Pratap Singh And Others vs State Of H.P. And Others

Ajay Mohan Goel, J

By way of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for the following substantive reliefs:-

“(i) That the order dated 28.06.2022 contained in Annexure P-8, order dated 11.07.1995 contained in Annexure P-4 may kindly be quashed and set aside by issuing a writ of certiorari.

(ii) That the respondents No. 1 and 2 may kindly be directed to allot Khasra No. 102, measuring 0-1-17 bigha, situated in Mohal Sambal/328, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. to the petitioners by issuing a writ of mandamus.”

Case of the petitioners is that consolidation operation took place in Mohal Sambal/328, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. and land of the petitioners alongwith that of respondents No. 3 and 4 and other co-owners was partitioned. At the relevant time, petitioner No. 1 was serving in Military. He was enrolled in the Indian Army on 12.05.1971 and discharged from service on 31.05.1999. As per the petitioners, land comprised in Khasra No. 102 (new), measuring 0-1-17 bigha, old Khasra number of which was 411/343/114, was wrongly allotted to respondents No. 3 and 4, as Consolidation Officials cannot partition constructed area and are only competent to partition the agricultural land. Respondents No. 3 and 4 obtained demarcation of land comprised in Khasra No. 627/396/102, measuring 0-1-17 bigha, situated in Mohal Sambal/328, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P., upon which, a house was existing, which was in the possession of petitioner No. 1. An appeal was filed by petitioner No. 4 under Section 30(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1971 Act’), impleading petitioner No. 1 also as one of the appellants, though petitioner No. 1 had not preferred the same. During the appellate proceedings, respondents No. 3 and 4 and their father manipulated the things. A compromise was shown to have taken place between the petitioners and respondents No. 3 and 4 through their father in terms of order dated 11.07.1995 (Annexure P-4), but no compromise was entered into, as the signatures of petitioner No. 4 were forged on the compromise. It is further the contention of the petitioners that even if it is assumed that order dated 11.07.1995 was a valid order, then also, fact remained that respondents No. 3 and 4 had filed a Civil Suit No. 97/2003 against petitioner No. 1, claiming possession of land measuring 0-0-17 bigha, without any mention therein of order dated 11.07.1995. Respondents No. 3 and 4 were interfering in the peaceful possession of petitioner No. 1 upon the said land where his house was constructed. In these circumstances, petitioners filed a Revision Petition under Section 54 of the 1971 Act before respondent No. 2, which stood wrongly rejected by respondent No. 2 in terms of order dated 28.06.2022 by holding that the petition was filed belatedly after 26 years and that the matter in fact stood compromised between the parties on 11.07.1995, which was binding on the petitioners, as petitioner No. 4 had made a statement that the compromise would be binding upon all the petitioners.

According to the petitioners, as order dated 28.06.2022, passed by respondent No. 2 was bad in law because the authority erred in not appreciating that petitioner No. 1 was entitled to have the matter re-looked into in terms of the provisions of the 1971 Act, as he was serving in the Indian Army when the earlier order was passed, therefore, the petition deserved to be allowed in terms of the prayers made therein.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and having perused the impugned orders as well as the grounds of revision which were filed before the respondent No. 2 by the petitioners (Annexure P-9), we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition.

Annexure P-4, dated 11.07.1995 is the order passed by the Settlement Officer in Case No. 54/94, in which, all the petitioners were appellants. In terms of the said order, the appeal was allowed as per the statements made by Jai Pal (petitioner No. 4 herein) on behalf of the appellants before the Settlement Officer and Shri Raghuvir Singh, father of respondents No. 3 and 4 herein on their behalf, who were minor at the relevant time. Though it is averred in this petition that petitioner No. 1 had not signed the appeal and that signatures of petitioner No. 4 were forged in the compromise, but it is a matter of record that no challenge was made to this order on either of the grounds by either of the petitioners. This demonstrates that in fact they were never aggrieved by this order. The delay in filing the petition under Section 54 of the Consolidation Act is completely unexplained in the grounds of revision petition preferred before respondent No. 2.

Though in this petition, petitioner No. 1 has taken the stand that order dated 11.07.1995 was bad in law, as he was not heard at the time of passing of the order because he was in active Military service at the material time, but then in terms of the averments made in the writ petition itself, he was discharged from the active Military service on 31.05.1999 and there is no explanation as to why order dated 11.07.1995 (Annexure P-4) was not challenged by him within some reasonable time after his discharge. The plea of the said petitioner of not being able to file revision petition before respondent No. 2 on account of his being in Military service does not find mention in the grounds of revision petition, which demonstrates that said ground raised in this petition is just an afterthought.

A perusal of the order passed in the revision petition demonstrates that respondent No. 2 took into consideration the respective contentions of the parties and also order dated 11.07.1995 and accordingly held that the filing of the revision petition after 26 years, was not justified. We concur with the findings returned by the learned Divisional Commissioner for the reason that order dated 11.07.1995 (Annexure P-4) was indeed a result of the compromise entered into between the parties therein, i.e., the petitioners and the private respondents. Learned Divisional Commissioner rightly rejected the revision petition by holding that neither the revision petition was based on correct assertions nor the delay of 26 years in assailing the order was legally justifiable, as during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners could not justify the delay in filing the revision petition to the satisfaction of this Court.

In view of the above discussion, as we do not find any merit in the writ petition, the same is dismissed, so also pending miscellaneous applications, if any. No order as to costs.