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Judgment
ORDER
Per : Umesh Gajankush, Member (J)
The present Review Application has been filed by the applicant under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 with an averment that OA No. 818/2023 was disposed of by this Tribunal vide its order dated 17.08.2025 by directing the respondents to consider the Review Application submitted by the applicant to the Hon'ble President of India.
It is stated that the application to the Hon'ble President of India was already disposed by the Department during the pendency of the said OA. Hence, the order now needs review in view of the new facts on record. This fact is true to the personal knowledge of the applicant and was not before the Tribunal at the time of hearing.
It is also stated that applicant seeks to place on record order dated 10.07.2024 passed by the respondents with respect to the memorandum to the Hon'ble President submitted by the applicant.
It is submitted that the said representation was no longer pending on the date of the said judgment hence, there was no reason to issue the said directions to the respondents to consider the same or for the applicant to submit an additional copy to them within 15 days.
After notice the official respondents have filed the reply to the review application stating that the review application is misconceive, devoid of merit and not maintainable either in law or on facts.
Central Administrative Tribunal3.1 It is stated that the applicant has failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of jurisdiction by this Tribunal.
It is stated that order dated 07.08.2025 was passed after considering the pleadings and submissions available on record. The Tribunal specifically took note of the fact that the applicant had preferred a memorial to the Hon'ble President of India and that the status thereof was not available on record at the time of disposal of the original application.
The applicant vide letter dated 15.01.2024 (Annexure RRA-2) informed that there is no provision under CCS (CCA) Rules to file a Memorial Petition under any order and no appeal lies against any order passed by the Hon'ble President.
It is submitted that the present Review Application is merely an attempt to re-open and re-agitate issues arising out of the disciplinary proceedings and to seek a rehearing of the Original Application on merits, which is impermissible in review jurisdiction.
It is submitted that there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the order dated 07.08.2025. The scope of review jurisdiction is extremely limited and cannot be invoked for rehearing of the matter or for re-consideration of issues already decided by this Tribunal.
It is submitted that the respondents had no occasion to place the order dated 10.07.2024 on record during the hearing of the original application. There was no deliberate concealment or misrepresentation on the part of the respondents.
It is further submitted that the applicant cannot take advantage of his own omission in not bringing the order dated 10.07.2024 to the notice of the Tribunal and thereafter seek review of the final order. Therefore, on the basis of reply, the respondents have prayed for dismisal of Review Application.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Shri Nagrani, learned counsel for the applicant Central Administrative Tribunalvehemently argued that on the date of passing of the order dated 07.08.2025, the Memorial of the applicant was already disposed of vide communication dated 10.07.2024. However, the same was not before the Tribunal at the time of hearing.
It is further submitted that even looking to the communication dated 10.07.2024, it is apparent that memorial was not decided on merits.
During the course of the arguments, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr. vs. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741 to contend that in review jurisdiction, this Tribunal can review its order even for existence of sufficient reason.
It is submitted that there is a sufficient reason to review the order. During the course of the arguments, the learned counsel has invited our attention to provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC to show that "for any other sufficient reason also, the powers of review can be exercised."
Further reliance has been placed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunalcounsel for the applicant on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Gazi vs. State of M.P. & Ors. reported in 2000 (4) SCC 342.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the official respondents, Shri Sachin Patil on the basis of reply vehemently submits that there is no error apparent of the face of the record for exercising the limited powers of review. The applicant cannot claim review for his own omission and therefore, Review Application is liable to be rejected.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of the record, it is not the case of any error apparent on the face of the record in respect of order dated 07.08.2025. In fact, it is the admission of the applicant that the order dated 10.07.2024 which is placed by the applicant along with Review Application and also in disposed of OA as MA No. 841/2025 on 25.08.2025 was not before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the Original Application.
Now, so far as contention of the applicant that for sufficient reason, the powers of the review can be exercised. It is to be noted that when the order dated 10.07.2024 was already issued during the pendency of the original application. However, no reason much less any cogent reason placed by the applicant in the review application for not placing the aforesaid order on the records of original application till matter was closed for orders on 03.07.2025.
At this stage, it is relevant here to reproduce paragraphs no. 89, 90, 91, 92 and 93 in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BCCI (supra).
“89.Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason.
90.Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words “sufficient reason” in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit".
91.It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, this Court made observations as regard limitations in the application of review of its order stating :
"Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more Central Administrative Tribunalrestricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47, rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule’.", but the said rule is not universal.
92.Yet again in Lily Thomas, this Court has laid down the law in the following terms:
"52.The dictionary meaning of the word ‘review’ is ‘the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement’. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error."
It is also not correct to contend that the court while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the Central Administrative Tribunalcourt accepts its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in the AGM of the Board held on 29-9-2004, the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake.”
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 90 specifically observed that what would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
We have already noted the facts and circumstances in the preceding paragraph and we are of the opinion that the applicant has failed to show any sufficient reason for not bringing the aforesaid order dated 10.07.2024 on record during the pendency of the OA.
So far as contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that by the aforesaid communication dated 10.07.2024, the case of the applicant was not considered on merits and in fact there is no adverse order and therefore, direction 14 (d) of the order dated 07.08.2025 is not applicable.
Suffice it to say that the validity or otherwise of the said order cannot be gone into in the limited jurisdiction of review, even otherwise, while passing order dated 07.08.2025, this Tribunal has categorically reserved the Central Administrative Tribunal liberty with the applicant to challenge any adverse order passed.
So far as judgment relied by the learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Mohammed Gazi (supra) is concerned, in the said case, the following question was for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
“Whether a person can be penalised for no fault of his merely by resorting to equity clause in favour of the respondent State particularly when such person is found to have not been benefitted or the State deprived of the benefits on account of the stay order issued by the Court is the question of law to be decided in this appeal. Another related question requiring determination is as to whether on account of the pendency of the writ petition filed by another party without impleading the affected person as a party in which the stay order granted by the Court, such person can be directed to forfeit a part of the security amount deposited by him particularly when the court itself found that even the equities were equally balanced between the State and such person.” and the said question was decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with following observations:
“6.The Division Bench, while disposing of the LPA, also found that the appellant could not be held responsible for not lifting the Tendu leaves and thereby had not committed breach of any condition of the tender. Finding that the State was also not responsible for any breach, the Division Bench decided to pass the order impugned on the basis of equities. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant before the Division Bench that there was no fault on his part because he had offered bid and was prepared to accept the Tendu leaves which he could not lift on account of stay order were found by the Division Bench to be not Central Administrative Tribunal erroneous. The Division Bench held that "the submission of the learned counsel does not appear to be erroneous". As the State also could not be held responsible for the fault, the Division Bench directed that a sum of Rs.30,000/- be deducted from the earnest money of the appellant. Such a direction of the High Court cannot be sustained in view of the findings on fact returned in favour of the appellant.
7.In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do which he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey and Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee.
8.Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in directing the deduction of the sum of Rs.30,000/- from the security amount deposited by the appellant. We find that the learned Single Judge had assigned cogent reasons for return of the earnest money to the appellant and those findings could not be disturbed by the Division Bench allegedly on the ground of equities. The appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 1-12-1998 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of M.P. in LPA No. 270/1998. The order of the learned Single Judge is restored and the appellant held entitled to refund of the whole amount of the earnest money deposited by him. No costs.” In view of the aforesaid, the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Gazi is not applicable in the present set of facts. Central Administrative Tribunal
Thus, in view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, no ground is made out for exercising the review jurisdiction and review is accordingly dismissed.
Pending MAs, if any, shall stand disposed of. No order as to cost.