Pushpa Kumari vs State of Jharkhand And Ors

The present writ petition is taken up today through Video conferencing.

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the seizure list dated 06th June, 2020 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) whereby a passenger bus bearing registration no.BR-31 PA-9765 has been seized by the Deputy Transport Commissioner-cum-Secretary, South Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority, Ranchi (respondent no.2) under the Ormanjhi Police Station alleging that the bus in question was being plied without valid documents. Further prayer has been made for quashing the letter no. 127/R.T.A. dated 19th June, 2020 by which the petitioner has been directed to pay the penalty of Rs.4,66,257/- under Sections 177, 179 and 192(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short "the Act, 1988") and under Sections 5/7/8/9/21/22/23/24/25/28(I) of the Jharkhand Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 2001.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner's bus bearing registration No.BR 31 PA-9765 was issued permanent permit by the State Transport Authority, Bihar at Patna for the route from Gopalganj to Jamshedpur being Permit No.38 of 2018 which was valid up to five years with effect from 26th March, 2018. The State Transport Authority, Jharkhand also countersigned on the said permit vide Countersignature Slip No.02 of 2019. Due to the spread of Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, the whole country was under lockdown and when the lockdown was lifted and gradually different services were permitted to be opened, the bus service was also started to cater those migrant labourer and other destitute people who got stranded during the lockdown period.

The bus of the petitioner was engaged in the said noble cause which was seized under Ormanjhi police station on 06th June, 2020 on the highway by the respondent no.2 with an allegation that it was not having valid documents. It is further submitted that the demand raised by the respondent no. 2 is not sustainable in law as per the Gazette Notification dated 21st May, 2020 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India considering the difficulties faced by the persons in depositing various fees or late fees, as mandated under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, due to lockdown situation in the wake of Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in the country. Thus, it was ordered that all the documents which were expiring on or after 01st February, 2020 would remain valid till 31st July, 2020. In view of the said fact, the question of seizure of the petitioner's vehicle on 06th June, 2020 by imposing heavy fine is unwarranted and beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent no.2. It is also submitted that the seized commercial vehicle of the petitioner lying in premises of Ormanjhi Police Station, Ranchi is getting damaged due to rain and heat. The said vehicle has been seized without taking care of the guidelines framed by the authorities and arbitrarily imposing penalty, as such the petitioner's seized vehicle may be released forthwith waiving undue penalty to prevent misuse of administrative power. It is further submitted that the penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner without giving any detailed break-up, so as to justify the same per law. Moreover, all the documents of the seized vehicle were valid except update road tax, which the petitioner is ready to pay.

Mr. Rahul Saboo, learned S.C. I appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that although the permit for the said bus was countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Jharkhand, Ranchi vide Countersignature Slip no.02 of 2019 but due to the outbreak of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, strict measures were taken by the State Government and several guidelines were issued in this regard to prevent further spread of the pandemic. In this pretext the Transport Department, Government of Jharkhand vide order dated 21st March, 2020 suspended all the operations of Inter State/National Permit buses originating from the State of Jharkhand as well as Inter State Buses originating from the neighbouring States with effect from 12:00 A.M.(midnight) of 22nd March, 2020. It is further submitted that the petitioner's bus was being plied on the road without any document and, as such, the same has rightly been seized and the fine has also been imposed under the various provisions of the Act, 1988. Admittedly, the Road Tax and Additional Tax token of the vehicle were valid only till 17th March, 2020 and the gazette notification issued on 21st May, 2020 does not cover road tax and, as such, the said notification is of no help to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the said vehicle has been kept in the premises of Ormanjhi Police Station, Ranchi as the same was seized within its territorial jurisdiction. No application for release of the said seized vehicle has been filed by the petitioner before the concerned court, rather, the petitioner has directly invoked the writ jurisdiction and hence, the present writ petition is not maintainable. The vehicle of the petitioner has been seized in accordance with law and a case has been lodged under various provisions of the Act, 1988. The prosecution report dated 19th June, 2020 has also been duly sent to the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi in accordance with law. Subsequently, a case has been registered in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi being Complaint Case No. 3477 of 2020. The petitioner has an alternative remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure for getting his vehicle released by making appropriate application.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner is seeking direction of this Court for release of bus bearing registration No. BR-31 PA 9765 which has been seized by the respondent no.2 alleging that the same was being plied without having valid papers. The petitioner has also challenged the penalty of Rs.4,66,257/- imposed by the respondent no.2 upon her vide letter no.127/R.T.A. dated 19th June, 2020.

Be that as it may. On bare perusal of the letter no.127/R.T.A. dated 19th June, 2020 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition), it would be evident that the respondent no.2 has not explained as to how he has arrived at the conclusion of imposing penalty upon the petitioner and under which provisions of law, except mentioning few provisions of the statute in the "subject" column. It is a four lines order/letter directing the petitioner to pay penalty of Rs.4,66,257/- without giving any detail of the same whatsoever.

In the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.

Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi- judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.

Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donough more Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi- judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity". (p. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice". (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p.548.)In Siemens Engineering Co. case this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process". This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India wherein it has been held: (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice."

In the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited and Another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision- makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.)

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process".

It may, thus, be construed that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision which would enable the appellate court as well as the court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to effectively exercise such appellate or supervisory power. Moreover, the recording of reasons would guarantee consideration by the authority; introduce clarity in the decisions; and minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. The rule of providing the reasons in support of an order would also serve the requirement of audi alteram partem which is a basic principle of natural justice.

In the present case, the impugned letter no. 127/R.T.A. dated 19th June, 2020 issued by the respondent no.2 is quite cryptic. In the said letter, no reason has been assigned as to why the penalty of Rs.4,66,257/- has been imposed upon the petitioner. The details of the said figure of penalty is also totally absent. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the said letter cannot be sustained in law and, as such, the same is hereby quashed. The matter is remanded back to the respondent no.2 to pass a fresh reasoned order after providing due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

It is further observed that the seized bus of the petitioner is a commercial vehicle which is lying in the open space at the Ormanjhi Police Station, Ranchi and is rapidly getting damaged due to rain and heat. In the case of General Insurance Council & Others Vs. State of A.P. & Others reported in (2010) 6 SCC 768, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is of no use to keep the seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period. It is for the Magistrate to pass appropriate order immediately by taking appropriate bond and guarantee as well as security for return of the said vehicles, if required at any point of time. This can be done pending hearing of applications for return of such vehicles.

Thus, in the meantime, if the petitioner furnishes Bank Guarantee of Rs.4,00,000/- before the respondent no. 2, the seized vehicle shall be released by the respondent no.2 in her favour forthwith which shall be subject to the outcome of the order as may be passed by the respondent no.2 on remand.

The present writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of with aforesaid observation and direction.