Punjabi University vs Bhim Singh

Mahavir Singh Chauhan, J.—Dr. Bhim Singh, the respondent herein, who had joined Punjabi University, Patiala, appellant herein, as a Lecturer on November 28, 1984 and was promoted as a Reader on July, 27, 1987, submitted his resignation which was accepted by the appellant with effect from October 29, 2000 as conveyed to him vide order dated November 21, 2000 (Annexure P1 annexed with writ petition). His request for grant of gratuity and leave encashment was, however, rejected by the appellant-University vide order dated February 21, 2001. He challenged that order and also to challenge order dated February 21, 2001 and seek a direction to the appellant-University to release his gratuity and leave encashment, by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 5398 of 2001. Appellant- University contested respondent''s claim on the plea that he was not entitled to the claimed relief under Regulation 2.14 of the University Calendar (for short, ''the Regulation'') in so far as he had not completed fifteen years continuous service and his resignation is not covered by the 4term "retirement". Learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed the Civil Writ Petition vide order dated October 25, 2013 holding the respondent entitled to gratuity as claimed by him. To assail order dated October 25, 2013 passed by the learned Single Judge, appellant-University has preferred this appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent, along with an application for condonation of delay. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants on merits.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that before the learned Single Judge it was argued that the respondent was not entitled to gratuity etc., firstly, because he had not completed fifteen years continuous service with the appellant-University (as required by Proviso to Regulation 2.14) as he remained on extra-ordinary leave from July 29,1998 to October 29, 2000 out of his service period from November 28, 1984 to October 29, 2000; and, secondly, because he resigned his job, and as per Regulation 2.14 gratuity etc. is permissible only on retirement or death. He argues that the Hon''ble Supreme Court in UCO Bank and Others Vs. Sanwar Mal, , has held that the term "retirement" does not include "resignation", but the learned Single Judge has dealt with only first part of the argument and no finding has been returned on the second point. Learned counsel, however, does not press the argument based on fifteen years continuous service and submits that the respondent having resigned his job, is not entitled to gratuity etc.

Nothing more has been urged.

From a perusal of the impugned order it emerges that the argument, which is being raised before us, was not raised before the learned Single Judge, and claim of the respondent was resisted only on the plea that he did not have to his credit fifteen years'' continuous service, which plea the learned Single Judge has turned down by observing as under:

"The reason for interpreting the Rule in their favour by the respondents is that on 29.7.1998, the petitioner proceeded on extraordinary leave and remained as such till 29.10.2000. This leave was without pay. In the year 2000, he resigned, which resignation was accepted.

The petitioner had joined the service on 28.11.1984. According to the respondents, the period from 1998 to 2000 has to be excluded.

I am not in agreement with the contentions raised by the respondents for the simple reason that the proviso would only state that no gratuity shall be given to an employee who has less than 15 years of continuous service. The petitioner, who proceeded on leave from 1998 to 2000, continued to be an employee of the respondents for all intents and purposes. It is the respondents who permitted such an extraordinary leave without pay to the petitioner but that does not imply that he would cease to be an employee of the respondents. The fact that the resignation was accepted by the respondents would also be an indicator of the relationship of an employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondents.

Finding no justification in the stand taken by the respondents, the petition is accepted. The petitioner is held entitled to the gratuity as claimed by him."

Be that as it may, appellants'' plea based on interpretation of the term "resignation" is also bound to fail. Regulation 2.14 relied upon by the appellants to decline respondent''s claim for gratuity etc. runs as under:

"14. As an addition to the benefits given under the statutes regarding the Provident Fund, the Vice Chancellor may, grant at the time of retirement to an employee, or after his death, to the person whose name has been registered under Clause (10) of this statute, for efficient and faithful service, a gratuity equal to l/4th (one fourth) of his pay which the employee was drawing at the time of retirement or death, in case he dies before retirement for each completed six monthly period of service.

A person, who after having served in other Universities in the Punjab State, including Panjab University, Chandigarh or in any Government Deptt./college in Punjab (including areas in Punjab at the time he joined this University), has joined this University shall also be allowed the benefit of previous service while calculating gratuity at this University at the time of retirement, superannuation or pre-mature retirement, as the case may be, provided that he had put in at least three years service in the parent department and opts to deposit in the Punjabi University Fund the amount of gratuity, if any, received for previous service.

However, where the Vice Chancellor is of the opinion that the gratuity should not be paid to an employee for certain reasons, the matter maybe referred to the Syndicate with full facts for its consideration and decision.

Provided further that no gratuity shall be given to an employee under 15 years'' continuous service and that no gratuity shall accrue for any year over 30 years service."

It is not disputed before us that it was permissible for the respondent, under the University Calendar, to put in his resignation after giving three months notice. It is also not in dispute that it was within the discretion of the appellant-University to accept or not to accept the resignation. It is also not in dispute that the notice of resignation was accepted by the appellant- University by relaxing the condition of three months notice. As noticed hereinbefore, the appellant-University does not dispute that the respondent had to his credit qualifying service of fifteen years when he put in his papers. Only dispute raised on behalf of the appellant-University is that the respondent having resigned his job cannot be considered to have retired from service. To support this contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon UCO Bank and others v. Sanwar Mal (supra). We, however, are of the view that appellants'' contention lacks substance and the cited judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.

Term "Retire" has been defined in American Heritage Dictionary as "to withdraw from one''s occupation, business, or office; stop working." According to Compact Oxford Dictionary it means to "Leave one''s job and cease to work especially because one has reached a particular age". Meaning assigned to the word "Retire" in The Chambers Dictionary (12th Edition) is "To withdraw; to retreat; to recede; to withdraw from society, office, public or active life, business profession etc." ''To resign'' means to voluntarily leave a job or office or say when an employee chooses to leave his office or job, he is said to have resigned. If the above mentioned two terms are read in juxtaposition to each other it comes out that ''to resign'' means to retire before reaching a particular age, viz., the age of superannuation or say to retire prematurely. Dr. Bhim Singh, the respondent herein, submitted his resignation after having acquired the qualifying service of fifteen years for the purpose of gratuity and his resignation, though, could be rejected, was accepted by the appellant- University on October 29, 2000, without any reservation. The circumstances indicate that respondent''s intention was to prematurely retire voluntarily from service and merely because he used the word "resignation", instead of premature retirement, benefit of gratuity cannot be denied to him.

No doubt in UCO Bank and others v. Sanwar Mal (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court had ruled that "retirement" and "resignation" have different connotations but, as afore-stated, these observations came in a set of facts and circumstances wholly different from the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. It would be of immense benefit to refer here to a very recent judgement of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sheelkumar Jain Vs. The New India Assurance Company Ltd. and Others, . In this case the petitioner was an employee of the New India Assurance Company Limited and after having completed 20 years of service, he gave a letter to the Management on 16.9.1991 saying that he would like to resign from his post and requested to treat the letter as three months'' notice and to relieve him from service. The letter was accepted by the Management and the petitioner was informed that his resignation had been accepted by the competent authority with effect from 16.12.1991, i.e., after the completion of three months'' notice period. After the introduction of the pension scheme, the petitioner therein made a request for sanction of pension and he had also exercised the requisite option. The respondent therein did not consider his request favourably and therefore, he approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court by filing a Writ Petition, wherein he sought a direction to respondents to pay him pension under the Scheme. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, which was confirmed by the Division Bench. As against that, the employee preferred an appeal before the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The Hon''ble Supreme Court considered several decisions including the decision in the case of UCO Bank and Others v. Sanwar Mal, (supra), and examined the words ''resignation'' and ''voluntary retirement''. Referring to the decision in the case of UCO Bank and Others v. Sanwar Mal, (supra), and in the case of Reserve Bank of India and Another Vs. Cecil Dennis Solomon and Another, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed that in those decisions, Court was not called upon to decide whether the termination of services of the employee was by way of resignation or voluntary retirement, whereas, in the case before the Supreme Court they were called upon to decide the issue whether the termination of the services of the appellant in 1991 amounted to resignation or voluntary retirement. Clause 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 in that case was to the effect that "Resignation or dismissal or removal or termination or compulsory retirement of an employee from the service of the Corporation or a Company shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and, consequently, shall not qualify for pensionary benefits" while such benefits were available in case of voluntary retirement under Clause 30 thereof. After considering the Scheme, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "10. The Pension Scheme, 1995 was framed and notified only in 1995 and yet the Pension Scheme, 1995 was made applicable also to employees who had left the services of the Respondent No. 1-Company before 1995. Clauses 22 and 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 quoted above were not in existence when the Appellant submitted his letter dated 16.09.1991 to the General Manager of Respondent No. 1- Company. Hence, when the Appellant served his letter dated 16.09.1991 to the General Manager of Respondent No. 1- Company, he had no knowledge of the difference between ''resignation '' under Clause 22 and ''voluntary retirement '' under Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995. Similarly, the Respondent No. Company employer had no knowledge of the difference between ''resignation'' and ''voluntary retirement '' under Clauses 22 and 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 respectively. Both the Appellant and the Respondent No. 1 have acted in accordance with the provisions of Sub-clause (1) of Clause 5 of the Scheme, 1976 at the time of determination of service of the Appellant in the year 1991. It is in this background that we have now to decide whether the determination of service of the Appellant under Sub-clause (1) of Clause 5 of the Scheme, 1976 amounts to resignation in terms of Clause 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 or amounts to voluntary retirement in terms of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995. Clause 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 states that resignation of an employee from the service of the Corporation or a Company shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does not define the term "resignation". Under Sub-clause (1) of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995, an employee, who has completed 20 years of qualifying service, may by giving notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority retire from service and under Sub-clause (2) of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995, the notice of voluntary retirement shall require acceptance by the appointing authority. Since ''voluntary retirement'' unlike ''resignation '' does not entail forfeiture of past services and instead qualifies for pension, an employee to whom Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 applies cannot be said to have ''resigned'' from service. In the facts of the present case, we find that the Appellant had completed 20 years qualifying service and had given notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority of his intention to leave service and the appointing authority had accepted notice of the Appellant and relieved him from service. Hence, Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 applied to the Appellant even though in his letter dated 16.09.1991 to the General Manager of Respondent No. 1-Company he had used the word ''resign''."

In view of the above, we are not inclined to accept appellants'' plea that the respondent is not entitled to gratuity etc. only because he used the word "resign" instead of "voluntary retirement" in his notice dated October 29, 2000, which was accepted by the 2nd appellant, by relaxing the requirement of three months'' notice period, vide order dated November 21, 2000. Thus, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the learned Single Judge.

Dismissed.