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Judgment
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-plaintiff assails the legality, propriety and correctness of a judgment and order dated 17th June 2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Vasai, in MCA No. 31 of 2025, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No.1-original defendant No.1 against an order dated 7th July 2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge in SCS No. 257 of 2022, thereby restraining the defendants from creating any third party rights or interest in the suit property, came to be allowed and the said order of temporary injunction was set aside.
The petitioner-plaintiff instituted the suit seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated 23rd November 2020, was not binding on the plaintiff and it be cancelled qua the share of the plaintiff in the suit property and the consequential relief of injunction.
The substance of the suit was that Rajo Patil was the original holder of the suit property. He had left behind two daughters; Chandraprabha and Laxmi, and three sons, Anant, Raghunath and Jagannath. The plaintiff and defendant Nos. 5 and 6 are the successor-in-interest of Chandraprabha. The plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 13 are thus the co-owners of the suit property. The plaintiff is entitled to 1/15th share therein.
Defendant No.2 has executed a sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of defendant No.1, on 23rd November 2020 purportedly on the basis of the power of attorney purportedly executed by the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 3 to 13 on 30th May 2008. The plaintiff claims the said power of attorney is false. It is neither registered nor sufficiently stamped. No consideration has been paid to the plaintiff. Therefore, said transaction of sale of the suit property by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is illegal and void and not binding on the plaintiff’s share in the suit property.
The plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction in the said suit. The learned Civil Judge was persuaded to allow the application finding that a prima facie case was made out and, in the event, injunction was not granted the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss.
Being aggrieved, defendant No.1 preferred an appeal before the District Court. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned District Judge was persuaded to allow the appeal holding inter alia that there was material to indicate that the plaintiff had received a sum of Rs.1,75,000/- from defendant No.1 and passed a receipt. Prima facie, there was no material to show that the said payment was not towards the consideration for the sale of the suit property. Finding that the plaintiff had not approached the Court with clean hands and the balance of convenience was in favour of defendant No.1, the leaned District Judge allowed the appeal.
Mr. Kaustubh Patil, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned District judge committed an error in interfering with a discretionary order passed by the trial Court. The learned District Judge did not keep in view the jurisdictional limits in the matter of interference with a discretionary order passed by the trial Court. By no stretch of imagination could it be said that the exercise of the discretion by the trial Court was perverse or against the settled principles of law.
Mr. Patil further submitted that as the power of attorney was not registered, defendant No.2 could not have executed the sale deed on the strength of such unregistered power of attorney, after more than 12 years of execution thereof. Even the intrinsic evidence of the said power of attorney shows that it is unreliable. In this backdrop, when the plaintiff has indisputably 1/15th share in the suit property, for preservation of the subject matter of the suit injunction was required to be granted to restrain the defendants from creating third party interest therein.
Mr. Thorat, the learned Counsel for respondent/defendant No.1, submitted that all the heirs of the late Rajo Patil have accepted the transaction of sale, except the plaintiff. Even the plaintiff had received the consideration. Subsequently, the plaintiff has turned around and instituted the suit, after defendant No.1 carried out substantial development over the suit property.
In these circumstances, the learned District Judge correctly exercised the discretion to set aside the order of blanket injunction, especially in the context of the alleged 1/15th share of the plaintiff in the suit property. Nonetheless, defendant No.1 is willing to deposit the amount of Rs.11,34,666/- at which the suit claim is valued to secure and safeguard the interest of the petitioner, submitted Mr. Thorat.
An additional affidavit in reply came to be placed on record to demonstrate the extent of development carried out over the suit property after obtaining the requisite permission from the planning authority. It is asserted therein that, the construction is underway, and ground plus six upper floors have been erected.
I have given careful consideration to the rival submissions canvassed across the bar. It is trite, an appeal against a discretionary order is an appeal on principle. The appellate Court is not expected to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court, unless the exercise of discretion is perverse or against the settled principles of law. Perversity and arbitrariness in the order of the Court of first instance may arise either by taking into account the factors which are not relevant for granting injunction or refusing to take into account a relevant factor while declining the injunction.
In the case at hand the fate of the suit would hinge upon the question whether the power of attorney purportedly executed by the plaintiff and her co-sharers in favour of defendant No.2 is legal and valid.
At this stage, even if the case of the plaintiff is construed rather generously and it is assumed that the sale deed executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 does not bind the share of the plaintiff in the suit property, a prima facie case can be said to have been made out. However, that is not sufficient to grant injunction of the nature that was granted by the trial Court.
It is well-recognized that, mere existence of a prima facie case is not by itself sufficient to grant injunction. Apart from the consideration as to whether refusal to grant injunction would result in, “irreparable injury”, the scale of “balance of convenience” must tilt in favour of the party seeking injunction. The balance of convenience is an important consideration even if there is serious question to be tried or prima facie case in support of grant of injunction.
A profitable reference in this context can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi Vs Harish Ambalal Choksi,1 wherein the following observations are made:
“34.The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See: Dalpat Kumar V Prahlad Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719: (AIR 1993 SC 276)).”
(emphasis supplied)
In the case at hand as noted above, at best, the plaintiff has 1/15th share in the suit property. None of the other co-sharers of the plaintiff seem to have questioned the sale of the suit property by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1, on the strength of the purported power of attorney executed by the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 3 to 13 in favour of defendant No.2. Moreover, after transfer of the suit property, defendant No.1 seems to have carried out substantial development. A real estate project is being developed at suit property. Substantial construction has been carried out. A blanket injunction to restrain defendant No.1 from creating third party interest in the suit property, in these circumstances, would cause grave injury not only to defendant No.1 but to the third parties who might have booked units in the said project developed by defendant No.1.
A useful reference in this context can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mandali Ranganna And Ors Vs T Ramachandra and Ors,2 wherein the Supreme Court declined to grant injunction where substantial construction was carried out. The Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 21, 22 and 26 as under:
“21 While considering an application for grant of injunction, the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz., existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties.
22.Grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. We are not however, oblivious of the fact that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence depending upon the nature thereof. The courts dealing with such matters must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties. For the said purpose, application of mind on the part of the courts is imperative. Contentions raised by the parties must be determined objectively. … … …
26.Rightly or wrongly constructions have come up. They cannot be directed to be demolished, at least at this stage. Respondent No. 7 is said to have spent three crores of rupees. If that be so, in our opinion, it would not be proper to stop further constructions.” (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, in the case of ECE Industries Ltd Vs S. P. Real Estate Developers Pvt Ltd and Anr,3 the Supreme Court declined to grant injunction where the balance of convenience lay against grant of injunction. The observations in paragraphs 19 and 20 read as under:
“19.Such being the state of affairs, i.e. substantial construction has been made on the suit property in respect of which crores of money have been invested by the defendants/respondents and since the defendants/respondents have already paid/deposited the amount payable in terms of the agreement, although belatedly, to the plaintiff/appellant, we do not think that the plaintiff-appellant will suffer any substantial injury if the construction work is not stopped by an order of injunction. It is well settled that when construction has been made on a land, which is of considerable magnitude, and when the plaintiff shall not face any substantial injury, if no order of injunction is granted because of payment/deposit of the entire amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under the Agreement, though belatedly, we are of the view that the Court will not, as a matter of course, pass an order of injunction against the other party restraining the other party from raising any construction on the suit property till the disposal of the suit. If ultimately, the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant is decreed, he can be compensated in damages or the defendants/respondents may be directed to pull down the construction and deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff/appellant when no equity can be claimed for such construction by the defendants/respondents. On the other hand, in our view, if at this stage, an order of injunction is granted against the defendants/respondents from proceeding with further construction in the suit property, it will undoubtedly destroy the constructions already made by the defendants/respondents and the defendants/respondents will suffer irreparable loss and injury for not allowing them to make construction on the suit property. That apart, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, the entire amount payable by the defendants/respondents having been paid/deposited in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, there is no reason to pass an order of injunction against the defendants/respondents when the plaintiff/appellant would not face substantial injury for permitting the defendants/respondents to proceed with the construction in the suit property.
20.Accordingly, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, we are, therefore, of the view that the balance of convenience lies against granting an order of injunction, which, if granted, will substantially and irreparably injure and prejudice the defendants/respondents. For the reasons aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was fully justified in affirming the order of the trial Court refusing to grant any order of injunction in favour of the plaintiff/appellant.
If the facts of the case at hand are appraised through the aforesaid prism, this Court considers it appropriate not to interfere with the impugned order as, in the peculiar facts of the case, the balance of convenience firmly tilts in favour of defendant No.1. At the same time, this Court considers it appropriate to secure the interest of the plantiff by directing defendant No.1 to provide appropriate security so that the equities could be worked out at the final adjudication of the suit.
Hence, the following order:
: O R D E R :
The petition stands partly allowed.
The impugned order stands affirmed subject to the
following conditions:
The respondent/defendant No.1 shall deposit an amount of Rs.11,34,666/- before the trial Court, as undertaken, within a period of two weeks from the date of uploading of this order.
The respondent/defendant No.1 shall reserve a two BHK flat in the building being constructed on the suit plot and shall file an undertaking, on an affidavit, to that effect that the respondent/defendant No.1 will not sale, alienate or otherwise create any third party interest in the said flat.
In the undertaking to be furnished, the respondent/defendant No.1 shall furnish full particulars of the said two BHK flat to be reserved, like the flat number, floor, area etc.
The aforesaid amount and the said flat shall abide the final outcome of the suit.
The respondent/defendant No.1, however, shall not claim any equity on the basis of the aforesaid deposit of the amount and the earmarking of the flat, at the time of final adjudication of the suit.
Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
No costs.
