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Heard on the question of admission as well as on I.A. No. 8412 of 2026, which is an application for stay of the impugned order dated 04.06.2026 and for further stay of trial proceedings in S.T. No. 11/2024 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanpura.
The petitioner has preferred the present Criminal Revision challenging the order dated 04.06.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanpura in S.T. No. 11/2024 (arising out of Crime No. 24/2024, Police Station Bhanpura for offences punishable under Sections 354, 354A of the IPC and Sections 7/8, 11/12 of the POCSO Act), whereby the application filed on behalf of the prosecution under Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) [formerly Section 311 of the CrPC] has been allowed, granting permission to recall the father of the prosecutrix as a witness and to adduce additional electronic evidence.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, primarily on the ground that it has been passed at an extremely belated stage—after the conclusion of the entire prosecution evidence, the recording of the statement of the accused, and when the matter was fixed for final arguments. It is vehemently argued that the alleged electronic evidence (video clips, Instagram chats, and mobile data) was admittedly available prior to the registration of the FIR dated 18.01.2024, yet no explanation has been furnished as to why it was not produced during the investigation. Furthermore, the father of the prosecutrix had categorically stated in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that no such audio, video, or photographs were sent to him by the petitioner.
The counsel further contends that the application under Section 348 BNSS is a malafide counterblast to a monetary dispute, as the petitioner had initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the prosecutrix's family for the recovery of Rs. 14,00,000/- based on a promissory note. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Bhopal Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (CRR/509/2012), it is submitted that the powers under this section cannot be exercised to grant the prosecution a second opportunity to fill up lacunae in its case. Having considered the submissions and perused the record, the core issue pertains to the amplitude of the discretionary power vested before the trial Court to recall witnesses and admit evidence at an advanced stage of the trial. The legislative intent and judicial interpretation of Section 311 of the CrPC (now pari materia with Section 348 of the BNSS) consistently emphasize that the determinative factor is whether the evidence is essential to the just decision of the case.
In this context, this Court is inclined to quote the authoritative finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar, (2021) 3 SCC 661 : 2021 SCC Online SC 172 at page 665 , which reads as under:
“14.The object underlying Section 311 CrPC is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The significant expression that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the discretionary power conferred under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously, as it is always said “wider the power, greater is the necessity of caution while exercise of judicious discretion”.
15.The principles related to the exercise of the power under Section 311 CrPC have been well settled by this Court in Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. [Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P., (2011) 8 SCC 136 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 371 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 240] : (SCC p. 141, para 17)
“17.Though Section 311 confers vast discretion upon the court and is expressed in the widest possible terms, the discretionary power under the said section can be invoked only for the ends of justice. Discretionary power should be exercised consistently with the provisions of the Code and the principles of criminal law. The discretionary power conferred under Section 311 has to be exercised judicially for reasons stated by the court and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Before directing the learned Special Judge to examine Smt Ruchi Saxena as a court witness, the High Court did not examine the reasons assigned by the learned Special Judge as to why it was not necessary to examine her as a court witness and has given the impugned direction without assigning any reason.”
This principle has been further reiterated in Mannan Shaikh v. State of W.B. [Mannan Shaikh v. State of W.B., (2014) 13 SCC 59 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 547] and thereafter in Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat [Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, (2017) 9 SCC 340 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 729] and Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI [Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839] . The relevant paragraphs of Swapan Kumar Chatterjee [Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839] are as under : (Swapan Kumar Chatterjee case [Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839] , SCC p. 331, paras 10-11)
“10.The first part of this section which is permissive gives purely discretionary authority to the criminal court and enables it at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code to act in one of the three ways, namely, (i) to summon any person as a witness; or (ii) to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness; or (iii) to recall and re-examine any person already examined. The second part, which is mandatory, imposes an obligation on the court (i) to summon and examine, or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case.
11.It is well settled that the power conferred under Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons and it should be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The court has vide power under this section to even recall witnesses for re-examination or further examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but the same has to be exercised after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under this provision shall not be exercised if the court is of the view that the application has been filed as an abuse of the process of law.”
The aim of every Court is to discover the truth. Section 311 CrPC is one of many such provisions which strengthen the arms of a court in its effort to unearth the truth by procedure sanctioned by law. At the same time, the discretionary power vested under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously for strong and valid reasons and with caution and circumspection to meet the ends of justice.
In the considered opinion of this Court, the stage of the trial even if it has reached the stage of final arguments cannot operate as an absolute embargo on the trial court's jurisdiction to exercise its powers under Section 348 of the BNSS. The statutory framework explicitly employs the expression "at any stage", which vests wide and expansive discretion in the trial court to ensure that no vital piece of evidence is shut out merely on account of procedural lapses, delay, or an oversight by the prosecution. The ultimate touchstone is always the 'essentiallity' of such evidence for arriving at a just and fair decision.
The primary duty of a criminal court is to unearth the truth. If the learned trial court, upon perusing the application, has recorded its subjective satisfaction that recalling the prosecution witness and admitting the electronic evidence is imperative to prevent a miscarriage of justice, such an exercise of discretion cannot be termed as arbitrary or perverse. In its revisional jurisdiction, this Court ought not to interfere with or throttle the trial proceedings when the trial court has acted within its lawful bounds to secure the ends of justice. The apprehension of the applicant regarding prejudice is unfounded, as the admission of such evidence is not synonymous with proving the guilt of the accused, but merely facilitates a complete adjudication of the dispute.. Thus, looking into the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the aforementioned settled principles of law, this Court finds no perversity or material irregularity in the impugned order dated 04.06.2026.
However, to ensure a fair trial and to protect the Fundamental Rights of the accused, it is made clear that a proper, adequate, and unfettered opportunity must be granted to the applicant/accused to cross-examine the recalled witness and to rebut the electronic evidence so adduced.
Accordingly, the Criminal Revision and I.A. No. 8412/2026 for stay of the impugned order stand dismissed. Certified copy as per rules.