High CourtsSingle Bench(2020) 02 TP CK 0050

Puspita Debbarma vs State Of Tripura And Ors

Tripura High Court · Decided on 11 February 2020

HON’BLE JUDGES
Arindam Lodh, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition (C) No. 858 Of 2016

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Judgment

54 paragraphs · 2,945 words
1.

Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel along with Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.

2.

By way of filing this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:

"i. Issue Rule upon the Respondent to show cause as to why Writ in the nature of mandamus and/or Order or direction shall not be issued whereby quashing and cancelling the Memo, No.F.13(1448)-HFW/2013/5798 V-III, dated, 31.03.2016, issued by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura.

ii. Issue Rule upon the Respondent to show cause as to why Writ in the nature of mandamus and/or Order or direction shall not be issued whereby quashing and cancelling the Memo, No.F.13.(1448)-HFW/2013/2363(V-II), dated, 14.06.2016, issued by the Director of Health Services, Govt. of Tripura.

iii. Make the rules absolute,

iv. Call for records,

v. Pass any further order/orders as this Hon'ble High Court considered fit and proper."

3.

Brief facts of the case are as under:

The petitioner took admission in MBBS Course in the Agartala Government Medical College, being sponsored by the Government of Tripura and at the time of admission, under a Government scheme, she executed a bond. One of the terms and conditions of the said bond was that within six months of completion of internship, she would be given offer of appointment and accordingly she executed a bond by way of an agreement dated 28.07.2007 mentioned in Memorandum dated 31.03.2016 [Annexure P/6 to the writ petition]. The terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement which are relevant to decide the instant case, are reproduced here-in-below:-

"....(viii) that the nominee, within 60 days of the date of his/her completing the period of internship/rotating houseman ship where applicable give notice in writing to the Director of Health Services, Tripura, by a registered post intimating about the date of completing internship/rotating houseman ship period.

(ix)(a) That the trainee, after successful completion of the said course shall be bound to serve under the Government of Tripura, if called upon to do so by the Government to any post as may be settled by the Government, whose decision on this behalf shall be final having due regard to the basic qualification attained by his/her for a period of at least 5 (five) years from the date of the offer made by the Government within 6(six) months from the date of communication of the results specified in sub-clause-viii of clause 3 above by the trainee to the Government failing which the Government will have the right and be at liberty to take such action as it may deem fit and proper.

(ix)(b) If, for any reason, it is not possible on the part of the Government to provide any offer of appointment to the trainee(bounden) within the period of 6(six) months to serve under the Govt. of Tripura, in that event the trainee (bounden) shall be at liberty to seek appointment elsewhere and he would be relieved from the obligation of the bond executed herein.

4.

Admitted facts are that the petitioner had completed her MBBS course on 09.02.2012 and she also completed her internship period from 23.02.2012 to 22.02.2013. Consequently, the State-respondents were under obligation to appoint/induct the petitioner under the Tripura Health Services within a period of six months from the date of communication of her completing internship period. Accordingly, the petitioner vide her communication dated 21.03.2013 had informed the Director of Health Services, Government of Tripura that she completed her compulsory rotator internship from 23.02.2012 to 22.02.2013 [Annexure P/2 to the writ petition]. But the State-respondents could not appoint the petitioner within the said stipulated period of six months. However, the respondent No.2 issued an offer of appointment in favour of the petitioner vide memorandum dated 15.10.2013. The petitioner had accepted the terms of the said memorandum and accordingly, she joined the service under the respondents. On 24.01.2015 the petitioner resigned from the post of Junior Medical Officer, Tripura Health Services by submitting resignation letter to the respondent No.2. After receipt of the said resignation letter, the State-respondents vide memorandum dated 31.03.2016 asked the petitioner to deposit bonded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- only to the Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of Tripura, within 30.04.2016 through Treasury Challan along with interest amounting to Rs.52,351/- only. The petitioner responded to the said memorandum stating inter alia that the State-respondents had failed to appoint her within the stipulated period of six months as per the agreement, so, she was not liable to pay the bonded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- and sought for exemption. The State-respondents vide memorandum dated 14.06.2016 informed the petitioner, with reference to her application, dated 23.04.2016, that her prayer for exemption from paying the bonded money had not been considered by the Government and hence, the memorandum dated 31.03.2016 stood good.

5.

Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the decision of the State-respondents is arbitrary, suffers from non application of mind and the Clause (ix)(b) stipulated in the agreement has been misconstrued and misread by the State-respondents and the petitioner is not liable to pay the bonded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- for not serving the State-respondents for the period of 5 years.

6.

On the other hand, Mr. M. Debbarma, learned Addl. G.A. has defended the action of the State-respondents contending that the prayer for exemption of paying the bonded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was taken into consideration and after due application of mind and in terms of Clause (ix)(b) of the agreement, her prayer was rejected and the petitioner was asked to pay the bonded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest.

7.

I have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel of the parties to the lis. I have also scanned the impugned memorandum dated 31.03.2016 and 14.06.2016 which are under challenge in this writ petition as well as Clause (ix)(b) of the agreement. For the purpose of convenience, I may reproduce the memorandum dated 31.03.2016.

"GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT No.F.13(1448)-HFW/2013/5798 V-III Dated,Agartala the 31-3-2016

MEMORANDUM

WHEREAS, Dr. Puspita Debbarma, Grade-IV of THS, Dhalai Dist Hospital has tendered her resignation from her service under this Department w.e.f. 24-01-2015.

AND

WHEREAS it appears from the records that Dr. Debbarma have been nominated by this Department for undergoing study in MBBS course during the session 2007 at AGMC, /Agartala.

AND

WHEREAS it also appears that Dr. Debbarma has executed a bond under this Department in connection with her study in MBBS course.

AND

WHEREAS as per terms and condition (Bond) executed by Dr. Puspita Debbarma and her sureties on 28-07-2007 in the event of Dr. Puspita Debbarma, the obligator fails to serve under this Department for a period of 5(five) years, the obligator and the sureties shall forthwith pay to the Government or as may be directed by the Government an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rs. Five lakh) only together with interest from the date of demand.

AND

WHEREAS Dr. Puspita Debbarma did not complete 5(five) years service under this Department and tendered resignation from service under this Department w.e.f. 24-01-2015.

AND

Thus Dr. Puspita Debbarma has violated the terms and conditions of the bond executed by her on 28-07-2007.

Dr. Puspita Debbarma, Grade-IV of THS is therefore asked to deposit bonded amount Rs.5,00,000/- (five lakh) only to this Department within 30-04-2016 through Treasury Challan under Head of Account 0210-Medical & Public Health, 03-Medical Education Training & Research 105 Allopathy and also to deposit the interest amount of Rs.52,351/- (fifty two thousand three hundred fifty one) only under Head of Account 0049-04-800-00 for consideration of her request to accept the resignation.

Sd/-

(Anima Debbarma) Under Secretary to the Government of Tripura."

8.

The memorandum dated 14.06.2016 states as follows:-

"No.F.13(1448)-HFW/2013 GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT Dated, Agartala the 14-06-2016

MEMO

With reference to the application dated 23-04-2016 Dr. Puspita Debbarma, ,Grade-IV of THS, Dhalai Dist. Hospital, Kulai, Dhalai Tripura is hereby informed that her prayer for exemption from bonded money is not considered by the Government.

Hence, the Memorandum issued under Health & F.W. Department No.F.13(1448)-HFW/2013 dated 31-03-2016 is stands.

This is issued with the approval of the Govt. vide UO No-870/Pr.Secy/(H & FWD)-16 dated 29-04-2016.

Director of Health Services Government of Tripura."

9.

A bare perusal of the memorandum dated 31.03.2016, it is crystal clear that the State-respondents had invoked the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement dated 28.07.2007, wherein it was clearly stated that in the event of failure to serve the State-respondents for a period of 5 years, the petitioner would be under obligation to pay an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- only together with interest from the date of demand. It was also stated that the petitioner had failed to complete her 5 years service under the department due to her resignation w.e.f.24.01.2015 and the memorandum dated 14.06.2016 clearly stated that the prayer of the petitioner to exempt her from paying the bonded money was not considered by the Government. Thus, the whole crux of the case is centered around Clause (ix)(b) of the agreement.

10.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that since the State-respondents had failed to provide/induct the petitioner with a suitable job within a period six months, in that event the petitioner should be relieved from the obligation of the bond executed by her. I find no merit in the submission of the learned counsel. The object of execution of the agreement and the bond thereon is to appoint a sponsored candidate to serve the State for a period of 5 years at least. The petitioner took admission in the MBBS course as a sponsored candidate of the State-respondents. True, it is that the State-respondents were under obligation to provide appointment to the petitioner within a period of six months from the date of communication of her completion of period of internship.

11.

In the instant case, offer of appointment was issued in favour of the petitioner after expiry of six months, but within next one month that was issued in her favour. The petitioner did not deny the issuance of offer of appointment, though, it was issued after expiry of six months. The petitioner on her own wisdom had accepted the offer of appointment and joined Tripura Health Services.

12.

It is settled principle as time and again approved by the Supreme Court that "the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their language is found not so much in a strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained" [Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353, p.356: Santasingh v.State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, p.2389: 1976 SCC (Cri) 546: (1976) 4 SCC 190; Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, (2004) 8 SCC 387,p.401: AIR 2004 SC 4179].

13.

In the words of Shah, J: "It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature";[ New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207, p.1213:1963 Supp(2) SCR 459; see further Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871;(1965) 1 SCR 7; Deputy Custodian v. Official Receiver, AIR 1965 SC 951, pp.956,957:1965 (1) SCR 220......]

14.

According to me, after meticulous and careful reading of the two Clause (ix)(a) and (ix)(b) of the agreement, the entire clause should not be considered in isolation. It should be read and considered in conjunction with other. The Clause has started with the language that if it is not possible for the Government to appoint a trainee within a period of six months, then, in that event the trainee shall be at liberty to seek appointment elsewhere and he/she would be relieved from the obligation of the bond executed herein. So, on reading, two components are emanated in the said Clause. Firstly, the Government is under obligation to appoint a trainee doctor who successfully completed his/her internship period within a period of six months and if the Government fails to provide such appointment in that case, such trainee would be at liberty to seek appointment elsewhere. Secondly, if he/she finds any job elsewhere, then, in that event, such trainee would be relieved from the obligation of the bond executed by him/her.

15.

In the case in hand, it is not the case of the petitioner that due to failure of the State-respondents she had sought for appointment under any authority other than the State-respondents, and for that reason, she should be relieved of her obligation to execute any bond in favour of the State-respondents.

16.

Here, the petitioner had accepted offer of appointment and joined the Health Services under the State-respondents. After expiry of period of one year she resigned from her service due to marriage elsewhere. In my opinion, Clause 3(ix)(b) is clearly applicable to the petitioner and she has to pay her bonded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- for her failure to serve the State-respondents for period of 5 years.

17.

Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the Court should go by the literal meaning of a provision and it should not interpret otherwise. There is no doubt that it is the bounden duty of the Court to act upon the literal meaning of a statute first and the Court should not add, alter or mend anything which are not in the provision itself. It is also equally true that when question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision, then, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context.

18.

In this context, LORD HULSBURY had observed- "that you must look at the whole instrument inasmuch as there may be inaccuracy and inconsistency; you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it be possible to do so, to the intention of the framer of it". Further, LORD DAVEY said- "Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter". "It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute", laid down LORD COKE "to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best ex-presseth the meaning of the makers" [Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, AIR 1978 SC 995, p.1000: 1978 (2) SCC 144: Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court,(1985) 3 SCC 103, p.112: AIR 1985 SC 1034].

19.

Keeping in view of the aforesaid propositions, in my opinion, all the provisions of the said agreement/bond are to be read harmoniously, and therefore, one part i.e. later part of clause 3(ix)(b) that "he would be relieved from the obligation of the bond executed herein" should not be read in isolation of the preceding part of the same clause which stipulates that "if it is not possible on the part of the Government to provide any offer of appointment to the trainee(bounden) within the period of 6(six) months to serve under the Govt. of Tripura, in that event the trainee(bounden) shall be at liberty to seek appointment elsewhere". The phraseology as quoted above has been joined together with the word 'AND'.

20.

As I said earlier that the two parts as surfaced in the phraseology of Clause 3(ix)(b) cannot be read in isolation to another since the two expressions are conjuncted with the word "AND". Since the word "AND" is normally conjunctive in nature, and in the context of the instant case, according to me, the later expression is concomitant to the former expression which after reading together give the impression which is more meaningful commensurate to meet the purpose requiring a candidate to execute the bond as envisaged in the whole scheme of the agreement.

21.

On bare perusal of Clause 3(ix)(b), in my opinion, is clear and unambiguous that in the event of failure of the State Government to provide appointment in favour of any trainee, such trainee would be at liberty to seek appointment elsewhere and in that case he/she would be relieved from his/her obligation. That apart, this Court is also under the obligation to take into account the object of the scheme/ statute. The State Government has invoked this Clause only with an intention to ensure that a doctor who studied the MBBS course being sponsored by the Government has to serve the people of the State of Tripura for period of five years, at least. If the contention of Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel is accepted by this Court, then, it would frustrate the object of taking bond from sponsored student by way of executing an agreement.

22.

For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit to the challenge of the impugned memorandum dated 31.03.2016 wherein the petitioner was asked to pay Rs.5,00,000/- along with interest and the memorandum dated 14.06.2016, whereby rejection of her prayer of exemption from paying bonded money, stand legally good and valid.

23.

In the result, the instant writ petition is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.