Pravakar Mahakud vs State Of Orissa

V. Narasingh, J. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned counsel for the State.

This Criminal Revision has been filed assailing the Judgment dated 31.01.2005 passed by the learned Adhoc Addl. Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Champua, in Criminal Appeal No. 06/59 of 2004-02, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 29.11.2002 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Barbil, in G.R. Case No. 55 of 1996, qua the Petitioner under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC, directing him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months under Section 279 of the IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years under Section 304-A of the IPC, with a further direction that the sentences shall run concurrently.

The allegation against the present Petitioner is that, on 29.01.1996, he was driving a dumper bearing Regd. No. OSJ-3440 in a rash and negligent manner and at a high speed and, at about 1 P.M., near Durga Pandal, Jurudi, the aforesaid vehicle ran over a 12-year-old boy, namely, Chuin @ Ashok Ku. Rout, who succumbed to the injuries at the spot. The deceased was working in the shop of one Ashok Ku. Nayak. Following the incident, Ashok Nayak lodged a written report at Joda P.S. On the said basis, G.R. Case No. 55 of 1996 was instituted against the Petitioner and after completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed for commission of offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC read with Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

To drive home the charge, the prosecution examined six witnesses, of whom P.W.1, Ashok Nayak, is the informant, P.W.2, Niranjan Jena, is a witness to the inquest as well as the seizure, P.W.3, Kirtan Bihari Pradhan, is a witness to the inquest and also to the occurrence, P.W.4, Sunil Bhowmik, is a post-occurrence witness, P.W.5 is the Investigating Officer and P.W.6 is the doctor who conducted the autopsy. Several documents were also marked as exhibits, of which Ext.1, the seizure list of the vehicle, Ext.3, the inquest report, Ext.7, the post-mortem report, Ext.4, the spot map and Ext.6, the M.V.I. Report are of significance.

Though no documentary evidence was adduced in support of the defence, one witness was examined as D.W.1.

Taking into account the evidence on record and disbelieving the plea of false implication, the learned Trial Court recorded an order of conviction and, while not entertaining the plea for release under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘P.O. Act’), imposed simple imprisonment for six months under Section 279 of the IPC and simple imprisonment for a period of two years under Section 304-A of the IPC. Sentences were to run concurrently.

On appeal being preferred, the Appellate Court, while negating the prayer for release under the P.O. Act, affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence. Assailing the same, the present revision has been filed.

It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court is ex facie perverse so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, in as much as no independent witnesses were examined and the witnesses examined were official witnesses. It is further submitted that, though such ground was specifically taken, the same did not find favour with the Trial Court nor was it taken into account by the Appellate Court.

Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgments warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

This Court is not oblivious to the scope of interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Since the allegation of perverse appreciation cannot be adjudicated without analysing the evidence on record, for such limited purpose this Court considers it appropriate to scan the evidence.

On perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has specifically referred to the seizure list and the evidence on record and arrived at the finding that the same lends authenticity to the prosecution case. In the facts of the present case, non-examination of independent witnesses does not, in any manner, dilute the prosecution case.

Such finding has been affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. As already noted, such finding has been affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, as already noted.

On careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, including the seizure list and the statements of the witnesses and considering the rival submissions this Court does not find any infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Court in affirming the conviction and sentence so as to warrant interference in this Criminal Revision and accordingly, the conviction and sentence as passed by the Appellate Court is hereby affirmed.

So far as the execution of sentence is concerned, learned counsel for the State submits that the Petitioner was in custody for an insignificant period and, taking into account the manner in which the offence was committed, no leniency ought to be shown.

Per contra, learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Bhuyan, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870, submits that the Court is required to assign reasons while denying the benefit of the P.O. Act. Referring to the observations of the learned Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court, it is submitted that the same do not pass the test as laid down in Chellammal (supra).

On the question of sentence, taking into account that the incident took place on 29.01.1995 and, in the meanwhile, three decades have passed and that the Petitioner is aged about 64 years and taking a cue from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chellammal (supra) and there is nothing on record to indicate that during these three decades the Petitioner has indulged himself in any other offence, this Court is persuaded to hold that the benefit of the P.O. Act can be extended to the Petitioner, since ex facie the sentence prescribed for the offence being two years does not suffer from the disqualification as envisaged under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1958.

Accordingly, the benefit of the P.O. Act is extended and this Court directs that Petitioner be released on probation under Section 4 of the P.O. Act, on conditions to be settled by the Trial Court.

The Criminal Revision, along with the pending I.As, stand disposed of.