High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 10 BOM CK 5526

Prembala Manmohan Chawla vs Brijgopal Ramballah Modani

Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench · Decided on 22 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Nandesh S. Deshpande, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 6471 of 2026

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Judgment

17 paragraphs · 1,223 words
1.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.

2.

The present petition challenges order dated 24.07.2026 passed below Exhibit 3, by the 10th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division and Addl.C.J.M., Nagpur, in Special Darkhast No. 91/2023.

3.

Facts as can be seen from the petition are as under:

On 27.12.2006, an agreement to sell was executed between the parties in respect of the suit property for a valuable consideration. However, since the agreement was breached, this constrained the respondent herein to file a suit bearing Special Civil Suit No. 732/2008 for specific performance of agreement. After the trial, on 29.02.2012, the Court decreed the suit in favor of the original plaintiff, i.e., the respondent herein.

4.

The challenge to the said decree proved unsuccessful, since the First Appeal as also the Second Appeal filed was dismissed by the District Judge and this Court respectively.

5.

Thereafter, the decree was put into execution, and the said execution was registered as Special Darkhast No. 91/2023. In the said execution, an application was filed below Exhibit 19 for amendment of plaint and correction of the decree under the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 and Sections 151 and 152 of the C.P.C. The said application sought substitution of "Mouza Sakkardara" with "Mouza Hiwari". The Executing Court passed an order on 15.09.2025, allowing the said application of the decree holder, i.e., the respondent herein.

6.

Being aggrieved, the petitioner herein challenged the said order by filing a Writ Petition bearing W.P. No. 5804/2025. However, the said petition was dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 18.12.2025. The challenge to the judgment of this Court also proved unsuccessful, since the Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the petition for Special Leave to Appeal(C) No. 3689/2026 on 26.02.2026. In the backdrop of these facts, the petitioner herein filed an application on 24.03.2026 below Exhibit 30, seeking permission to effect consequential amendment to the written statement. The said application was rejected by the Executing Court by passing the impugned order on 24.07.2026.

7.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Counsel for the respondent.

8.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order is totally unsustainable in law, in as much as, it fails to appreciate that the amendment as sought in the written statement was in consequence to the original plaintiff, i.e., the respondent herein amending the plaint. She further submits that the Executing Court has committed a serious error in rejecting the said application below Exhibit 30. She further submits that the Executing Court has ignored the fundamental principle that procedural law is intended to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat a parties’ substantive right to effectively defend itself. She further submits that the entire tenor of the decree was altered and therefore the petitioner was within his right to amend the written statement.

9.

She places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Guridal Singh and others vs. Raj Kumar Aneja and others, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 445.

10.

Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent opposes the contentions. He along with a pursis places some documents on record in support of his contention. He would contend that application filed by the respondent herein below Exhibit 19 was filed not only under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the C.P.C., but also under Section 151 and 152 of C.P.C., wherein it was requested for amending the plaint, execution application, and the decree by replacing the Mouza as stated supra. He submits that in fact the property card of the property in question, even belonging to the petitioner herein shows that the property is in “Mauza Hiwari” and not “Mauza Sakkardara” as alleged. He therefore submits that in the backdrop of the fact that the decree itself stands amended, cannot be a reason for the petitioner, i.e., the defendant to amend the plaint.

11.

I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and with their able assistance gone through the record of the matter. As can be seen from the matter in hand and as has been conceded by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner doesn't own any property at Mauza Sakkardara. It can also be seen from the record that in the written statement originally filed; wherein the description of the property was erroneously mentioned as being in Mauza Sakkardara (instead of Mauza Hiwari); the description of the property was not disputed. In the backdrop of these facts, when the respondent herein found that the property is in fact in Mauza Hiwari and not Mauza Sakkardara, he filed an application at Exhibit 19 as stated supra, which was allowed up to the Hon’ble Apex Court. Thus, by filing an application for amending written statement, the petitioner herein is trying to come out of the admission which she has given in the written statement. Thus the nature of the property has not changed as has been alleged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

12.

After going through the impugned order and more particularly the reasoning as spelt out in paragraph No. 6 onwards, thereof, it is clear that there is no perversity in the said order. As has been rightly observed by the Executing Court that the consequential amendment is permitted only to allow the opposite party to respond to a new claim or facts introduced by the primary amendment. It has also found, and rightly so, that the amendment in the plaint and the decree was in the nature of a typographical error and has already been adjudicated upon. Thus, it has stated that if the consequential amendment is allowed, it would amount to reopening the pleadings of a concluded suit, which would be impermissible in law.

13.

In that view of the matter, it has correctly stated that the application is liable for rejection. As far as judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and more particularly paragraph No. 19 thereof, there is no dispute about the said proposition. The said paragraph states that when one of the parties is permitted to amend the pleading, an opportunity has to be given to the opposite party to amend his pleading. However, as stated supra, this is not the present case. Not only the pleading has been amended, but the decree has also been amended, and the said amendment has reached finality since the challenge to the same has proved unsuccessful. Having found so, there is no perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order. The petition is therefore meritless, liable to be rejected. It is rejected accordingly. Rule is discharged.

LATER ON

After the pronouncement of the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays for continuation of interim order granted vide order dated 20.08.2026, so as to enable him to work out his remedies as for challenging the judgment before the appropriate forum of law.

In that view of the matter, the interim relief granted vide order dated supra is extended for a further period of four weeks from today, however, it is made clear that after the expiration of four weeks, the said interim relief would automatically cease to operate.