P.V. Narayanan vs Keltron Projectors Ltd. Peroorkada, Thiruvananthapuram, Pin 695005

Mohammed Nias.C.P. J.

This writ appeal is filed aggrieved by the judgment dated 2.3.2022 of the learned single Judge in WP(C)No.26786 of 2018 filed by the appellant challenging Ext.P38 order and inter alia claiming compensation under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) at the rate of 30 days wages for every completed year of their service.

The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the writ appeal are as follows:-

The appellants-petitioners, erstwhile employees of KELTRON Projectors Limited (KPL) contended that KPL was a subsidiary of the second respondent KELTRON and that in KELTRON 45 days package has been implemented in the case of its employees as well as the employees of other subsidiary companies. The appellants claimed similar treatment and approached this Court earlier in WP(C)No.31111 of 2010 leading to Ext.P34 judgment, wherein this Court directed the Government to consider the claims of the appellants including the benefit of granting 45 days wages for every year of completed service in addition to gratuity, encashment of leave, medical benefits etc. as part of the scheme for voluntary retirement. That writ petition was filed stating the employees were given only 15 days for every completed year of their service and their claim was for 45 days seeking parity with the benefits offered by the Government to other subsidiary companies of KELTRON. Pursuant to the said judgment, impugned order, Ext.P38 is seen passed giving three reasons for not accepting the claim of the appellants, which reads as follows:-

“4. Government have examined the case in detail and the claim of the ex-employees does not seem to be tenable due to following reasons:-

(1) Keltrol Project Limited (KPL) does not qualify as a PSU of Government of Kerala, since 50% of the shares are held by the Private Parties. Thus, this company cannot be treated at par with other subsidiary companies of Keltron where it has a major majority share.

(2) Compensation was made to Keltron Project Limited (KPL) employees as per the memorandum of settlement dated 18.05.2002 which specifically mentions that the workers will be paid closure compensation as provided in Section 25 FFF of ID Act, 1947. The employees have accepted the amounts as per the Memorandum of Settlement and have also given a receipt stating that this is the full and final settlement.

(3) The employees are claiming to be treated at par with employees of Keltron/subsidiary companies of Keltron as far as the VRS settlement is to be considered.”

It was this order that was challenged by the petitioners before the learned single Judge.

The learned single Judge found that the KPL cannot be considered as a Public Sector undertaking of the Government of Kerala as 50% of the shares are held by the Private Parties, and that the said company cannot be treated at par with other subsidiary companies. The learned single Judge also found that the appellants had already taken the benefit of 15 days and cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate as they had acquiesced their claim and are barred from raking up again. The learned single Judge found that there was a settlement and therefore they cannot be permitted to seek enlargement of the same by making subsequent representation or claims. In that view of the matter, the writ petition was dismissed.

In the appeal before us, the learned counsel for the appellants Sri.Pirappancode V.S.Sudheer argues that the entire reasoning of the learned single Judge as also in Ext.P38 cannot be sustained. He argues that KPL is fully managed by KELTRON and that the other similarly situated subsidiary companies were granted the benefits of 45 days wages for every completed year and there cannot be any discrimination as far as the employees of KPL are concerned. Even the full amounts sanctioned by the Government has not been disbursed to them. It is his further arguments that hearing note, Ext.P37 clearly took note of the concern of the appellants and had taken a view that the appellants are entitled to succeed in their claim. Learned counsel argued that the Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the similar companies offered 45 days wages for every completed year and claimed parity. He also submits that the directions in Ext.P35 judgment was flouted while passing Ext.P38 order.

The learned counsel appearing for respondent 1 and 2, Smt.M.A.Zohra submits that the KPL is not a subsidiary of KELTRON and that share pattern would also reveal the same. KPL is also not a Government company within the meaning of Section 2(18) read with Section 617 of the Companies Act and also will not fall under the definition Subsidiary Companies and under Section 4(1) (a)(ii) of the Companies Act, 1956. On that short ground the claim of the appellants would fail. It is also argued that going by the settlement between the management and the Union as evidenced by Ext.P2, the claim now made is beyond the terms of the settlement. In the absence of a challenge to the settlement, no variation can be claimed from the settlement. Learned counsel argues that this was a case of a closure compensation being given and not a Voluntary Retirement Scheme as contended by the appellants. The entire reasoning in Ext.P38 is tenable. The learned single Judge rightly refused to grant any relief to the petitioners.

Having heard the learned counsel on either side, we are of the definite view that the claim of the appellants should fail By Ext.P2, after elaborate discussion, a memorandum of settlement was entered between the Unions and the Management to close down the factory as per the minutes of the meeting dated 29.4.2002 and accordingly closure notice was published intimating the closure of the factory with effect from 31.5.2002. After bilateral discussions, the terms were finalised. The workers were directed to be paid closure compensation as provided in Section 25 FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as the establishment was closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer. Having accepted the said settlement, the appellants had pleaded in their writ petition that the settlement is void and that it was a device adopted by respondents 1 to 3 as their acts amounted to unfair practice in the organization. This stand of the appellants cannot be accepted.

The memorandum of settlement is binding on the Union in terms of Sections 12 and 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reasoning given by the learned single Judge in the above lines are completely legal and proper, and the attempt of the appellants to say that they had opted for VRS is factually wrong and cannot be accepted. It was under the terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, in particular Section 25F thereof that the number of days were calculated. The binding nature of the settlement is also governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The contention of the appellants, that they are to be treated at par with other subsidiary companies also cannot be accepted for the same reason as noted above. All the three reasons given in Ext.P38 order cannot be faulted in any manner, and accordingly, we are in complete agreement with the judgment of the learned single Judge. The argument that the hearing note was discarded also is as much untenable as the Government was never bound by the same while passing Ext.P38 order.

The writ appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.