President, Parampujya Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Smarak Samiti vs Dr. Bhuwaneshwari W/o Ashok Mehre & Ors.

Heard.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

The present petition challenges judgment and order dated 01.10.2026 passed by the Presiding Officer, University and College Tribunal, Nagpur, in Appeal bearing No.N-2/2026.

Facts as can be seen from the petition are as under:-

(4.1) The petitioner herein is a registered Public Trust registered with an object of imparting education and for charitable objects. Thus, the Trust has its own bye-laws for day-to-day administration and it runs various Educational Institutions in the city. The respondent No.1 was initially appointed as a ‘Professor’ on 13.04.2022 on probation at Dr. Ambedkar College, Dikshabhumi, Nagpur. It was a specific condition in the appointment order that the said appointment would be on probation and shall not be deemed to be confirmed till she is issued an order of confirmation at the end of the probation period i.e. after 2 years. It is further stated in the appointment order that if such a confirmation order is not issued then it would be considered that the probation period is extended for further one year.

(4.2) It is further stated in the petition that since the respondent No.1 was not working up to the mark, the petitioner, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Trust, informed the same to the first respondent that her probation is not confirmed and will not be extended from the date of issuance of the said letter. Again vide letter dated 30.01.2025, the petitioner informed the first respondent that since her probation as Principal is not confirmed, she is relieved from the post of Principal and shall report to the head of the Department of Biochemistry to resume the duty as a faculty member. This constrained respondent No.1 to challenge the orders dated 27.01.2025 and 30.01.2025 by filing a writ petition before this Court bearing Writ Petition No.588 of 2025. However, during the pendency of the said petition, it was informed to the Court that the College Tribunal is working and therefore, liberty was granted to the respondent No.1 to file an appeal before the University and College Tribunal, Nagpur.

(4.3) Accordingly, the first respondent filed an Appeal bearing No.N-2/2026 before the University and College Tribunal, challenging both the orders as stated supra.

(4.4) The petitioner herein in response to the notice issued filed an exhaustive reply thereby opposing the contentions made by the respondent No.1. It was pointed out in the said reply that there is a dispute in the petitioner Trust but the present petitioner has been directed and authorized by the Office of the Charity Commissioner to administer the Trust.

After hearing the parties and after appreciating the material on record, the University and College Tribunal, Nagpur, vide judgment dated 01.10.2026, allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No.1. The Tribunal directed reinstatement of the respondent No.1 on the post of ‘Principal’ with all benefits. It is this judgment which is impugned in the present petition on various grounds as stated in the petition.

I have heard Shri A.C. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner along with Mr. Abhyankar, Mr. Zeeshan Z. Haq, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, Mr. Akshay Sudame, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and Mrs. Barabde, learned AGP for respondent/State.

Mr. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel, by pointing me out the initial order of appointment of the respondent No.1 would submit that Clause 5 of the said appointment order is explicit enough to point out that the first respondent's appointment was on a probation period for two years and if during the said period an order of confirmation is not passed then it would be considered that the probation is extended by one year. By drawing support from the said clause, Mr. Dharmadhikari would submit that it is nobody's case that the first respondent was granted or issued an order of confirmation and therefore, it does not lie in her mouth to allege that the reversal is bad in law. He also submits that the respondent No.1 having accepted the terms of the appointment, she is estopped from stating or alleging that any right accrues to her in view of the regulations of the University Grants Commission or otherwise. He would also submit that even though there cannot be any estoppel against the statute, that would not ipso facto mean that a person who has without any demur or protest accepted the order of appointment can subsequently allege otherwise. He would also draw my attention to the letter dated 27.01.2025, wherein the petitioner i.e. the employer has stated that it was decided not to further extend the probation of the respondent No.1 and therefore, the necessary fallout would be that she would be reverted back to the post of faculty.

The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon a judgment of the Full Bench of this Court reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J page 713, Ramkrishna Chauhan Vs. Seth D.M. High School and Ors., more particularly, para 24 thereof. He would also rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vidyavardhaka Sangha and anr. Vs. Y. D. Deshpande and Ors., reported in 2006 (12) SCC 482 particularly paragraph 4 thereof.

Per contra, Mr. Sudame, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent would vehemently oppose the contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He would draw my attention to the appointment order of the respondent No.1, which would clearly show that the appointment was a tenure appointment, i.e. for a period of 5 years. He would also draw my attention that the said appointment order clearly states that the appointment which is of 5 years and among that 2 years is on probation and based on performance it would be continued up to 3 years on the terms and conditions as mentioned therein. He would submit that only because the respondent No.1 has accepted the order of appointment allegedly without any protest, that would not ipso facto clothe the petitioner to allege that she cannot raise any grievance, if the terms and conditions are against the statutory provisions.

He would also draw support from the notification of the University Grants Commission, wherein the Regulations called University Grants Commission (Minimum qualification for appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other measure for the maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018, are framed. He would submit by relying on Regulation 1.2 and Regulation (V)(B) that the State of Maharashtra has adopted the said regulations and by virtue of Clause (V)(B), there is no concept of probation. The said Clause (V)(B), as stated by the learned counsel for the first respondent, contemplates that the College Principal should be appointed for a period of 5 years, extendable for another term of 5 years, on the basis of performance assessment by a Committee appointed by the University constituted as per the extant regulations.

He would also draw my attention to the judgment of the Tribunal impugned in the petition. He would submit that there is no perversity in the judgment of the Tribunal so as to warrant interference in writ jurisdiction.

In support of his contention, he places reliance on judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and anr., reported in 1986 (3) SCC 156 and more particularly, para 88 and 89 thereof. He would also draw support from a judgment of Kalyani Mathivanan Vs. K. V. Jeyaraj and Ors., reported in 2015 (6) SCC 363, in which an identical controversy was adjudicated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. He would also place reliance on a judgment of this Court in Premlata Subhakar Sathe Vs. Governing Body of G.S. Tompe College and Ors., reported in 1981 Mh.L.J 332, in support of his contentions. He has also placed on record Ordinance No.24 framed by the erstwhile Nagpur University and is saved by the provisions of the Maharashtra Public Universities Act.

Rival contentions fall for my consideration in the backdrop of the above said statutory provisions and the enunciation of law.

Facts as stated are more or less not disputed. The question which falls for consideration in the present petition is as to whether a condition in the appointment order which is prima facie contrary to the statutory regulations framed by the UGC if accepted witout protest can still be a cause for challenging the same subsequently. For the sake of brevity, the relevant clauses of the order of appointment are reproduced as under:

It is an admitted fact on record that the said order of appointment incorporating these clauses as referred to supra was accepted by the respondent No.1.

It is further also an admitted position that vide communication dated 27.01.2025, it was informed by the petitioner that the services of the respondent No.1 could not be extended.

A meaningful reading of these clauses and more particularly, Clause 6 as reproduced supra would make it clear explicitly that the services even though are confined or are contrary to the UGC Regulations are still to be governed by all the concerned provisions of the Nagpur University, State Government and more importantly, the University Grant Commission Regulations. The UGC Regulations as has been pointed out by me in the earlier part of the Judgment and more particularly, Clause 1.2 states about the application of those regulations. It is an admitted fact on record that the State of Maharashtra has adopted those regulations and therefore, the applicability is not in dispute. As per Clause(V) (B), the tenure of the Principal is for a period of 5 years and which can be extended for 5 years on the basis of the performance. It is, thus, clear that the concept of probation is alien to the said regulations. Only because the respondent No.1 has chosen to accept the said letter of appointment containing the stipulation of probation cannot be interpreted to say that she has waived her right. This is more so since the regulations of the UGC gives a right to the concerned person to continue on the said post for a period of 5 years.

The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has rightly relied upon the judgment of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and anr., reported in 1986 (3) SCC 156 and more particularly, para 88 and 89. In the said para, the Hon'ble Apex Court has amplified the concept of inequality of bargaining power between the parties although arising out of circumstances not within their control or as a result of situations not of their creation. In the said paras, the Hon'ble Apex Court after discussing the said concept in detail has stated that if there is an unfair and unreasonable contract or an unfair and reasonable clause in a contract it would entered into between the parties, who are not equal in bargaining power, the same would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In my considered opinion the principle as laid down would apply in the present matter as the employee cannot be said to be having a bargaining power in the matter.

The next judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 is in the case of Kalyani Mathivanan Vs. K. V Jeyaraj and Ors., reported in 2015 (6) SCC 363 in which the facts were that the post of a ‘Vice Chancellor’ in the concerned University fell vacant and the Government constituted a Search Committee to appoint suitable candidates. Out of the persons who applied were considered by a Search Committee and finally three persons were shortlisted. On the recommendation of the Search Committee, the appellant therein was appointed and his appointment was challenged before the Court. In the backdrop of these facts, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 35 stated that the scheme under the UGC Regulations is not applicable to the teaching staff of the universities, colleges and other higher educational institutions coming under the purview of the State Legislature unless the State Government wish to adopt and implement the scheme subject to terms and conditions mentioned therein.

In the present matter, it is an admitted position on record that the State of Maharashtra has adopted the said Regulations. It, therefore, went on to hold that the UGC Regulations are mandatory to teachers and other academic staff in all the Central University and Colleges thereunder and the Institutions deemed to be universities whose maintenance expenditure is met by UGC. Furthermore, it held that the said Regulations are directory for the Universities, Colleges and other higher educational institutions under the purview of the State Legislation as the matter has been left to the State Government to adopt and implement the scheme. It therefore stated that the said UGC Regulations are partly mandatory and partly directory.

The next judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 in the case of Premlata Subhakar Sathe Vs. Governing Body of G.S. Tompe College and Ors., reported in1981 Mh.L.J 332, 1981 MHLJ 332, wherein the sanctity of the College Code is elucidated by the Full Bench. It states that Article 33 of the College Code deals with the appointment of teacher and provides for the procedure to be followed for such appointments. By sub-Article 2, it is provided that such teachers shall be appointed on the written contract in the form prescribed in Schedule A. The Full Bench observes and concludes that it is not open to the parties to vary the terms of written contract to the disadvantage of the petitioner. Thus, the form prescribed in Schedule-A is a statutory form of contract and is a part and parcel of Chapter (V) of the College Code itself. It also went on to hold that the word ‘shall’ as used is indicative of a legislative intention that the appointment to be in the form as prescribed is mandatory in nature.

In the backdrop of these facts, if the judgment impugned of the College and University Tribunal is concerned, it specifically deals with each and every Clause from para 18 onwards. It records a finding that it being a tenure post, probation is not required for such post. It also refers to the celebrated judgment of Maharshi Dayanand University Vs. Surjeet Kaur, reported in 2010 (11) SCC 159 to hold that there cannot be any estoppel against law. Furthermore in para 23 thereof by relying on the judgment of Mathivanan as mentioned supra, it states the effect of the UGC Regulations.

Furthermore, as can be seen from the judgment of the Deputy Charity Commissioner in various applications for enquiry, Application Inquiry No.451/2025 is partly allowed. It further directs that the Trustees on record should strictly abide and act as per bye-laws of the Trust. The present file is one of the applicants in the said Application Inquiry No.451/2025.

The Tribunal on the basis of material on record has rightly observed that no documentary evidence is placed on record by the petitioner to show that letter dated 27.01.2025 (informing respondent No.1 that her probation would not be extended) was backed by any resolution of the Trust. Even the order of reversion dated 30.01.2025 is not backed by any resolution of the Trust.

After careful consideration of the judgment impugned of the College Tribunal, I do not find that there is anything wrong in the said judgment. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to support his case by placing reliance on the judgment of Ramkrishna Chauhan of the Full Bench of this Court, the facts in the said case were altogether different. There the question which fell for consideration of the Full Bench was that was it open for the School Tribunal to hold that an employee would be deemed to be on probation within the meaning of Section 5 (2) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, on the ground that the appointment was made in a clear and permanent vacancy, notwithstanding the fact that the letter of appointment specifically stipulated that the appointment was being made on a temporary basis. In the context of the said questions referred to the Full Bench, it is observed that since the appointment order mentions that the appointment is on temporary period or for a limited period, it is not open to the employee to assume that he was appointed on probation against permanent vacancy, nor it is open for the School Tribunal or any Court to assumes a fact. Thus, the Full Bench holds that there is no legal fiction or deeming provision that every appointment made against the permanent vacancy is deemed to be on probation, though the management makes that appointment on a temporary basis, having found that the candidates appeared in the selection process was unsuitable.

Even though there cannot be any dispute about this proposition, the facts in the present case are totally different. In the present case, we are dealing with an appointment which is a tenure appointment, wherein the concept of probation is totally given a go-bye by the UGC Regulations which as I have held supra have been held to be applicable to the petitioner institution. In the totality of circumstances, I do not find any perversity in the judgment impugned for warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.

The Writ Petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed.