviction passed by the Rent
Controller namely XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in RCOP No. 773/2005 on the ground of additional accommodation is the subject
matter of challenge in this revision.
The landlady, the respondent herein, filed the RCOP stating that she is the owner of Old Door No. 6, New No. 6A, Harlys Road, Kilpauk; that
the building consists of ground floor and first floor; that she was residing in the ground floor; that the first floor was rented out to the petitioner
herein by way of rental agreement dated 14.6.2003, on the monthly rental of Rs. 7,500/-; that the tenant paid an advance of Rs. 82,500/-; that she
is living with her eldest son, who is married and has got his children; that she is living with all the members of the family; that there has been often
quarrel due to the small place in which they are being accommodated; that her grandchildren have grown up; that under the circumstances, it would
be very difficult to accommodate all the family members in the ground floor; that she bonafide requires the first floor for her additional
accommodation; that a notice was issued on 5.3.2005 to the petitioner which brought forth a reply on 11.3.2005, and under the circumstances,
she was constrained to file the RCOP before the Rent Controller
The petition was resisted by the petitioner-tenant on the ground that after the lease period was over, by an endorsement in the original
agreement, it was extended for a further period of 11 months; that there was an oral agreement that the lease shall be for a period of nearly five
years; that based on this, the petitioner has invested huge amount to suit his needs by doing the interior decorations; that any eviction order will
cause untrue hardship to the petitioner; that the balance of convenience was also in favour of the petitioner-tenant; that there was lack of bonafide
on the part of the landlady; that apart from that, another suit for the same cause of action is pending before the City Civil Court; that E.P. No.
15/2005 in O.S. No. 6393/2002 is filed and pending; that the petitioner is the garnishee in the said E.P., and under the circumstances, the petition
was to be dismissed.
On enquiry, the Rent Controller agreed with the case of the landlady and passed an order of eviction. An appeal by the tenant-revision
petitioner, also failed. Under the circumstances, this revision has been brought forth.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner advancing his arguments at the time of the hearing of the revision, raised a legal plea that in the instant
case, the application was brought forth for additional accommodation u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act; that in such a case, the application could be filed
only after the period of lease is over; that in the instant case, originally, the lease period was from 4.6.2003 to 14.5.2004; that it was a written
agreement; that an endorsement was made extending the lease for a further period of 11 months ending with 14.5.2005; but, the eviction
application was filed even before that period was over; that the provisions of Section 10(3)(d) would mandate that the application for eviction for
additional accommodation could be filed only after the lease period is over; that the instant application filed, was not maintainable at all; that on that
ground, the application should have been rejected; that the lower authorities were not called upon to go into the other aspects of the matter; that
even assuming that all other aspects were in favour of the landlady, the application itself was not maintainable at all, and under the circumstances,
the Rent Controller should have rejected the application outright.
In answer to the above, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that both the authorities below have agreed with the bonafide
requirement of the landlady; and that the ground now urged by the petitioner, was not found in the course of the counter, though it was a ground of
appeal before the appellate forum. Now, at this juncture, the learned Counsel would submit that even the extended time was also over in April
2005; that two years were already over; that once the bonafide requirement of the landlady is established, then the Court must look into the
hardship, and apart from that, when the period itself is over, it has got to be ordered.
The Court after careful consideration of the rival submissions made, is of the considered opinion that the revision has got to be dismissed. In the
instant case, it is true that there was a written agreement entered into between the parties for the period from 4.6.2003 to 14.5.2004, and
thereafter, it was also extended for a period of 11 months. It was also over. This Court is thoroughly satisfied with the requirement of the landlady.
It is not in controversy that there are two floors. The ground floor is occupied by the landlady. The first floor is with the tenant, and the lease period
is also for 11 months. It is also not in controversy that subsequently, it was extended by way of an endorsement in the original agreement. It is
pertinent to point out that the only legal plea which was not raised even by way of an application before the Rent Controller, is now raised.
According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Section 10(3)(d) would clearly mandate that the application could be filed only after the period
of lease is over, and hence, the application was not maintainable, and it should have been dismissed.
Now, at this juncture, it would be more apt and appropriate to reproduce Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act which runs as follows.
10(3)(c): A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in
Clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put
the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is
carrying on, as the case may be.
The above provision of law would give rights to the landlord to apply for eviction. Section 10(3)(d) of the Act runs like this.
10(3)(d): Where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply
under this sub-section before the expiry of such period.
The legislative intent in making this specific provision was that the possession of a tenant who is under the occupation of a particular premises,
should not be disturbed within the stipulated period, and hence, the landlord should be deterred from making an application. In the case on hand,
the lease period which was extended, was admittedly over in April 2005. When the above ground is raised before this Court, we are in June 2007.
Under the circumstances, the Court has to see the relative hardship of the party concerned. In the instant case, the ground floor is occupied by the
landlady, who is having a married son, daughter-in-law and also grandchildren. The first floor is in the hands of the petitioner-tenant. Now, the
landlady sought for additional accommodation. The matter has been pending for a few years. Now, the tenant came forward to raise such a ground
for the first time. Applying the rule of relative hardship, this Court is of the opinion that applying the technical point, dismissing the application and
driving the landlady again to file an application should not be done. It is true that the an application could be filed only after the lease period is over.
Now, at this juncture, it is to be pointed out that the legislative intent was that an application should not be filed out of time. But, now the period is
already over before two years. This Court feels that it is not a fit case where this legal plea could be accepted in order to put the landlady under
hardship which she has already suffered for a period of two years. Under the circumstances, the authorities below were perfectly correct in
ordering eviction.
In the result, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MP is also dismissed.
Now, the learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks reasonable time to vacate the premises and hand over possession. The Court heard the
learned Counsel for the respondent. Considering the facts and circumstances, 9 months'' time is granted in that regard.