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Judgment
Dharam Veer Sharma, J.
The instant special appeal has been preferred under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 read with Rule 10, Chapter IX of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 against order dated 19.6.2006 (Annexure No. SAI) passed by the Hon''ble Mr. Justice S.N. Shukla, in Writ Petition No. 3001 (M/S) of 2006, Dr. Virendar Singh v. Debts Recovery Appellant Tribunal, Allahabad and consequential contempt proceeding drawn by means of Criminal Misc. Case No. 1295 of 2006, State of LZ.P. v. Shri P.K. Deb, Chairperson initiated before this Hon''ble Court under Contempt Jurisdiction.
The Writ Petition No. 3001 (M/S) of 2006, Dr. Virendra Singh v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad and others, the Hon''ble Single Judge on 19.6.2006 took suo moto cognizance by invoking his power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India as Court of record to punish for contempt alleged to have been committed by a retired Judge Justice P.K. Deb, Chairperson, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad. It transpires from the record that in Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003, certain orders were passed by Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad despite order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 1210 (M/S) of 2004, which was dismissed by this Court by learned Single Judge, whereby order dated 18.5.2005 with following directions :
"In view of above, on account of availability of alternative statutory appellate remedy the present writ petition is not maintainable. It shall be open to the petitioner to prefer an appeal under, Section 20 of Recovery of Debt Dues to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993. On account of pendency of controversy in this Court since more than a year has been passed and also on account of fact that an interim order was passed in petitioner''s favour, the Appellate Authority is directed to entertain the appeal on merit without being influenced by delay and latches. In case, the appeal is preferred within a period of one month from today, the Appellate Authority shall decide the same simultaneously along with the pending Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003, filed against the order dated 19.8.2003 in accordance to law. While deciding the appeal the Appellate Authority shall consider the ground raised by the petitioner''s Counsel referred hereinabove apart from other grounds, which may be raised in the memo of appeal. The Appellate Authority shall decide both the appeal in accordance to law expeditiously and preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this Court. Parties shall maintain status quo for the period of four months or till disposal of appeal whichever is earlier. Subject to aforesaid observation, the writ petition is dismissed on account of availability of alternative remedy."
In pursuance of the aforesaid directions, the matter was dealt with by Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Allahabad and following order was passed in Appeal No. R543 of 2005 on 25.5.2006 by the appellant which reads as under :
"It appears that an assuming wrong jurisdiction the writ petition was filed before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court, although'' the matter relates to the Allahabad Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and it could also be found that the order of hearing the present appeal along with the Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003 was also misconceived as M.A. No. 154/2003 is pending before the learned Presiding Officer, DRT, Allahabad having sole jurisdiction over it under Section 30 of the Act and as such this Appellate Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to withdraw the appeal i.e., M.A. No. 154/2003 from the file of DRT, Allahabad or hearing the same along with the present appeal. This matter was considered at the time of admission of the present appeal and detailed observation was made in my order dated 25.1.2006 and the appeal was admitted only in respect of the impugned order alone. I do not want to reiterate the matter as the order dated 25.1.2006 had never been challenged before the Hon''ble High Court."
The aforesaid observation was brought to the notice of Hon''ble Single Judge. After considering the submissions, following order was passed on 19.6.2006 which reads as under :
".....Prima facie, after perusing the order impugned and the findings given by the opposite party No. 5 in light of order passed by this Court on 18.5.2005. I am of the view that a deliberate attempt has been made by the authority concerned to make such a finding against this Court, otherwise, if the authority concerned or any of the contesting parties was disagreed with the order passed by this Court, he should have got it modified or clarified by way of moving an application of modification/clarification by this Court. However, without adopting such recourse he proceeded to comment upon this Hon''ble Court which is not permissible under the law. It also cannot be taken as error in the order but the interpretation of the order passed by this Court committed by the said authority speaks that the same has been done in full conscious which, according to me, is a contempt of this Court.
Accordingly, in exercise of power provided under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, I hereby draw a contempt proceedings against Mr. P.K. Deb, Chairperson, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, opposite party No. 6 and fix the next date as 4th July, 2006 for his appearance before this Court dealing with the jurisdiction of contempt matters...."
After considering the totality of the circumstances, the learned Single Judge drew contempt proceedings under Article 215. Aggrieved by the above order, the instant appeal has been preferred inter alia on the following grounds :
(i) The learned Single Judge formed the view without any justification as there was no intention to damage or tarnish the image of High Court and to undermine the authority of the High Court by the appellant;
(ii) The Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under Section 20 DRT Act, consequently there was no scope to simultaneously decide the appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal as well as Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003. Accordingly, the order was passed by the appellant with the spirit of Section 30 of Recovery of Debt Due to Bank and Financial Act, 1993;
(iii) The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the observations were made while exercising the statutory duties under the mandatory provisions regarding hearing of appeal for condoning the delay under the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Act, 1993. Under the Act it is provided that while assuming the appellate jurisdiction at as stage when miscellaneous appeal was pending before the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, the appellate jurisdiction cannot exercise the jurisdiction to hear the said miscellaneous appeal unless an appeal is filed under Section 20 of the DRT Act challenging the order passed by the Presiding Officer Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad. Consequently, the act of the appellant was not in accordance with the law and the same could not be appreciated by the learned Single Judge. The appellant exercised his power in rightful discharge of his duties while the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the legal and mandatory provisions and Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Act, 1993;
(iv) As the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction or authority to withdraw the appeal bearing Miscellaneous Application No. 154 of 2003, from the file of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad for hearing the same along with the appeal under question;
(v) Appellant exercise his jurisdiction in accordance with law and has neither defined nor flouted the order of the Court. Accordingly, his action cannot be treated to be contemptuous;
(vi) The entire cause of action arose at Allahabad and no part of cause of action arose at Lucknow and therefore, Lucknow Bench of this Hon''ble Court has no jurisdiction to exercise the power under Contempt of Court Act; and
(vii) Judicial Officers Protection Act (Act No. XVIII) of 1950 and Judges Protection Act, 1985 provide that (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of subsection (2) no Court shall entertain of continue any civil or criminal proceedings against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when or in the course of acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action against any person who is or was a Judge and accordingly no suit or other legal proceedings would be initiated against the contemnor in view of express bar of Recovery of Debts Due Act, 1993.
We have heard the parties at length and perused the record.
Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the impugned order passed by the Hon''ble Single Judge is in total disregard of law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court in Keshav Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1965 SC 745. Our attention was drawn to the following extract of the judgment which reads as under :
"We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt, large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the Court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity or their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct."
The learned Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the Hon''ble Single Judge acted contrary to the provision of law as laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker, reported in 1988 (3) SCC 167. The Hon''ble Apex Court approved the earlier view as reported in the case of S. Mulgaokar, 1978 (3) SCC 339, which reads as under :
"Krishna Iyer, J., in his judgment observed that the Court should act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the attack was calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The Court must harmonize the constitutional values of free criticism, and the need for a fearless curtail process and its presiding functional, the Judge to criticize a Judge fairly albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right. Where freedom of expression sub serves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it. The Court must avoid confusion between personal protection of a libeled Judge and prevention of obstruction of public justice and the community''s confidence in that great process. The former is not contempt but latter is, although overlapping spaces abound, the fourth functions canon is that the Fourth Estate should be given free play within responsible limits even when the focus of its critical attention is the Court, including the higher Court, the fifth normative guideline for the Judges to observe is not to be hypersensitive even when distortions and criticisms overstep the limits, but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, and the sixth consideration is that if the Court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges as scurrilous, offensive, intimidator or malicious beyond condo nation limits, the strong arm of the law must strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its sources and stream and accordingly no suit."
On the above preposition of law, it is urged that the Hon''ble Single Judge failed to appreciate the law laid down by Apex Court which reads as under:
"Free speech is a fundamental right; so too free access to justice. To strangle both these freedoms because the Courts are allergic to what they regard is savage criticism is to foster judicial tyranny or tantrum. Parliamentary privileges and immunities are a third basic grade sanctioned by the Constitution geared to the fearless defence of the people''s democratic rights by parliamentary. To ban criticism of legislators when one observes their pentatonic performance or berserk behavior is bedlam law. Hermeneutic harmony governs the content and contours of contempt power so as to reconcile it with fundamental rights. When? because this trinity of values is a trust for the people and tryst by the people. Whatever power springs from the Founding Deed must ultimately be accountable to the people since they are the final Indus. Contempt Power must, in fairness, respect other great rights of the people."
Our attention was further drawn to a celebrate; decision of Privy Council in the case of Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, reported in 1946 AC 335, wherein it was held as under :
"Justice is not a cloistered virtue. She must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, though outspoken, comment of ordinary men."
Lastly, it is contended that the impugned order is in violation of law of contempt which has been enunciated by Lord Denning, M.R. in a historic case R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Exp Blackburn, reported in (1968) All ER 319 (CA). Relevant extract is reproduced as under :
"Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stakes. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.
It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a Court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticize us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.
Exposed as we are to the winds of criticisms, nothing which is said by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor I would add, from saying what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done."
In view of the aforesaid submissions, the appellant has tried to impress this Court that the learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in exercising the power under Article 215. On the contrary, the learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that since no final order has been passed by this Court, accordingly the appeal is not maintainable. It has further been urged that the contemnor is a retired Judge of the High Court and he should have due regard for the Courts and accordingly his action is nefarious.
Before considering the rival submissions of the parties, we would like to observed at this stage that the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is wellfounded that the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge with the assumption that the appellant committed contempt, which brings the action within the scope of appellant jurisdiction.
We agree to the learned Counsel for the appellant that instead of providing opportunity of being heard the appellant was held guilty by learned Single Judge in total disregard of principle of natural justice. Thus, finality may be attached to the impugned order, consequently the appeal lies. Therefore, the objections advanced about the maintainability of the special appeal is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
We are also unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the learned Single Judge was right in exercising his power as a Court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India for obstruction of the Court of justice without adhering the principle of natural justice.
Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively, the dignity and authority of Courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. It is for this purpose that the Courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those who indulge in acts, whether inside or outside the Courts which tend to undermine their authority and bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalizing them and obstructing them discharging their duties without fear or favour.
The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of Law. An act constitutes contempt if it is calculated to or has the tendency of interfering with the due course of justice. The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in the case of Contempt of Court is not to vindicate the dignity of the person of the Judge but to prevent undue interference with the public possess must in no way be tarnished, diminished or wiped out by contumacious behavior of any person. An erring Judge and erring contemnor are both a danger to the pristine purity of the seat of Justice. If anyone affects by his conduct his sanctity and purity of the seat of Justice he deserves condemnation. Courts are necessarily presided over by Judges who, like all other men, are liable to err. Their decision are open to fair, honest and reasonable criticism. Courts are not unduly sensitive to fair comment or even outspoken comments being made about their judgment and orders made objectively, fairly and without any malice.
Normally, action for contempt may not be taken by the Court where the disobedience of the order is unintentional and accidental or the order was made with the consent of parties. Where it is impossible to comply with the order contempt proceedings may not be initiated.
Both the Hon''ble Apex Court and the High Courts are Courts of Record. The Constitution does not define "Court of Record" but this expression is well recognised in judicial world. A Court of Record is "a Court whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony" and has the power of summarily punishing contempt of itself as well as of Subordinate Courts. A Court of Record is a Court, the records of which are admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be questioned when produced before any Court. The power that Courts of Record enjoy to punish for contempt is a part of their inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the Courts to administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and to prevent interference in the due administration of justice.
In Contempt of Court cases the Court should always proceed with the thought that law should be most zealously and carefully applied and the power is to be cautiously exercised with the greatest reluctance and anxiety, because of the betterment and welfare of the State and because the privileges of the Judges are involved. The Court should not be anxious of the vulgar desire to elevate itself for grasping after a preeminence by using its legal thumbscrew injudiciously and punishing for "mysterious and indefinable offence" which is not only easy to commit but liable to "prompt and condemn punishment". The Court should not be over and hypersensitive. It should not exercise this jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety or on any exaggerated notion of the dignity of the Judges.
Courts are impersonal in meeting out justice. They are never vindictive. A judicious weighment as to the facts in the case and as to whether on the facts the alleged contemnor did commit contempt is absolutely necessary.
Thus it would appear from Oswald''s dictum that the Judge who acts in good faith and not out of bad faith and motive, is not liable for any error of judgment committed by him in his official capacity. This is the general principle on which in India, there is enacted a statute called. The Judicial Officers'' Protect Act, XVIII of 1950''. It is described as an Act for Protection of Judicial Officers acting judicially. Its only provision, Section 1, postulates :
"1. Nonliability to suit of officers acting judicially for official acts done in good faith and of officers executing warrants and orders. No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done, or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his official duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, provided that he at the time in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same."
So it is clear that Judicial Officer is protected
(1) for any act done or ordered to be done in the discharge of his official duty;
(2) if he acted in good faith believing he had jurisdiction to do so;
(3) and it does not matter if in fact he had or had not jurisdiction; and
(4) no suit can lie in any Civil Court against the Judge for the execution of any warrant or order which he would be bound to execute.
Likewise, the provision in Judges Protection Act, 1985 says:
"Additional protection to Judges. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of subsection (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action.
(whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge."
What is important is ''good faith'' on the part of the Judicial Officer, it must be a bonafide belief referred to in the Act aforesaid and not a belief based on no probable or plausible ground, arrived at inconsiderately and without due enquiry. It means care and attention on the part of the person who does or orders the act complained of. The immunity granted under the Act only refers to acts done in good faith and is further confined to suits in Civil Courts. Judicial opinion further says that where the act complained of is one done in the discharge of judicial duty within the jurisdiction of the officer, the fact that he did not in good faith believe in his jurisdiction to act in the manner he did does not deprive him of the protection. This appears to be an extension of the principle stated in the section. This leads to the conclusion that if there is no bad faith or motive, the protection is there.
It is the fundamental requirement of law that the doctrine of natural justice be complied with and the same has, as a matter of fact, turned out to be an integral part of administrative jurisprudence, the judicial process itself embraces a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend though the same is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The facts in the present matter under consideration are singularly singular. The entire chain of events smack of some personal clash and adaptation of a method unknown to law in hottest of haste.
It is said that law is nothing but strong common sense and so is the natural justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons, however, at times it is equated to. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations, which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice, which has to determine its form.
The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality pedantry or logical prevarication. It brush aside the technicalities. It supplied the omissions of a formulated law. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasijudicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue or depriving somebody form his/her valuable rights. In that case the principle of natural justice is attracted. Needless to say that by lapse of time the principles of natural justice are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case they have to meet (while in this case these basic ingredients is wanting). Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation (in this case no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner). In the absence of a notice of this kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated (which is contended by the petitioner). Thus, it is but essential that the parties should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. Surprisingly, no notice was given to the appellant. Thus, the foremost principle of natural justice appears to have been flouted in this case as Returning Officer has not proceeded in accordance with the approved rule of fair play.
We find that the concept of natural justice has gained significance and shades with the time. The principles of natural justice are those rules which have been admittedly laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasijudicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights.
We have considered the impugned order in the light of earlier order passed by the appellant. Admittedly, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant to explain his conduct. It is a basic requirement of principle of natural justice that after giving opportunity of being heard, any adverse order should be passed, whereas in the present case the impugned order dated 19.6.2006 has been passed without giving any opportunity to the appellant, who is a retired Judge of the High Court. Thus, the order is not sustainable in the eyes of law because of violation of principle of natural justice. We further find that there is not even iota of evidence to suggest that the appellant passed the order with the intention to damage and tarnish image of the High Court, consequently, the learned Single Judge took a hyper technical view in this matter.
We have also adverted various provisions. They provide ring of protection of the Judges against contempt. We have already discussed the whole issue keeping in mind duties and responsibilities to the judicial officers in imparting justice in these matters. The protection is provided to the Judges to act fearlessly and discharge their duties bonafidely.
Having regard to the orders passed by the appellant, we have no hesitation to say that even from the bird''s eye view it cannot gathered, that the impugned orders dated 18.5.2005 or 25.5.2006 were not passed in good faith or bona fide. We cannot presume that there is probable or plausible ground to arrive at a decision that the immunity granted to Judges under Judges Protection Act should not be allowed to be availed by the appellant. Consequently, the appellant passed the order dated 25.5.2006 in Appeal No. R543 of 2005 bona fidely in good faith and without any intention to tarnish the image of this Court.
Yet there is another aspect. It was not well within the power of the appellant to simultaneously decide the appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal as well as Misc. Appeal No. 154 of 2003, accordingly, the order was passed with the spirit of Section 30 of Recovery of Debt Dues to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993. We would like to refer the provisions of Sections 20 and 30 which read as under :
"20. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. (1) Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Ordinance, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.
(2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties.
(3) Every appeal under subsection (1) shall be filed within a period of fortyfive days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed :
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of fortyfive days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.
(4) On receipt of an appeal under subsection (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting aside the order appealed against.
(5) the Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned Tribunal.
(6) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under subsection
(1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of receipt of the appeal.
Orders of Recovery Officer to be deemed as orders of Tribunal. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 29, an order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive), shall be deemed to have been made by the Tribunal and an appeal against such order shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal."
Even bare reading of both the sections leave no room for doubt that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the appellant was not exercising the statutory duties or exercising under the mandatory provisions regarding hearing of appeal. The appellant in rightful discharge of his duties exercise powers while considering the condo nation of delay as a judicial officer in accordance with law. Consequently, there is no shade of contempt in the impugned order dated 25.5.2006.
At this juncture, it would be further pertinent to mention that the law of contempt gained significance and the judiciary which is guardian of the rule of law ensures that judicial officer performed their duties and functions efficiently. Thus, their actions if are bona fide and in accordance with law, in that case the dignity and authority of Tribunals has to be respected and they have to be protected at all cost.
We do not find any justification to undermine the authority of the Chairman, Debt Tribunal, who has vast experience as Judge of the High Court and had no intention to disrupt and disrespect the majesty of the Court or in any way obstruct the course of justice. Thus, this Court has always trusted the authority of Tribunal and Subordinate Courts and has always ensured to encourage the ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. Undoubtedly, the provisions of Judicial Officers Protection Act and Judges Protection Act provide certain immunities to the Judges in dispense on of justice. In this case, we do not find any whisper or lack of good faith or bona fide or obstruction of course of justice intentionally.
Before parting with the judgment we would like to refer that in view of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court and the spirit of law, this Court has laws been reluctant to take action for contempt against Judges or Officers, if they have acted bona fidely. This is the consistent view of this Court that if it is impossible to comply with the order, the contempt proceedings may not be initiated.
Considering the facts in its entirely and the legal position enumerated herein above, the impugned orders dated 25.5.2006 and 23.2.2004 passed by opposite parties No. 1 and 2 as contained in Annexure Nos. 1 and 2 are hereby quashed.
In the result, special appeal arising out of the judgment dated 19.6.2006 is allowed. Appeal allowed.