Pritam Roy Chowdhury vs Pallab Roy Chowdhury & Anr

The present appeal has been filed challenging the final decree dated 25th March, 2006 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Katwa, Burdwan in terms of the Pre-litigation case no. 164 of 2006.

In fact, the appellant has challenged the award of the Lok Adalat passed on the said date, which was subsequently ratified and/or confirmed by the Civil Judge. The core point on which the challenge is made is that some of the properties incorporated in Lot --B to the application, in fact, belonged to his client exclusively and cannot be treated nor can be brought within the hotchpot of the properties of the family. It is further stated that a fraud was committed and, therefore, the Court should interfere with the said award.

The learned Advocate for the respondent no. 1 took a preliminary objection that the instant appeal is not maintainable in view of the embargo created under Section 21 (2) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. It is thus submitted that the instant appeal is incompetent and, therefore, not maintainable.

We invited the respondent no. 1 to address us first, as a point of demurrer has been taken and we further notice the provisions contained under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Even after noticing the same and inviting the attention of the learned Advocate of the appellant to it, it is vehemently submitted that there is no other forum provided to the appellant when, in fact, a fraud has been committed not only on the parties, but on the members of the Lok Adalat.

Repealing the aforesaid contention the respondent says that the appellant has divested his right, title and interest in some other properties comprised in the Lot allotted to him indicating that by virtue of the said compromise final decree he acquired the exclusive ownership thereof.

We need not delve into such extent. We are primarily concentrating on the pivotal issue as to whether the instant appeal is competent despite the embargo created under Section 21 (2) of the said Act. For the purpose of convenience the aforesaid provision is quoted as under:

"21. (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other coiurt and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870.

(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award.".

It is axiomatic to record that every award of the Lok Adalat is a deemed decree passed by the Civil Court or an order of other nature. It further postulates that if the compromise or settlement is effected by the Lok Adalat, every such award shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award.

There is a fallacy in the submission of the learned Advocate of the appellant that no challenge is made to an award passed by the Lok Adalat, but to an order of the Civil Court. We find that a proceeding was initiated at the pre-litigation stage as the parties did not approach the Court. At that stage settlement was arrived before the Lok Adalat, which was reduced in the form of an award and in view of the provisions of the said Act ratification is required, which, in fact, has been done. Even the preamble of the instant Memorandum of Appeal would evince that the challenge is thrown to the final decree dated 25th March, 2006 in terms of the Pre-Litigation Case No. 164 of 2006.

Had there been a variance in the ratification done by the Court and the settlement arrived before the Lok Adalat, the position would have been different. Indirectly the appellant wanted to challenge the settlement, which was reduced in the form of an award passed by the Lok Adalat in the instant appeal. In view of the embargo created under Section 2(2) of the said Act, the appeal is not maintainable.

Since we have found that the appeal is not maintainable, we need not go to into the other application including the application for condonation of delay.

However, the dismissal of the appeal shall not prevent the appellant to exhaust the remedy, which is available under the law against the impugned award or the final decree passed thereupon.

Let the certified copy annexed to the Memorandum of Appeal be returned to the learned Advocate on record of the appellant upon replacement of a photocopy thereof.