Puran Singh vs Emperor

Agarwala, J.—The appellant Manzoor Elahi has been convicted of an offence under Sections 395/397, Penal Code, and sentenced to seven years'' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. The appellant Puran Singh has been sentenced to five years'' rigorous imprisonment for an offence u/s 395.

The facts are that about 11-30 p.m. on 13-12-1944, a military truck stopped opposite the shop of Panna Lal Modi (P.W. 2) in the town of Ranchi. Three men alighted from the track and entered the shop, one being armed with a revolver and another with a dagger. One of them snatched away from Panna Lal''s hand a sum of Rs. 3000 in currency notes. Another of them removed the shop''s cash box containing share-certificates, insurance-policies and money. The three men then got into the truck which drove off. On 16th of December, three days later, Manzoor Elahi made a statement to Sergeant Major Bradshaw (P.W. 1) who recorded it. Another statement was made by Puran Singh, and other statements by a number of other persons who were arrested in connection with this occurrence. On 18th a cash-box in a damaged condition was recovered from a trench latrine by coolies who had been sent to look for it by Sergeant Major Bradshaw. This box has been identified by Panna Lal as the cash box which was removed from his shop. He was in possession of the key which fitted the padlock on the box.

In connection with this occurrence eight persons were put on trial, of whom six have been acquitted for insufficiency of evidence establishing their presence at the occurrence. The conviction of the appellant, Manzoor Elahi rests on his identification by Panna Lal as the man who entered the shop armed with a revolver, on the statement which he made to Sergeant Major Bradshaw, and the discovery of the box by the Sergeant Major in consequence of that statement. So far as Puran Singh is concerned, no witness has identified him; his conviction rests on the statement which he made to the Sergeant Major and on the fact that it was he who took the Sergeant Major to the trench-latrine from which the box was recovered.

So far as the identification of Manzoor Elahi was concerned, it rests solely on the testimony of Panna Lal. Panna Lal''s son (P.W. 4) and his partner (P.W. 5) who was also in the shop at the time of the occurrence, failed to identify this appellant, and while Panna Lal himself says that it was this appellant who was armed with a revolver, the other two witnesses say that the man with the revolver was Kapildeo. The evidence of identification being discrepant it would not afford a safe basis for a conviction by itself. Further more, the statement made to Sergeant Major Bradshaw was a confession which must be excluded from consideration in view of the fact that the Sergeant Major was a member of the Military Police and, therefore, any confession made to him by an accused person while in custody is excluded by Section 25, Evidence Act.

Section 27, Evidence Act, however, renders admissible so much of a statement which would otherwise be excluded by Section 25 as leads to the discovery of a fact. Sergeant Major Bradshaw''s evidence is that in consequence of the statement which Manzoor Elahi made to him that the stolen box was in the latrine trench, he caused that trench to be searched and from it recovered the box. The extent to which the statement of Manzoor Elahi is rendered admissible by Section 27 has been discussed before us at great length and we have been referred to the numerous cases in the various High Courts which reveal the extent of divergence which exists with regard to the construction of this section of the Evidence Act. I do not propose to refer to all those cases. They have been thoroughly discussed in a Pull Bench decision of the Madras High Court in 1937 in Athappa Goundan and Others Vs. Emperor, . The controversy with regard to this section has usually turned on whether any part of a statement amounting to a direct admission of the accused''s guilt is admissible or whether only such part of the statement of the accused is rendered admissible u/s 27 as leads to the discovery of a material object. It must be presumed that the object of the section is to admit evidence which is relevant to the matter under inquiry, namely, the guilt of the accused, and not to admit evidence which is not relevant to that matter. The discovery of a material object is of no relevancy to the question whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged against him unless it is connected with the offence. It is, therefore, the connection of the thing discovered which renders its discovery a relevant fact. It is true that the connection between the offence and the thing discovered may be established by evidence other than the statement leading to the discovery, but that does not appear to be a reason for excluding proof of the connection by the statement itself. The view expressed by the learned Chief Justice of Madras (at p. 628 of the case which I have just referred) sums up the two points of view:

The fact deposed to and the fact discovered obviously must be relevant and the fact or thing discovered can only be relevant if it is connected with the offence of which the accused is charged; and the confession in the section is a confession of the offence charged and not of anything else. Before the statement is given in evidence it must be shown that the fact discovered is a relevant fact and that the object is a material object. In cases where the things discovered as a result of the accused''s information are proved to be property stolen from a person and the subject of the charge or worn by the victim of a murder, just before the murder is committed, the property so discovered is directly connected with the crime and the fact thereby discovered relevant. It can be made relevant by evidence aliunde, and it can be made relevant by the statement of the accused itself. Suppose there is no evidence aliunde, what warrant is there for saying that the part of the statement of the accused that makes it relevant must be excluded because it amounts to a confession? Is there any warrant for garbling the statement in order to make it innocuous to the accused and in the process causing it to be irrelevant and consequently inadmissible in evidence.

In that passage the learned Chief Justice, in my view, shows conclusively how the whole object of Section 27, Evidence Act is frustrated if the statement made by the accused is so cut down as to exclude any part of it which connects the object discovered with the crime and the accused with the commission of the crime. The view expressed by the learned Chief Justice of Madras is in accord with the decision of this Court in Lalji Dusadh Vs. Emperor, . The material facts of that case were that in answer to the investigating Police Officer the accused stated that he had thrown the weapon with which he assaulted the deceased at a certain place. The weapon was discovered as the result of that disclosure. It was held that the statement consisting of the assertion that the weapon had been thrown at a particular place and that it was the weapon with which the offence was committed, was admissible u/s 27.

The statement of the accused with which we are concerned in the present case is not merely a statement that a cash-box had been thrown into the latrine-trench but that the cash-box so thrown was the box which had been removed from Panna Lal''s shop by the persons who entered it on the night of 13th December. A mere statement that some kind of a cash-box had been thrown into the latrine would have been irrelevant to the only question which arose in this case, namely, whether the appellant participated in the crime which took place on the night of 13th December. It is only if the cash-box found as a result of the accused''s statement is the box that was removed from the shop, that its discovery was at all relevant to the question of the appellant''s guilt. The statement of the accused, therefore, that the box thrown into the latrine was the-stolen box was admissible, and if it be true statement it affords a firm basis for an inference that the accused was present at the commission of the offence. The truth of this statement is established by the evidence of Panna Lal and his son Dayanand (P.W. 2) that the box was the one stolen. Prabhu Lal, who was also present that night and is a partner of Panna Lal, was unable to identify the box when it was produced before him. He explains this by saying that he does not usually live at Ranchi but at Lohardaga and that the box was in so damaged a condition that he could not be sure that it was the same cash box. The evidence of Panna Lal and his son must be accepted, however, especially in view of the fact that Panna Lal was in possession of the key which fitted the padlock on the box. It is true that neither the box nor the padlock was of so unique a type that similar boxes and locks are not obtainable, but it would be a strange coincidence if Panna Lal should have been in possession of precisely the kind of box and key which someone else had thrown into the latrine soon after Panna Lal''s box had been stolen. I am satisfied on the evidence that Manzoor Elahi was one of the three men who entered the shop, although owing to the discrepancy between the evidence of Panna Lal and the other two witnesses there may be room for doubt as to whether he was the man who was armed with a revolver.

The evidence of the three witnesses and the fact that the stolen box was recovered in consequence of the statement made by Manzoor Elahi, do not suffice to establish that there, were five persons participating in the occurrence at Panna Lal''s house on the night in question. The witnesses speak only of three men entering the shop and of the truck being driven off by a fourth man after the three men had left the shop and got into the truck. On that evidence, therefore, only four persons are proved to have participated in the crime. So much of the statement of Manzoor Elahi as does not relate to the discovery of the box not being admissible in evidence, there is no material on the record by which the presence of more than four participants in the occurrence has been proved.

Although it was Manzoor Elahi who informed Sergeant Major Bradshaw that the stolen box had been thrown into the latrine and this was the first step in causing the Sergeant Major to search the latrine, he was actually taken to the latrine by Puran Singh after the latter had made the statement that he had thrown the stolen box into the latrine-trench. The discovery of the box was, therefore, attributable also to the statement which this appellant made to the Sergeant Major, and that part which led to the Sergeant Major''s discovery of the box is no less admissible as against him as the statement by Manzoor Elahi is against the latter.

The offence disclosed by the evidence to which I have referred, however, as I have pointed out, does not prove the presence of more than four persons. The charge of dacoity, therefore, has not been proved; but the evidence does prove that the offence committed was robbery. The witnesses say that the man armed with revolver threatened them and it was as a result of that threat that nothing was done to prevent the commission of the crime. The convictions must, therefore, be altered into convictions u/s 392, Penal Code; but I see no reason for interfering with the sentences which are not excessive in the circumstances of the case. Subject to this alteration in the convictions the appeals will be dismissed.

Bennett, J.

I agree. I should like to add my own reasons and opinion as to the extent to which the respective statements of the accused are admissible in evidence u/s 27, Evidence Act. The material wording of that section for this purpose is:

Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received...so much of such information...as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved.

Before a fact may be deposed to, it must be relevant, and so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered must, therefore, as it seems to me, relate to the discovery of a relevant fact. The relevant fact here was not that any cash-box was discovered in the latrine as a result of the information given by the accused, but that the cash-box stolen from the house of the complainant had been so discovered. This seems to me to be the application of the ordinary meaning of the words used in Section 27, Evidence Act; and I agree with the observations of Horwill J. in the Madras case, referred to by my learned brother, where he refers to the judgment of Lort-Williams J. in Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer AIR 1928 P.C. 2 where Lort-Williams J. said:

If their natural meaning were given to the words of Section 27.... I am satisfied that the result would be contrary to the intention of the Legislature. It would be so wide as to render Section 26 practically useless.... If therefore so much of the information as is clearly connected with, or has reference to the fact thereby discovered, is admissible u/s 27, it is difficult to see where the line can be drawn.

and as to that part of the judgment of Lort-Williams J., Horwill J. said:

In other words he was of the opinion that when a confession to the police which would be inadmissible u/s 26 leads to the discovery of property, the whole confession may be admissible if the natural interpretation of Section 27 were adopted. That is exactly our view. It is the attempt to interpret Section 27 in the light of the existing English law that has led a great many Courts to give an interpretation to that section which is not warranted by the words used.

It must be borne in mind that, apart from Section 27, Evidence Act, it is always open to the prosecution to prove the fact of a discovery and the fact that such discovery was made consequent upon information supplied by a certain person. If the restricted interpretation of Section 27 is to be followed, therefore, little or no purpose would be served by Section 27, the provisions of which would be rendered largely, if not wholly, nugatory.

Applying these observations to the statements leading to the discovery made in this case, I am of opinion that the following parts of the statement made by Manzoor Elahi are admissible in evidence:

On Wednesday the 13th of December, 1944, at about 11 P.M. we drove to a cloth-shop in the bazar main-road and stopped the truck in front of the shop.... Saidgul picked up a cash-box.... We went back to the camp. One Sikh driver and Prem Lal took the cash-box and papers and dropped them into a deep latrine-trench which I can show you....

If the restrictive interpretation of Section 27 were applied to that statement, all that would be permitted in evidence would be the fact that the appellant Manzoor Elahi had stated that the box and papers Lad been dropped into a deep latrine-trench which he could show to the police, but that statement would add nothing to the facts which were, in any event, admissible in evidence, namely, that the cash-box was, in fact, recovered from that deep latrine-trench, and that it was so discovered as a result of information given by Manzoor Elahi.

Similarly, in regard to the statement made by appellant Puran Singh, I think the admissible portion of that statement reads as follows:

About 18 hours on Wednesday the 13th December, 1944, I...spoke with Havildar Manzoor Elahi and I went with him...to Ranchi. After a little time we took the truck to a shop in the main road.... I remained in the truck...soon a man came with a box which he put into the truck and we drove off back to the camp.... X went into a tent and Havildar Manzoor carried the box into the tent and opened the box. Manzoor gave me the box which had some papers in it and told me to throw it down the latrine. I went to the latrine, a short way off and threw it down the hole.

Again, if the restrictive interpretation of Section 27 is to be applied to that statement, all that would be admitted is the statement, "I went to the latrine, a short way off, and threw the cash-box down the hole", but that statement, again, would add nothing to the facts already admissible in evidence, namely, that the cash-box was, in fact, discovered from the latrine, and was so discovered as a consequence of information given by Puran Singh.

Section 27 should be read so as to make it effective, if it can be so read and not in any restricted sense, and when so read, it seems to me, to bear its natural and ordinary meaning.

I, therefore, agree that the appeals be dismissed.