President Nagar Parishad, Orchha vs Radheshyam and another

This appeal u/s. 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, for short, ''the Code'') has been preferred against judgment and order dated 26.4.2013 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Barwani, in Sessions Trial No.87/2012 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under :

Conviction u/s. Rigorous Imprisonment. Fine Amount (Rs.) Default (RI)

366 5 years. 1,000/- 6 months

376 10 years. 2,000/- 6 months.

342 6 months. 500/- 3 months.

506 Part II 6 months. 500/- 3 months.

Prosecution case, briefly stated, is that during 2010- 2011, the prosecutrix, aged about 15 years, resident of Kundan Nagar, Barwani was studying in St. Joseph Higher Secondary School, Dhani. She used to stay in the school hostel. Appellant - Ashish, who was residing in the nearby locality, developed intimacy with her and thereafter, for around two years, he was meeting her frequently. The parents of the prosecutrix on completion of her 8th standard studies of the prosecutrix admitted her in Govt. Girls Higher Secondary School, Barwani. On 1.4.2012, at around 11 am., when the prosecutrix (P.W.1) went to ''Sai Temple'' situated in "Sainath Colony", Barwani, to take ''Prasada'', the appellant met her and thereafter, she was enticed away by him and taken in a bus to Dhani. The appellant arranged a room in the school at Dhani and stayed there with the prosecutrix (P.W.1) for about 7-8 days. Allegedly, during this period, the appellant used to subject the prosecutrix (P.W.1) to forcible sexual intercourse and also threatened her to kill. On 8.4.2012, in the evening, the appellant did not return to the room, therefore, the prosecutrix (P.W.1) on her own left the room and came back to her parents at Barwani. She narrated the incident to her mother - Sunita (P.W.3), Uncle - Bhagvan (P.W.4), Aunt - Ramabai (P.W.5), and father - Indersingh (P.W.7). On 11.4.2012, the prosecutrix (P.W.1) lodged the first information report, Ex. P/1 in this regard with Police Station Barwani, on the basis whereof, a case u/s. 363, 366, 342, 506 and 376 of IPC was registered against the appellant.

R.C. Billore, the then Sub Inspector, Police Station Barwani, conducted the investigation in the matter. During the course of investigation, on 12.4.2012, he visited "Sai Temple", Barwani and prepared site map, Ex. P/3. He also visited the place where the prosecutrix was allegedly, kept by the appellant and prepared site map Ex. P/4 in this regard. The prosecutrix (P.W.1) was sent for medical examination. Dr. (Mrs.) M. Saxena (P.W.6) of District Hospital Barwani, medically examined her on 11.4.2012, however, she expressed inability to express any opinion with regard to recent sexual intercourse upon the prosecutrix (P.W.1), however, she prepared two slides of veginal smear of the prosecutrix (P.W.1). Apart this, pubic hairs were also obtained. Both these items were handed over to Police in sealed cover. The appellant was arrested and sent for medical examination. Dr. Yogesh Antale (P.W.2) examined him on 14.5.2012 at District Hospital, Barwani and found him fit for sexual intercourse. The pubic hair and underwear of appellant were also obtained and the same were sealed and handed over to the Police. The prosecutrix (P.W.1), her mother - Sunita (P.W.3), father - Indersingh (P.W.7) and other witnesses were interrogated. The seized articles were sent for forensic examination to Regional Forensic Laboratory, Indore. The Forensic Expert vide Ex. P/13 confirmed the presence of human sperm and semen on slide of veginal smear of the prosecutrix.

After usual investigation, a charge-sheet was laid before the competent Magistrate. In due course, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, from where, it was made over to First Additional Sessions Judge, Barwani. Charges for offence u/s. 363, 366, 376, 342 and 506 Part II of IPC were framed against the appellant, who abjured the guilt and claimed to be tried.

The prosecution in order to prove its case, examined as many as 14 witnesses before the learned trial Court including the prosecutrix (P.W.1) and Investigating Officer - R.C. Billore (P.W.8). Sunita - (P.W.3) and Indersingh (P.W.7) are respectively, the mother and father of prosecutrix (P.W.1). Apart this, Ex. P/1 to P/13 were also marked in evidence.

The appellant was examined u/s. 313 of ''the Code'' with regard to incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. He denied all the circumstances and submitted that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case, however, none was examined in defence.

The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced before it, vide the impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant, as stated hereinbefore.

The conviction and sentence has been challenged on the ground that the learned trial Court has committed a serious error in placing reliance upon the uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix (P.W.1), which suffers from serious infirmities. It is contended that no missing report was lodged by the parents of prosecutrix (P.W.1) and that, no explanation was offered for delay in lodging the first information report which was lodged after a delay of 3 days. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has seriously erred in arriving at the finding that the prosecutrix was below 15 years of age at the time of alleged occurrence. The contention is that without there being any plausible evidence, the learned trial Court has recorded the finding with regard to age of the prosecutrix (P.W.1). The contention is that for all these reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted.

Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor supporting the finding of guilt as well as sentence imposed against the appellant, has submitted that the learned trial Court after in-depth analysis and appreciation of evidence has recorded the finding of guilt against the appellant; The plea raised on behalf of the appellant with regard to delay in the first information report, corroboration of evidence and determination of age of the prosecutrix, have been considered at length by the learned trial Court in the light of various judicial pronouncements, therefore, no ground is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The point for consideration is whether the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Court is sustainable and further, whether the sentence imposed against the appellant is in conformity with the facts and circumstances of the case ?

It is contended that as per prosecution, the prosecutrix came back to her house on 9.4.2012 around 2 pm., however, the first information report has been lodged on 11.4.2012 i.e. after a delay of two days. The contention is that the delay in lodgment of the first information report has not been explained, therefore, the prosecution case becomes doubtful. The law is well settled that the delay in a case of sexual assault cannot be equated with a case involving other offences. In State of Himanchal Pradesh vs. Premsingh, AIR 2009 SC 1010, the apex Court held that there are several factors which weigh in the mind of prosecutrix and her family members before coming to the Police Station to lodge a complaint and that in a tradition bound society prevalent in India, more particularly, the rural areas, it would be quite unsafe to throw out the prosecution case merely on the ground that there is some delay in lodging the first information report. In the instant case, the parties are from semi-urban background; the prestige of a young woman was at stake, therefore, the delay of two days, in the instant case, cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case.

The issue of age of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) assumes significance because firstly, it has come in the testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) that she was acquainted with the appellant for past two years and that, they used to speak to each other telephonically, secondly, it has also emerged that the prosecutrix (P.W.1) on being asked by the appellant to accompany him, agreed for the same and travelled with him in a bus to Village Dhani. The prosecutrix (P.W.1) in Para 5 of her cross-examination, has admitted that when appellant asked her to accompany, she did not raise hue and cry nor she complained to Driver, Conductor or other persons in the bus that she is being taken by the appellant against her consent. This simply indicates that the prosecutrix (P.W.1) accompanied the appellant willingly. It is noticeable that suggestions in this regard have also been given to Ramabai (P.W.5) - Aunt of the prosecutrix (Para 4) and Indersingh (P.W.7) - the father of the prosecutrix (Para 4) that the prosecutrix (P.W.1) willingly went with the appellant.

The consent of the prosecutrix in a prosecution for offence u/s. 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC can be a good defence if it is found that the prosecutrix was above 18 years of age, at the time of occurrence, however, if it is found that she is less than 18 years of age in a prosecution for offences u/s. 363 and 366, and less than 16 years of age in a prosecution for offence u/s. 376 of the IPC, then consenting conduct may not be a succesful defence.

As regards determination of age, the learned trial Court on elaborate appreciation of evidence has found that the prosecutrix whose date of birth as per scholar''s register is 24.10.1997 was around 14 1/2 years old at the time alleged occurrence.

To appreciate the finding of the learned trial Court, it is necessary to advert to the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution in this regard. The prosecutrix (P.W.1) herself has deposed in Para 4 that her date of birth is 24.10.1997. Her testimony on this point has remained totally unchallenged and not even a suggestion has been given to her on behalf of the defence that she is falsely deposing regarding her date of birth or that, at the time of alleged occurrence, she was more than 18 years of age. Hence, there may not be any reason to reject the oral testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) as regards her age which has remained unscratched and unchallenged.

As regards documentary evidence, reference can be made to the testimony of Rajaram Waskalle (P.W.11), the then Principal of Government Girls Higher Secondary School, Barwani. This witness has deposed that as per scholar''s register Ex. P/11, the date of birth of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) as recorded at Serial No.20073 is 24.10.1997. As deposed by this witness, he issued certificate, Ex. P/10 on the basis of entry made in the scholar''s register, a copy of which is available on record as Ex. P/11-C. In cross-examination, Rajaram Waskalle (P.W.11) has deposed that the entry with regard to date of birth in the scholar''s register was made on the basis of entries made in this regard in the scholar''s register of the school where the prosecutrix (P.W.1) had earlier studied. The testimony of this witness is free from anomalies and, therefore, deserves acceptance.

In Jarnail Singh V/s. State of Haryana : AIR 2013 SC 3467, Hon''ble the apex Court has held that the entries with regard to date of birth of the prosecutrix in the scholar''s register are important piece of evidence and the same can be relied upon. Otherwise also, a scholar''s register maintained in the Government Higher Secondary School, in the ordinary course of business, is an official record and, therefore, relevant u/s. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. Unless credibility of such document is challenged and it is demonstrated that the entries are false or interpolated, the same has to be accepted.

In the instant case, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) coupled with the documentary evidence in the shape of scholar''s register Ex. P/11-C and certificate Ex. P/10 clearly indicates that the date of birth of prosecutrix (P.W.1) is 24.10.1997 and that, on the date of alleged incident i.e. on 1.4.2012, as per these entries, she was less than 15 years of age, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in this regard cannot be faulted with.

The law with regard to appreciation of testimony of a victim of rape is by now well settled by a catena of decisions of Hon''ble the apex Court. In State of Punjab vs. Gurmeet Singh & Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 384 the apex Court took note of the increasing rate of crime against the woman and held that- ''It is an irony that while we are celebrating woman''s rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim''s privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault- it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim, A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions of insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars.''

In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, [1990] 1 SCC 550 the apex court has summarised the legal position regarding appreciation of the testimony of a rape victim as under(para 14) : "A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discussed that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." ( Emphasis supplied )

The testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) requires to be examined in the light of aforesaid legal position.

The prosecutrix (P.W.1) has clearly deposed that on 1.4.2012, when she went to "Sai Temple" to have ''Prasada'', the appellant met her, promised to marry her and asked her to accompany, for which, she ultimately agreed. Despite elaborate and searching cross-examination, nothing could be elicited from this witness so as to discredit her on the aforesaid point. The prosecutrix (P.W.1) has clearly deposed that she was kept by the appellant in a room of a school for around 7 -8 days and that, he used to subject her to sexual intercourse against her wishes and also extended threats in this regard. There are couple of minor and insignificant omissions in her Police statement (Ex. D/1) vis-?-vis her Court statement as appearing in Para 9 of the crossexamination, but the same are totally inconsequential. Whether she managed to come back on her own or after being facilitated by the Watchman is not of much significance. The central issue remains, whether she was enticed away by the appellant and was put in a room for 7 - 8 days at Village Dhani and was subjected to secual intercourse. On these points, the testimony of prosecutrix (P.W.1) is clear, cogent, consistent and free from any material infirmity.

Though the appellant has pleaded that he has been falsely implicated, however, not a single suggestion has been given to the prosecutrix (P.W.1) or Sunita (P.W.3) - mother of the prosecutrix (P.W.1), Indersingh (P.W.7) - father of the prosecutrix (P.W.1), Bhagwan (P.W. 4) - Uncle of the prosecutrix (P.W.1), and Ramabai (P.W.5) - Aunt of the prosecutrix (P.W.1), that they had any past enmity or animosity with the appellant and, therefore, were interested in falsely implicating the appellant in the instant case. Otherwise also, usually, the parents will not make a false allegation about the rape qua their daughter simply to settle score on account of enmity. Though, the appellant has stated in his examination u/s. 313 of ''the Code'' that he has been falsely implicated on account of enmity, however, no evidence has been brought by him before the Court in this regard, therefore, the plea of false implication does not hold water and hence, same has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Court. This Court is in agreement with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in this regard.

In view of the aforesaid, the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Court against the appellant u/s. 363, 366, 376 and 506 Part II of the IPC being based on proper appreciation of evidence, does not call for any interference. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed against the appellant cannot be said to be unreasonable or excessive, therefore, the same also deserves to be maintained.

In view of the aforesaid analysis and discussion, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant is hereby maintained.