Punjab State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. vs Labour Court and Others

N.K. Sodhi, J.—Ram Bahadur, the second respondent (for short, "the workman"), was working as Chowkidar with the Punjab State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited (hereinafter called "the management") at its cement pipe plant at Singhpura. His services were terminated on account of serious misconduct alleged against him. The charges levelled against the workman were (i) that on February 27, 1985, he misbehaved with the Manager of the plant when he was in a drunken state and threatened to kill him. This incident was witnessed by two other employees, namely, Karam Singh and Mansha Singh; (ii) that he refused to receive memo No. 228 issued by the Manager, and (iii) that he got some safeda trees cut with the help of an outsider. A regular departmental enquiry was held against the workman, The Manager of the plant, Shri S. S. Cheema, appeared before the Enquiry Officer as a witness and made a statement on oath. He was cross-examined by the workman. It is stated that the incident had been witnessed by two other employees, namely, Karam Singh and Mansha Singh, and that they had made statements in writing to the Manager to the effect that the workman had misbehaved with him when the former was in a drunken state. Since both these employees were no longer in the employment of the management, the Manager tendered in evidence their written statements as had been made to him by them before the Enquiry Officer. After examining the evidence led by the parties, the Enquiry Officer found the first two charges against the workman were proved whereas the third charge was not proved. The report of the Enquiry Officer was accepted by the management and the workman was dismissed from service. This dismissal gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court, Patiala, for adjudication u/s 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The stand taken by the workman before the Labour Court was that the enquiry held against him was not fair and proper and on the basis of that enquiry, he could not be dismissed from service, the management, on the other hand, based its case on the enquiry proceedings the file of which was produced in evidence before the Labour Court. One of the issues framed was as to whether the enquiry conducted against the workman was fair and proper. After recording evidence of the parties, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the enquiry was not fair and proper as the statements of two witnesses were taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer who were not produced for cross- examination by the management and, therefore, the principles of natural justice stood violated. Since the management had not requested for an opportunity to lead evidence in regard to the merits of the misconduct alleged against the workman, the order of termination was set aside and the reference was decided in favour of the workman and against the management. The workman was directed to be reinstated with half back- wages. It is this award of the Labour Court that has been impugned by the management in the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.

I have heard counsel for the parties at length. The sole question to be determined in this case is whether a departmental enquiry stands vitiated merely because a statement of an ex-employee filed with the management is tendered in evidence and the same is taken note of by the Enquiry Officer without that employee being subjected to cross- examination. In my opinion, the answer to this question has to be in the negative. As observed earlier, the incident in which the workman is alleged to have misbehaved with the Manager of the plant when he was in a drunken condition is said to have been witnessed by two employees, namely, Karam Singh and Mansha Singh. These employees had stated in writing before the Manager that the workman had misbehaved in the manner alleged. The writings given by these two employees were tendered in evidence and not that they appeared as witnesses, Whatever be the evidentiary value of such statements, it was for the enquiry officer to evaluate such evidence and attach whatever weight he thought proper to it. He could have even ignored it. Similarly, the Labour Court too could have examined the same and evaluated it in exercise of its powers u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and it too could have ignored the same. But, merely because some evidence has been taken on record which has less probative value or has no such value is no ground to hold that the departmental enquiry itself stood vitiated. Mansha Singh and Karam Singh had not appeared as witnesses and the question of their being cross-examined did not, therefore, arise, It is by now well-settled that in a domestic enquiry strict rules of evidence do not apply and all materials which are logically probative are permissible. Even hearsay evidence can be taken note of provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility though the departmental authorities and Tribunals have to be careful in evaluating such evidence. A domestic Tribunal whose procedure is not regulated by a statute is free to adopt a procedure of its own so long as it conforms to the principles of natural justice. They can unlike courts obtain all information and material for the points under enquiry from all sources without being hampered by rules of procedure which govern Court proceedings. The only requirement is that whatever material they collect cannot be used by them unless it is put to the party against whom it is to be used. In the instant case, the statements tendered by the Manager before the Enquiry Officer and the Labour Court to decide the extent to which such evidence could be used and to attach to it whatever weight they thought was proper. The view that I am taking finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Another Vs. Rattan Singh, and again by a Full Bench judgment of this court in State of Haryana v. Ram Chander 1976 78 PLR 842 (FB). In the result, it has to be held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that the enquiry was contrary to the principles of natural justice merely because the statements of Karam Singh and Mansha Singh who had not appeared as witnesses were tendered in evidence. Since this was the only ground on which the Labour Court held that the enquiry was not fair and proper, its award has to be quashed.

Before concluding, I may refer to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the workman. It was stated that the Executive Committee of the petitioner-management had not taken a decision to file the present petition and, therefore, the same not having been properly instituted was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. It is not disputed that the Executive Committee is the competent authority under the by-laws to take such a decision and that in its meeting held on November 8, 1991, it authorised/ delegated to the Managing Director and the Additional Managing Director the power to sue and to be sued on behalf of the federation and further authorised the Law Officer in addition to some other officers to sign the Power of Attorney. In the present case, the Additional Managing Director took the decision to file the writ petition and the Power of Attorney and the writ petition have been signed by the Law Officer, The writ petition is, therefore, properly presented and the objection overruled,

It was then contended that since the writ petition was filed after 30 days from the date on which the impugned award was published, the same is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 17-A of the Act. There is no merit in this objection either. Section 17-A only deals with the commencement of an award and it cannot possibly restrict the powers of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of entertaining the petitions after 30 days of the publication of the award. In a given case if the petition is belated it can be dismissed on that ground but it cannot be said that merely because 30 days have expired from the date of publication of the award, this Court cannot entertain a petition thereafter.

Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned award set aside. The case will go back to the Labour Court with a direction that the reference be decided afresh on merits and in accordance with law. The parties through their Counsel have been directed to appearp2 before the Labour Court on March 6, 1995. There is no order as to costs.