Punam vs Divisional Commissioner, GNCT Of Delhi & Ors.

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, C.J.

Proceedings of this petition have been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 07.07.2022 passed by learned Divisional Commissioner in Appeal No. 320/2021/1249-1251, which was filed by the respondent no.2 against the order dated 10.02.2021 passed by the District Magistrate, rejecting the application made by the respondent no.2 under Rule 22(3)(1) of Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 [hereinafter referred to as the “2009 Rules”]. By the impugned order dated 07.07.2022, the appeal preferred by the respondent no.2 against the order of District Magistrate dated 10.02.2021has been allowed and the petitioner has been directed to vacate and handover peaceful possession of the subject property to the respondent no.2 with a further direction that the petitioner shall not create any hassles in the peaceful life of respondent no.2. The Divisional Commissioner/Appellate Authority has also directed that the District Magistrate and the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police [“DCP”] shall ensure compliance of the said order and also that they shall ensure that life and property of the respondent no.2 is secured and no harassment is caused to the respondent no.2.

Apart from challenging the order dated 07.07.2022 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, a prayer has also been made by the petitioner, seeking a declaration that Rule 22(3)(1)(i) and (iv) of the 2009 Rules are ultravires and violative of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner is the daughter-in-law of the respondent no.2 and is married to one Sh. Rakesh Kumar Malawliya, who is the son of respondent no.2, as per Hindu rites and customs, on 22.04.1996. Out of the said wedlock, two children were born who are 24 and 21 years of age respectively.

There appears to be some matrimonial discord between the petitioner and her husband, as a result of which, a complaint was filed by the petitioner on 13.08.2018 against her husband, Sh. Rakesh Kumar Malawliya and the respondent no.2, under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [hereinafter referred to as the “D.V. Act”] with certain prayers, including a prayer for passing a residence order under Section 19 of the D.V. Act restraining the respondent no.2 from dispossessing the petitioner from the shared household which she has been using in the property located at House No. 20, Ground Floor, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi. The proceedings of this application under the D.V. Act are stated to be pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class (Mahila Court), South, Saket Court, New Delhi.

On 23.10.2018, the respondent no.2 instituted proceedings seeking eviction of the petitioner from the shared household under Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules. In terms of the scheme of Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate [“SDM”] concerned conducted an inquiry and reported that, “on inquiry nothing could be established about any harassment being caused by the petitioner and further that this is a matter of mutual family dispute and conflict between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, therefore, no specific conclusion could be drawn on whether any harassment is being caused by the petitioner or not”.

The said application, thereafter, was disposed of by the District Magistrate, who, vide his order dated 10.02.2021, rejected the application moved by the respondent no.2 under Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules on consideration of certain material placed on record and also taking into account the report submitted by the SDM concerned.

The respondent no.2, feeling aggrieved, challenged the order dated 10.02.2021 passed by the District Magistrate in an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner filed by her under Rule 22(4) of 2009 Rules, which has been allowed by the Divisional Commissioner/Appellate Authority vide impugned order dated 07.07.2022, directing the petitioner to vacate the subject premises with a further direction to her not to create any hassles in the peaceful life of the respondent no.2. It is this order dated 07.07.2022 that has been challenged before us in the instant appeal.

The impugned order dated 07.07.2022 passed by the Divisional Commissioner has been challenged both on merits as also by asserting that the provisions contained Rule 22(3)(1)(i) & (iv) of 2009 Rules are ultra vires.

Ms. Meera Kaura Patel, learned counsel representing the petitioner while challenging the impugned rules has argued that the State Government, while framing the said rules, has exceeded its rule making power vested in it under Section 32 of the Maintenance And Welfare Of Parents And Senior Citizens Act, 2007 [hereinafter referred to as the “Senior Citizens Act”] by vesting a power of eviction that is not contemplated in the parent statute, which is primarily enacted for providing for maintenance and protection to senior citizens. Thus, the submission is that the impugned rules are ultra vires the Senior Citizens Act itself.

It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned rule is violative of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch that it acts against the interest of women and violates the protection available to them under the D.V. Act and therefore, it is unreasonable and violates even the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Referring to Section 17 of the D.V. Act, it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that every women under the said provision, in a domestic relationship, has been vested with the right to reside in the shared household, irrespective of the fact whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in such shared household. It has also been argued that Section 17 of the D.V. Act contains a non-obstante clause and accordingly, the right available to a woman under Section 17 of the D.V. Act is available to her irrespective of any other provision contained in any other law for the time being in force and therefore, the impugned rule clearly infringes her right to reside in a shared household emanating from Section 17 of the D.V. Act.

Our attention has been drawn to a Single Judge judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Simrat Randhawa v. State of Punjab & Ors. 2020 SCC OnLine P&H 4394, and it has been contended on the said basis by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned rule is not sustainable, as a similar provision contained in the Punjab Action Plan, 2004 was declared ultra vires by the said judgment. Clause 1, 2 and 3 of the Punjab Action Plan, 2004, which were considered in Simrat Randhawa (supra) are extracted herein below:

Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that in Simrat Randhawa (supra), it has been held by Punjab and Haryana High Court that the action plan introduced, arbitrarily, a concept foreign to the scheme in the Senior Citizens Act, i.e. eviction or ejectment and was therefore, declared as arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, harsh and unconstitutional and contrary to doctrine of rule of law and separation of powers as the basic feature of the Constitution of India.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to another judgment of learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Sudershan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2021 SCC OnLine P&H 4612. It has been stated in this regard that neither the Tribunal envisaged under the Senior Citizens Act nor the Appellate Authority have jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction and that the only power with the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority is to grant maintenance based on consideration of facts of the case and also to set aside the transfer of property in case senior citizen is able to prove that a fraud was played by the children while executing the transfer.

The submission, primarily on behalf of the petitioner challenging the impugned rule, is that proceedings of eviction under the 2009 Rules are not independent of the proceedings of D.V. Act which clearly vests a right in the women under Section 17 of the D.V. Act to reside in a shared household. It has also been the submission on behalf of the petitioner that what Senior Citizens Act provides for is the maintenance and welfare of the senior citizens and therefore, the impugned rule which provides for eviction is ultra vires the Act since the Act does not contemplate any proceedings for eviction. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Section 32 of the Senior Citizens Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and since no proceedings of eviction from a shared household is contained in the principal statute, any rule which provides for eviction would be beyond the Act itself. Thus, the impugned rule having been framed beyond the scope of the principal Act is illegal.

In this regard, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on (1) Hukam Chand v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 601, (2) Addl. Distt. Magistrate (Revenue) Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451and (3) Dr. Mahachand Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council & Ors., (2004)8 SCC 747, to submit that no delegated legislation can legally be permissible to be made which travels beyond the scope of the principal act itself. In other words, if the principal act does not contain any provision for providing a particular thing, then such a thing cannot be provided by way of delegated legislation.

In this regard, further submission has been made that rule making powers available to the State Government under Section 32 of the Senior Citizens Act read with Section 22(2) cannot be permitted to be used for providing something which the Act itself does not provide for and further that Section 22 and 32 are to be read in the context of the purpose for which Senior Citizens Act has been enacted, which does not provide for any express or even implied provision for instituting proceedings for eviction. It is also the submission on behalf of the petitioner that Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act provides that transfer of property can be declared to be void in case it is found that the transferee has refused or failed to provide amenities and physical needs to the senior citizens based on which the property was transferred by way of gift or otherwise and therefore, eviction can be ordered by the Tribunal created under the Senior Citizens Act only as a result of declaration of any transfer of property as void and not otherwise.

On the other hand, learned counsel representing the respondent no.2, Ms. Aakanksha Kaul has argued that so far as the validity of impugned Rules is concerned, the issue is no more res integra as Hon’ble Supreme Court in its latest judgment in Ravi Kant Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., rendered on 04.08.2026 in SLP (C) Diary No. 22768/2024, has held that in view of the constitutional mandate of Article 21 and 41 of Constitution of India, the Parliament has enacted the Senior Citizens Act, provisions of which incorporate the values deeply rooted in our country’s civilizational ethos which revere the mother and the father as divine and further that it is a well settled legal proposition that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it grants power of doing all such acts as are essential to its execution.

Submission is that though Ravi Kant Gupta (supra) had emanated from the State of Uttar Pradesh where no rule akin to the impugned rules existed, however, considering the object of Senior Citizens Act as also the provisions of D.V. Act, it has been held that the Tribunal created under the Senior Citizens Act will have the authority to order an eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure maintenance and protection of a senior citizen or a parent. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Ravi Kant Gupta (supra) are extracted herein below:

Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 on yet another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 669, where Hon’ble Supreme Court has concluded that though Senior Citizens Act does not specifically provides for eviction but on account of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, 2021 (15) SCC 730, the Tribunal may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens. Paragraph 31 of Samtola Devi (supra) reads as under:

Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 and 4, i.e. GNCT of Delhi and Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, has supported the submission made on behalf of the respondent no.2 by Ms. Kaul, whereas learned counsel for Union of India – respondent no. 5 has argued that the State Government does not have any authority or power available to it under the Senior Citizens Act to frame a rule which provides for eviction. The said submission is, however, based on the stand taken by the Union of India – respondent no. 5 in front of Punjab and Haryana High Court as recorded in the judgment of Simrat Randhawa (supra).

Before delving into the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties for and against the issue as to whether Rule 22 (3)(1)(i) and (iv) of the 2009 Rules are ultra vires, it may be apposite to discuss the scheme of the Maintenance And Welfare Of Parents And Senior Citizens Act, 2007. This Act has been enacted after the D.V. Act and aims at providing for more effective provisions for maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens and the matters connected therewith. Chapter II of the Senior Citizens Act provides for the maintenance of parents and senior citizens. Section 4, inter alia, makes it obligatory for the children or relative to maintain the senior citizen, which extends to the needs of such citizens so that senior citizens may lead a normal life. Section 4 of the Senior Citizens Act is extracted herein below:

Section 5 provides for a mechanism for seeking relief of maintenance, according to which an application for maintenance is to be made under Section 4 before the Tribunal, which in terms of Section 2(j) is to be constituted under Section 7 and is known as “Maintenance Tribunal”. Whereas, Chapter II of the Senior Citizens Act is in respect of maintenance of parents and senior citizens, Chapter V provides for the protection of life and property of senior citizens. Section 21 of the Act provides for the State Government to take certain measures for providing protection of life and property of senior citizens. Section 22 of the Act enables the State Government to confer such powers and impose such duties on a DM, as may be necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Act are properly carried out. It also permits the DM to specify a subordinate officer, who shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties conferred or imposed on him, and such powers and duties shall be carried out by the officers as may be prescribed. Sub-section 2 of Section 22 mandates that the State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of live and property of senior citizens. Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act is extracted herein below:

Thus, the scheme of Senior Citizens Act contains provisions for: (a) maintenance of parents and senior citizens (Chapter-II), and (b) protection of life and property of senior citizens (Chapter-V). It is also to be noticed that Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act contains a clause, according to which the provisions of this Act are to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with such provisions contained in any other enactment or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than the Senior Citizens Act. Thus, the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act by virtue of operation of Section 3 have the overriding effect.

We may also note at this juncture that Section 17 of the DV Act also contains a non-obstante clause. The issue of presence of non-obstante clause in Section 17 of DV Act and overriding effect clause in Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act drew attention of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha (supra), and though the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized the well-established principle that in the event of two special Acts containing non-obstante clauses, the later law shall typically prevail, however having regard to the fact that both these legislations are intended to deal with salutary aspects of public welfare and interest, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act to grant such remedies of maintenance which do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special enactments, such as the DV Act. Paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment in S. Vanitha (supra) are quoted herein below:

It is to be noticed that for the purposes of giving effect to the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, the 2009 Rules have been framed, which inter-alia provides for the procedure for eviction from the property/residential building of a senior citizen/parents. We have already noticed that Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act empowers the State Government to confer such powers and impose such duties on the DM as may be necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Act are properly carried out. Accordingly, the provisions contained in Rule 22 (3)(1) of the 2009 Rules, which provides for the procedure for eviction from the property/residential building of senior citizens/parents, are referable to Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act. Rule 22 (3)(1)of 2009 Rules is extracted herein below:

A perusal of the afore-quoted Rule 22 (3)(1) reveals that the said provision provides for making of an application by a senior citizen/parent before the DM for eviction of his son or daughter or legal heir from his property of any kind whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or intangible and include right or interest in such property, on the ground of his non-maintenance or ill-treatment. Thus, the application by senior citizen/parents can be moved under the said provision before the DM for eviction in case of non-maintenance and ill-treatment. What is significant to note here is that Rule 22 (3)(1)(i) of the 2009 Rules provides relief to a senior citizen/parents to mitigate his/her sufferings on account of non-maintenance and ill-treatment. In other words, if before the DM, a senior citizen/parents is able to establish that he/she is not being maintained or is being ill-treated, he/she may seek eviction of his son or daughter or legal heir from his property. Clause (ii) of Rule 22 (3)(1) of 2009 Rules requires the DM to forward the application received by him under Clause (i) to the concerned SDM for verification of the title of the property and the facts of the case, whereupon SDM is obligated to submit his report to the DM for final orders.

Rule 22 (3)(1)(iv) of 2009 Rules requires the DM to consider all the relevant facts of the Act and if he is of the opinion that any person is not maintaining the senior citizen or his parents and ill-treating him and yet is occupying the property of any kind and that he should be evicted, then he shall issue a notice calling upon the persons concerned to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be passed.

Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act provides that the State Government may confer powers and impose such duties on a District Magistrate as may be necessary to ensure that provisions of the said Act are property carried out. Sub-section 2 of Section 22 provides that the State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of life and property of the senior citizens. Accordingly, in our opinion, impugned Rule 22 (3)(1)(i) and (iv) of 2009 Rules are not only referable to the rule making power of the State Government available to it under Section 32 of the Senior Citizens Act but is also referable to Section 22 of the said Act. The State has, thus, empowered and imposed a duty on the District Magistrate under the impugned rules to evict the son or daughter or legal heir from his property on account of non-maintenance and ill-treatment of the senior citizens.

Sub-section 2 of Section 22 mandates the State Government to prescribe a comprehensive plan not only for providing protection of life but also protection of property of the senior citizens and for the purpose of achieving such an object, if Rule 22(3)(1) provides that an eviction order can be passed by the District Magistrate on an application made to him by a senior citizen in certain circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned rule cannot be said to be ultra vires the Senior Citizens Act. Sub-section 2 of Section 22 itself permits the State Government to prescribe a comprehensive plan which may be issued by a simple executive order or circular or in the form of rules such as the impugned Rules.

Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on two judgments of Punjab and Haryana High Court, namely Simrat Randhawa (supra) and Sudershan Kumar (supra) is of no avail to the petitioner as these judgements cannot be said to be good law any more in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kant Gupta (supra). Reference may also be had to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samtola Devi (supra) wherein it has been held that though Senior Citizens Act nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction but on account of observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha (supra), the Tribunals under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure protection of the senior citizens. Paragraph 31 of Samtola Devi (supra) has already been extracted in paragraph 20 of this judgment above.

We may also refer to yet another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, dated 30.01.2025 in the case of Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar, SLP (Civil) No. 7675/2024, which has reiterated that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act possesses the authority to order eviction to ensure maintenance and protection of the senior citizens. The observations made in paragraph 10 of Rajeswar Prasad Roy (supra) is based on the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha (supra), in paragraph 25 whereof the following principle of law applicable in the instant case has been laid down. Paragraph 10 of Rajeswar Prasad Roy (supra) is extracted as under:

We may refer to yet another judgment by Hon’ble Supreme in Kamalakant Mishra v. Collector, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2077 wherein paragraph 7, it has been held that since the framework of Senior Citizens Act clearly notes that it was enacted to address the plight of older persons and for their care and protection and the Act being a welfare legislation, its provision must be construed liberally so as to advance its beneficial purpose. Placing reliance on S. Vanitha (supra), Kamalakant Mishra (supra) holds that the Tribunal is well within its power to order eviction of a child or a relative of a senior citizen when there occurs a breach of obligation to maintain the senior citizen. Paragraph 7 of Kamalakant Mishra (supra) is extracted herein below:

So far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on (1) Hukam Chand (supra), (2) Siri Ram (supra) and (3) Dr. Mahachand Prasad Singh (supra) is concerned, there cannot be any dispute that no delegated legislation is permissible which travels beyond the scope of the principal act itself, however, in the instant case, power to make the provisions as contained in the impugned rules not only flows from Section 32 of the Senior Citizens Act but the said rules also owe their existence to Section 22(2) of the said Act. Accordingly, these judgments do not help the cause being sought to be espoused by the petitioner.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the challenge laid by the petitioner on the provisions of Rule 22 (3)(1)(i) and (iv) of the 2009 Rules fails, which is hereby rejected.

The main plank of argument of the petitioner on merits is that in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the D.V. Act, the petitioner has got a right to reside in the shared household irrespective of the fact whether she has or she does not have any right, title or beneficial interest in the subject property. It has been contended that since a residence application under Section 19 of the D.V. Act which was instituted by the petitioner is pending before the Court concerned, as such, without its disposing, the eviction could not have been passed. In this respect, we may refer to the findings recorded by the Divisional Commissioner who has categorically arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner already has a separate house at Bahadurgarh and further that she is working as a Post Graduate Teacher, and having a substantial income, she can easily live at her own residence.

The Divisional Commissioner while passing the impugned order dated 07.07.2022 has also recorded a finding that the respondent no.2 in her application had clearly stated that she wants to spend her remaining life peacefully and further that if there is matrimonial discord between the petitioner and her husband, it should not result in any harassment which drags the respondent no.2, who is a senior citizen, into frivolous litigations and complaints.

We may also refer to the provisions of Section 4(3) of the Senior Citizens Act, which provides that obligation of the children to maintain his/her parents extends to the needs of such parent either father or mother or both, so that such parent may lead a normal life. In the facts of the instant case, on account of marital discord between the petitioner and her husband if the respondent no.2 is not able to live normally and peacefully in the evening of her life, who is otherwise entitled to live peacefully and not haunted by the matrimonial discord between her son and daughter-in-law, in our opinion, the order of eviction of the petitioner has rightly been passed.

The relief granted to the respondent no.2 by the Appellate Court, i.e. the Divisional Commissioner, can be viewed from another point of view as well. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is employed as a Post Graduate Teacher and she is earning a decent salary. She is also having a separate house and therefore, her claim to reside in the shared household not being indefeasible has to be considered vis-à-vis right of the respondent no.2, who is a senior citizen to live a normal and peaceful life.

Another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules applies only to son, daughter and legal heirs, and not to the daughter-in-law, also merits rejections for the reason that in view of the law laid down by a division bench of this court in Shadab Khairi v. State, LPA No. 783/2017 decided on 22.02.2018, the said rule cannot be interpreted in restrictive manner. Shadab Khairi (supra) has dealt with the issue as to why the 2009 Rules should receive liberal interpretation. Paragraph 20 of this judgement is quoted hereunder:

In Darshna v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, LPA No. 537/2018 decided on 03.10.2018, a co-ordinate bench of this court has approved such view taken by the learned Single Judge in his order, against which, the said LPA was decided. The learned Single Judge in the said matter has held that the expression ‘son’ and ‘daughter’ and the legal heirs must take within its sweep the families of the daughter/son of a senior citizen, and further that the term ‘legal heirs’ must be understood in the broadest sense. The learned Single Judge order against which the LPA was filed has also held that indisputably a daughter-in-law is also an heir in certain circumstances; the said observation has been endorsed by the Division Bench in Darshna (supra). Paragraph 10 of Darshna (supra) is extracted herein below.

In paragraph 11, the Division Bench in Darshna (supra) endorses the conclusion drawn herein, and thus the submission that daughter-in-law will not be covered by the sweep of 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules is not tenable.

On behalf of the Petitioner, it has also been contended that for the grant of any relief to a senior citizen under the Senior Citizens Act, harassment, ill-treatment, and non-maintenance needs to be proved, and only the relief of maintenance can be granted and not that of eviction. The submission is that, there being no prayer for grant of maintenance and there being no proof of non-maintenance, the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act are not empowered to pass any order of eviction.

Such a submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner is non-tenable for the reason that an application for eviction can be filed under Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules irrespective of the fact whether maintenance is claimed or not. We base this conclusion on the reasoning that proceedings for eviction as contemplated in Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules are independent of the proceedings for maintenance for parents and senior citizens, which are filed before the Tribunal constituted under section 7, under the provision of section 4 read with section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, whereas, proceedings as contemplated under Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules are instituted before the District Magistrate, appellate authority of which is the Divisional Commissioner. Thus, the proceedings for maintenance under section 4 read with section 5 are independent of the proceedings of eviction which are to be instituted under Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules. Thus, these proceedings being independent of each other, even if a prayer for maintenance under section 4 read with section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act by instituting appropriate proceedings has not been made, an application under Rule 22(3)(1) of the 2009 Rules can be maintained. Accordingly, the submission made in this regard on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner does not appeal to us.

Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances and the records available, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Appellate Authority, i.e. the Divisional Commissioner has correctly been passed and therefore, the same does not call for any interference by this Court in the instant writ petition.

For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition fails, which is hereby dismissed. The application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

However, there will be no order as to costs.