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Judgment
The present appeal is filed to impugn the order dated 29.04.2026 passed by the DRT-II, Chandigarh in S.A. bearing NDN No. 1147/2026 titled as Purnima v. DCB Bank Limited & others wherein, the delay of 4 days in filing the Securitization Application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act was not condoned and the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was not given to the appellant.
The appellant stated that the appellant approached the civil court by filing Civil a Suit No. CS/905/2026 on 10.04.2026, which was disposed of on 22.04.2026 with liberty to approach DRT.
The DRT after referring the judgement of Supreme Court The property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 (SC) 36 observed that the quasi-judicial authorities cannot condone delay in the absence of an express legislative provision and that limitation periods prescribed under special statutes are mandatory in nature. The relevant para 8 of the impugned order is reproduced as under:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Property Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 (SC) 36, has authoritatively held that quasi-judicial authorities cannot condone delay in absence of an express legislative provision, and that limitation periods prescribed under special statutes are mandatory in nature. It was further held that the Limitation Act does not apply to such bodies unless expressly incorporated, and any condonation of delay in absence of such provision would be without jurisdiction.
Sh. Puru Gupta, Advocate for the appellant argued that in fact there was no delay in filing the Securitization Application as the appellant was prosecuting remedies before the civil court diligently and in good faith and as such entitled for Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Sh. Puru Gupta, Advocate further argued that the DRT has not rightly appreciated the law laid down in The property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda as cited herein above and in particular referred para no.160 (v) of the said judgment.
The perusal of 160 (v) of this judgement reflects that the Supreme Court has observed that “the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 could be applied to the provisions relating to quasi-judicial in the express of express bar and there is a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 respectively.”
Accordingly, in view of the observation of the Supreme Court in The Property Company (P) Limited V. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, the impugned order dated 29.04.2026 is set aside and the case is remanded back to the DRT-II, Chandigarh for fresh consideration of application bearing I.A. No. 522/2026 for determination to the extent that whether the appellant is entitled for benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in excluding period taken in prosecuting in Civil Suit bearing No. CS/905/2026 before the Civil Court, which was instituted on 10.04.2026 and disposed of on 22.04.2026.
The appellant is directed to appear before the DRT-II, Chandigarh on 15.06.2026 for further direction. The appeal stands disposed of.