Puppys Tours And Travels LLP vs Union Of India & Anr.

Details of prima-facie case for investigation of offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2003

- As per the FIR No. 215/2022 dated 24.10.2022 registered at Davanagere Extention Police Station, Davanagere District, the complainant was persuaded by the accused to downloaded cricket betting application i.e., satexb.com/m/sport/4/c/3/ and satexb.com/m/login and obtained his login credentials along with Rs.1 Lakh to bet on his behalf. They insisted the complainant to play betting game, whenever the cricket match is being fixed by using user's name and password and by logging to the said application. In this way, the complainant had lost around Rs.3 Lakh rupees in cricket betting by giving the said amount to the accused.

- As per the FIR No. 435/2016 dated 29.10.2016 registered at Challakere Police Station, Chitradurga District, the accused were cheating the innocent public by betting money on the India-New Zealand international cricket tournament on the 5th cross of S.R. Road, Challakere Town, Gandhinagar, in front of Mallikarjuna Medical Shop. Accordingly, the police raided the spot and arrested the accused.

As per the FIR No. 60/2015 dated 06.03.2015 registered at Challakere Police Station, Chitradurga District, the accused in the house rented by Mr. K C Thippeswamy, contacted the public online and took money from the public as a stake for cricket betting and gambling and cheated the public by playing lucky gambling of winning and losing. Upon gathering the information of betting, the police raided the cricket betting and gambling racket and arrested 09 accused. Later, the accused informed the police that they were conducting cricket betting and gambling on instructions of Mr. K.C. Virendra @ Pappy. The accused confessed to the police that they bet money on which team will win or lose in a cricket game, and which team will score how many runs in the stipulated 50 overs, and how many runs will be scored in the first 10, 15, 20, 25 and the next 50 overs. The accused were using the mobile phones, laptops, TVs to contact the public. As per the FIR No. 0064/2011 dated 02.03.2011 registered at Challakere Police Station, Chitradurga District, the accused persons K.C. Veerendra and Nagaraja were watching the live broadcast of the World Cup Cricket match between England

3.

Source from which information/material received: (As per new FIR/Complaint):

a)

FIR No. 1592/2024 dated 19.03.2024 registered by Cyber Crimes PS, Cyberabad, Telangana

b)

FIR No. 218/2022 dated 06.07.2022 registered by Harshalli PS, Bengaluru South

4.

Place(s) of occurrence of scheduled offence: (As per new FIR/Complaint): Cyberabad, Telangana and Karnataka

5.

Name and Address of person(s)/suspected persons with full particulars: (Attach separate sheet, if necessary)

a. FONEPAISA gateway, INDIA24bet.com and KING567.com

b. Fonepaisa Payment Solution Private Limited

c. Ram Pahwa Director of Fonepaisa Payment Solution Private Limited

d. Karan Singh Fonepaisa Payment Solution Private Limited

e. Ritesh Kumar Fonepaisa Payment Solution Private Limited

f. Betin Exchange company

g. Feb Fashionz company

h. Light Speed Webso company

i.

Other individual(s)/entity(ies)

6.

Details of property suspected to be Proceeds of Crime: (Attached separate sheet, if necessary)

(c)

Movable- Rs.11,50,000/-

(d)

Inmovable- Yet to be ascertained

7.

Material relating to commission of offence and assessment of proceeds of crime (Attached separate sheet, if necessary). (As per new FIR/Complaint):

a)

FIR No. 1592/2024 dated 19.03.2024 registered by Cyber Crimes PS, Cyberabad, Telangana

b)

FIR No. 218/2022 dated 06.07.2022 registered by Harshalli PS, Bengaluru South

•

As per the FIR No. 1592/2024 dated 19.03.2024 registered by Cyber Crimes PS, Cyberabad, Telangana, the complainant Mr. Motapalli Damodar Naveen Kumar, transferred around Rs.11,50,000/- in different intervals from his ICICI bank account to FONEPAISA merchant for online gaming at INDIA24bet.com and KING567.com. He mentioned that he won few games and money was shown in his account in virtual, but when he requested for withdrawal, they have blocked him and didn't process his withdrawal requests. Further he realised that it is fraud and that he lost amount to FONEPAISA gateway, INDIA24bet.com and KING567.com sites.

“17. Search and seizure.—

(1)

XXX

(2)

XXX

(3)

XXX

(4)

The authority seizing any record or property under sub-section (1) or freezing any record or property under sub-section (1A) shall, within a period of thirty days from such seizure or freezing, as the case may be, file an application, requesting for retention of such record or property seized under sub-section (1) or for continuation of the order of freezing served under sub-section (1A), before the Adjudicating Authority.”

“33.

Having heard learned Counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the records, we note that the Appellants have already invoked their statutory remedy before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of the PMLA, which remains pending.

34.

It is important to note that the PMLA provides a comprehensive and self-contained adjudicatory mechanism. Section 5 enables Provisional Attachment, Section 8 contemplates confirmation by the Adjudicating Authority, and Section 26 provides an appellate remedy before the Appellate Tribunal. The appellants, in the present case, have already invoked their statutory remedy of Appeal, which remains pending.

35.

This Court has consistently held that constitutional or appellate jurisdiction should ordinarily not be exercised where an efficacious alternate remedy is available and is actively being pursued. Reference may be made to Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Limited⁷, which cautions against bypassing statutory forums except in cases of patent illegality or jurisdictional error.

36.

We further note that it is undisputed that the ECIR registered by the ED does not name the appellants as accused persons. The charge-sheet filed by the CBI under RC 18(A)/2011/CBI/ACB/BLR also does not array them as accused, having dropped them in the supplementary report after finding no material to proceed. The complaint filed by the ED is predicated not on any independent act of laundering but on the allegation that the appellants withdrew certain sums from the attached bank accounts in violation of the PAOs, thereby frustrating the recovery of INR 33.80 Crore, alleged to be “proceeds of crime.”

37.

The core issue before us is not whether the appellants' entire banking operations are tainted, but whether the specific sum of INR 33,80,87,617/- (Thirty-Three Crore Eighty Lakh Eighty-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Seventeen Rupees), representing unpaid consideration for iron ore supplied by AMC, can be treated as “proceeds of crime” and whether its withdrawal post-PAO constitutes an offence under Section 3 PMLA. The apprehension that the entire account balance constitutes proceeds of crime is misplaced, particularly when the admitted position is that payments were made and received through regular banking channels and are duly reflected in the books of account.

38.

Viewed thus, the appropriate course would be to permit the statutory process to run its route to reach its logical conclusion. Interference at this stage would prejudge issues that are squarely within the domain of the Appellate Tribunal, including whether the attached property represents “proceeds of crime” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) PMLA and whether the withdrawals were in violation of law.”

“33.

The Provisional Attachment Order dated March 29, 2022 under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, challenged before the Learned Single Judge, stands confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated September 23, 2022 under Section 8(3). The respondents have availed statutory appellate remedies under Section 26 before the Appellate Tribunal (PMLA), New Delhi, where appeals (Nos. 5087/2022, 5088/2022, 5089/2022 and 5173/2022) remain pending adjudication.

34.

It is a settled principle of jurisprudence that Courts refrain from deciding academic or infructuous matters, particularly where a comprehensive statutory mechanism exists for redressal. In Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available unless exceptional circumstances warrant such interference.

35.

The PMLA provides such a complete adjudicatory hierarchy such as, provisional attachment under Section 5, confirmation under Section 8, appeal under section 26 and Special Court trial. None of the recognized exceptions such as futile remedy, jurisdictional defect or natural justice violation are attracted herein.

36.

This position is fortified under the PMLA regime by the Constitution Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), which upheld the Act's constitutional validity and cautioned that writ courts must exercise utmost restraint against interfering with provisional attachments, interim measures to secure proceeds of crime. ‘Reasons to believe’ requires prima facie satisfaction only, conclusive proof awaits statutory adjudication.

37.

The Adjudicating Authority's confirmation, despite awareness of writ pendency, underscores statutory primacy over premature writ intervention. Therefore, entertaining parallel writ proceedings post-adjudication would multiply litigation and frustrate public interest in protecting laundered assets. Exhaustion of statutory remedies remains the rule of judicial discipline.”

“8.

The principal question, which arises for consideration before this Court is:

“Whether the present writ petition challenging the PAO dated 13-3-2026 and the consequential proceedings initiated under the PMLA is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the complete statutory adjudicatory mechanism provided under the PMLA ?”

9.

At the outset, this Court finds considerable force in the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Directorate of Enforcement regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition.

10.

The PMLA has been enacted by the Parliament with an intent to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The said enactment categorically provides a complete adjudicatory mechanism in respect of an order of provisional attachment. Section 5(5) of the PMLA mandates filing of a complaint before the adjudicating authority, which, in terms of Section 8 of the PMLA, is empowered to examine the legality and validity of the provisional attachment after issuing notice to the affected person, considering his reply, affording him an opportunity of hearing and taking into consideration the material placed before it.

“2.

Definitions.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

(u)

“proceeds of crime” means any property derive or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where the such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

5. Attachment of property involved in money- laundering.-

(1)

Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that-

(a)

any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and

(b)

such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country:

Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in [first proviso], any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.]. (Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted.

(2)

The Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, shall, immediately after attachment under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the adjudicating authority, in a sealed envelope, in the manner as may be prescribed and such adjudicating authority shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed.

(3)

Every order of attachment made under sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section or on the date of an order made under ³[sub-section (3)] of Section 8, whichever is earlier

(4)

Nothing in this section shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from such enjoyment. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section “person interested”, in relation to any immovable property, includes all persons claiming or entitled to claim any interest in the property.

(5)

The Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any property under sub-section (1) shall, within a period of thirty days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the adjudicating authority

8.

Adjudication.-(1) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section (5) of Section 5, or applications made under sub-section (4) of Section 17 or under sub-section (10) of Section 18, if the adjudicating authority has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence under Section 3 or is in possession of proceeds of crime], he may serve a notice of not less than thirty days on such person calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property attached under sub-section (1) of Section 5, or, seized or frozen under Section 17 or Section 18, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties should not be declared to be the properties involved in money-laundering and confiscated by the Central Government : Provided that where a notice under this sub-section specifies any property as being held by a person on behalf of any other person, a copy of such notice shall also be served upon such other person:

Provided further that where such property is held jointly by more than one person, such notice shall be served to all persons holding such property.

(2)

The adjudicating authority shall, after—

(a)

considering the reply, if any, to the notice issued under sub-section (1);

(b)

hearing the aggrieved person and the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf, and

(c)

taking into account all relevant materials placed on record before him, by an order, record a finding whether all or any of the properties referred to in the notice issued under sub-section (1) are involved in money-laundering:

Provided that if the property is claimed by a person, other than a person to whom the notice had been issued, such person shall also be given an opportunity of being heard to prove that the property is not involved in money-laundering.

(3)

Where the adjudicating authority decides under sub-section (2) that any property is involved in money-laundering, he shall, by an order in writing, confirm the attachment of the property made under sub-section (1) of Section 5 or retention of property or record seized or frozen under Section 17 or Section 18 and record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property or record shall—

(a)

continue during investigation for a period not exceeding three hundred and sixty-five days or the pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under this Act before a court or under the corresponding law of any other country, before the competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India, as the case may be; and

(b)

become final after an order of confiscation is passed under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) of Section 8 or Section 58B or sub-section (2A) of Section 60 by the (Special Court).

Explanation.—For the purposes of computing the period of three hundred and sixty-five days under clause (a), the period during which the investigation is stayed by any court under any law for the time being in force shall be excluded.

(4)

Where the provisional order of attachment made under sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been confirmed under sub-section (3), the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf shall forthwith take the possession of the property attached under Section 5 or frozen under subsection (1A) of Section 17, in such manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that if it is not practicable to take possession of a property frozen under sub-section (1A) of Section 17, the order of confiscation shall have the same effect as if the property had been taken possession of.

(5)

Where on conclusion of a trial of an offence under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has been committed, it shall order that such property involved in the money-laundering or which has been used for commission of the offence of money-laundering shall stand confiscated to the Central Government.

(6)

Where on conclusion of a trial under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has not taken place or the property is not involved in money-laundering, it shall order release of such property to the person entitled to receive it.

(7)

Where the trial under this Act cannot be conducted by reason of the death of the accused or the accused being declared a proclaimed offender or for any other reason or having commenced but could not be concluded, the Special Court shall, on an application moved by the Director or a person claiming to be entitled to possession of a property in respect of which an order has been passed under sub-section (3) of Section 8, pass appropriate orders regarding confiscation or release of the property, as the case may be, involved in the offence of money-laundering after having regard to the material before it.

(8)

Where a property stands confiscated to the Central Government under sub-section (5), the Special Court, in such manner as may be prescribed, may also direct the Central Government to restore such confiscated property or part thereof of a claimant with a legitimate interest in the property, who may have suffered a quantifiable loss as a result of the offence of money laundering:

Provided that the Special Court shall not consider such claim unless it is satisfied that the claimant has acted in good faith and has suffered the loss despite having taken all reasonable precautions and is not involved in the offence of money laundering:

Provided further that the Special Court may, if it thinks fit, consider the claim of the claimant for the purposes of restoration of such properties during the trial of the case in such manner as may be prescribed.”

26.

Appeals to Appellate Tribunal.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3), the Director or any person aggrieved by an order made by the adjudicating authority under this Act, may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.

(2)

Any (reporting entity) aggrieved by any order of the Director made under sub-section (2) of Section 13, may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.

(3)

Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made by the adjudicating authority or Director is received and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may after giving an opportunity of being heard entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.

(4)

On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting aside the order appealed against.

(5)

The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned adjudicating authority or the Director, as the case may be.

(6)

The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of filing of the appeal.

42.

Appeal to High Court.—Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order:

Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “High Court” means—

(i)

The High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and

(ii)

Where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.”

14.

A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the PMLA would show that the Parliament has provided a complete adjudicatory mechanism against every provisional attachment order. The legality of the provisional attachment is required to be examined, in the first instance, by the adjudicating authority after affording full opportunity of hearing to the affected person. The order passed by the adjudicating authority is further amenable to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and thereafter before the jurisdictional High Court. Thus, the legislative scheme clearly indicates that questions relating to the legality, validity and correctness of a provisional attachment are intended to be adjudicated within the statutory framework itself.

15.

In the case of Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra), the Supreme Court held that where a statute provides an efficacious alternative remedy before a competent forum, the High Court should ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. In para 5, it has been held that:

“5.

This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show-cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the court. Further, when the court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is not accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection granted.”

“11.

A perusal of Section 5 of the Act makes it clear that the order passed under sub-Section 1 is a provisional measure and valid for maximum period of 180 days. The provisional attachment has to be approved by the adjudicating authority after proper adjudication within 180 days. The act envisages three layers of the grievance redressal in addition to safeguards incorporated in Section 5(1) of the Act. The adjudicating authority may confirm or set aside the provisional attachment order on the basis of material produced by the parties before it. If adjudicating authority confirms the order of provisional attachment, the Act envisages appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Section 42 of the Act provides further appeal to the High Court. Thus, it is clear that petitioner has an effective alternative remedy upto the High Court by way of adjudicating proceedings, appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and finally, appeal to the High Court. Petitioner can raise all the pleas including that of the jurisdiction before the adjudicating authority.

12.

It is trite law that Article 226 of the Constitution of India vests wide discretion in the writ court to entertain the writ petition on any grievance and to grant appropriate relief. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the writ court. The writ courts observe self-imposed restraint in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226. Availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain a writ petition. However, ordinarily, the writ petition is not entertained under Article 226 if the aggrieved person has an efficacious and effective remedy provided by concerned statute whereunder an adverse decision is taken against the person, which he seeks to assail in the writ petition. Notwithstanding, availability of alternative remedy in a case of exceptional nature or a case of glaring injustice, writ court can entertain a writ petition. However, that would not mean that writ jurisdiction can be exercised in every case, where alternative remedies are available to safeguard the interest of the aggrieved person. It is one thing to say that in exercise of power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, this High Court entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency or any public authority or order passed by quasi-judicial authority and it is altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”

“13.

In the case of Devas Multimedia Pvt. Ltd. v. The Joint Director, ED, Bangalore [decided on 4-10-2017 in WP No. 11544 of 2017], the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka has strengthened that the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, have a retrospective effect, as follows:—

“28.

In the instant case, as the adjudication process has not yet started and the matter is at the stage of show-cause notice and provisional attachment, it is not proper for this Court to express any opinion on this aspect of the matter. It is also evident from the show-cause notice that allegations of money-laundering are made in respect of transactions spanning over a period of time, even beyond the period when the amendment was brought about. This is evident from paras 9.40 and 9.46 of the show-cause notice.

29.

It is well established by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken, itself contains a mechanism for redressal of the grievance. This principle is well enunciated in the case of NIVEDITA SHARMA v. CELLULAR OPERATORS OF INDIA, (2011) 14 SCC 337 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case of SPECIAL DIRECTOR v. MOHD. GHULAM GHOUSE, (2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : (2004) 120 Comp Cas 467, has deprecated the practice of High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning the legality of the show-cause notices, thereby stalling enquiries retarding investigative process initiated to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties unless the petitioner established absolute want of jurisdiction of authority to even investigate into facts. It is observed in this context that writ petitions should not be entertained and the petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice.

30.

It is necessary to notice that at the stage of provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of PML Act, a person interested in the enjoyment of the suspect immovable property is not deprived of its enjoyment. Taking over possession of the attached property would arise upon confirmation of the provisional attachment. On an analysis of several provisions of the Act in particular Section 5, Section 8 and Section 26, it becomes clear that the legislative intent underlying the sequential provisions for provisional attachment, confirmation of such attachment and eventual confiscation or for retention of a seized property and also providing remedy of appeal to the appellate authority, is to balance public interest with the individual interest of the person against whom allegations are made and action is initiated. A mechanism is provided under the Act for redressal of the grievance at different stages that is to say before the adjudicating authority at 25 the first instance and latter before the Appellate Tribunal. It is only when a person is aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal that he may file an appeal to the High Court as per Section 42 of PML Act. When such is the mechanism provided for the effective redressal of the grievance within the four corners of the provisions of the PML Act, petitioner is not justified in rushing to this Court at the stage of show-cause notice and the provisional order of attachment. Therefore, it is not appropriate for this Court to enter into various contentions urged by petitioner.”

“26.

In the aforesaid circumstances of the case and availability of alternative statutory remedy of appeal, this Court is of the considered opinion that the challenge to the Provisional Attachment Order cannot be entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Act provides a complete and efficacious adjudicatory mechanism whereby the legality of the provisional attachment is required to be examined in the first instance by the adjudicating authority under Section 8, with further statutory appeals under Sections 26 and 42 of the Act. The petitioner has failed to establish any exceptional circumstance, such as patent lack of jurisdiction, breach of principles of natural justice or manifest arbitrariness, warranting interference by this Court at this stage. In view of the settled principle that where an efficacious statutory remedy is available, the High Court should ordinarily decline to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition and leaves it open to the petitioner to avail the remedies available under the PMLA-2002.”

ORDER