Praveen Kumar Sharma vs Manager, P.N.B. Bank, Manglore & Others

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

Heard Mr. Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank.

This appeal is preferred by the appellant-writ petitioner in Writ Petition (S/S) No.51 of 2016, aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 08.01.2016, along with an application seeking condonation of delay of 1295 days' in preferring the appeal ie a delay of more than three and a half years. The explanation furnished, by the appellant-writ petitioner, for the inordinate delay is that his wife was suffering from diabetes, with congenital heart disorder and a urinary tract infection. As to how his wife's illness disabled the appellant-writ petitioner, from invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Court earlier, is not explained.

Since Mr. Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel for the appellant, claimed that the appellant-writ petitioner had an excellent case on merits, and he should not be non-suited on the ground of delay, we also examined the contents of the order under appeal.

In the order under appeal dated 08.01.2016, the learned Single Judge noted that the appellant-writ petitioner, a Cashier in the respondent-Bank, was charged of embezzlement of funds; a departmental inquiry was held wherein the charges were held to have been established resulting in the appellant-writ petitioner being dismissed from service by order dated 15.07.1996; criminal proceedings had also been initiated against the appellant-writ petitioner under Section 409 IPC; more than ten years after he was dismissed from service, the appellant-writ petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on 13.11.2006; and the appeal preferred by the State was also dismissed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Roorkee, District Haridwar on 30.09.2010.

Nearly five and a half year after the appeal preferred by the State was dismissed on 30.09.2010, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings were two different proceedings; in a criminal case, charges were required to established beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in a departmental proceeding guilt could be established on the basis of preponderance of probabilities; and the appellant-writ petitioner had approached the Court twenty years after his dismissal from service on 15.07.1996.

A feeble submission is put across the bar by Mr. Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel for the appellant, that the appellant-writ petitioner could only have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, after the appeal preferred by the State, in the criminal case, was dismissed on 30.09.2010. This contention is wholly misconceived since departmental proceedings are independent of the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant-writ petitioner; and he ought to have, if he was so aggrieved, to challenge his dismissal order dated 15.07.1996 soon after it was passed.

Even if we were to proceed on the premise that the appellant-writ petitioner was justified in awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial, the order of acquittal was passed by the Criminal Court on 30.11.2006 and yet he invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court ten years thereafter in the year 2016. Even if the delay were to be computed from the date when the appeal preferred by the State was rejected on 30.09.2010, the delay, in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, would still be for a period of five and a half years.

Both on ground of delay and on merits, we see no reason to entertain the appeal or interfere with the order under appeal. The application, seeking condonation of 1295 days in preferring the Special Appeal, is dismissed and, consequently, the Special Appeal stands rejected. No costs.