High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 10 P&H CK 6078

Pransh Gilhotra vs Sabina Arora & Ors.

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 28 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Mandeep Pannu, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
CR No.7849 of 2026

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Judgment

25 paragraphs · 2,328 words

Mandeep Pannu, J.

1.

The present revision petition has been filed by the petitioners challenging the order dated 08.10.2026 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Fazilka, whereby the appeal preferred by respondents No.1 and 2 under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure against the ex-parte ad interim status quo order dated 17.09.2026 passed by learned trial Court has been allowed and the order of learned trial Court has been set aside.

2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff contends that the impugned order is legally unsustainable, as the appeal preferred by respondents No.1 and 2 was premature and ought not to have been entertained and decided by learned Lower Appellate Court. It is submitted that learned trial Court, while passing the ex-parte ad interim status quo order on 17.09.2026, had fixed the application for temporary injunction for consideration on 08.10.2026, i.e within thirty days of the passing of the said order. However, respondents No.1 and 2 preferred an appeal on 30.09.2026, obtained a stay on 01.10.2026 and the appeal was ultimately allowed on 08.10.2026, the very date on which the application was fixed before learned trial Court. It is, thus, contended that learned trial Court had not failed to comply with the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3-A CPC and that the period of thirty days had not expired when the appeal was entertained and decided.

3.

Learned counsel further submits that respondents No.1 and 2 ought to have approached learned trial Court for vacation, modification or alteration of the ex-parte ad interim order before invoking the appellate jurisdiction. It is argued that the application for temporary injunction was pending consideration before learned trial Court and the date fixed for its consideration had not yet arrived when the appeal was instituted. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Challappan and others, 2000(7) SCC 695 and the judgments in M/S India Glycols Limited v. Radico Khaitan Limited, First Appeal From Order No.950 of 2021, decided on 06.08.2021 by the Allahabad High Court, and Ghulam Ahmad Mir v. Javid Ahmad Wani and others, CM(M) No.30 of 2021 and CM No.934 of 2021, decided on 03.03.2023 by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court. It is, accordingly, contended that the impugned order deserves to be set aside on the ground that the appeal was entertained and decided prematurely, without the respondents first pursuing their remedy before learned trial Court.

4.

Learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2/defendants, on the other hand, submits that the impugned order passed by learned Lower Appellate Court is legal and justified. It is contended that learned trial Court, while passing the ex-parte ad interim status quo order dated 17.09.2026, failed to record adequate reasons demonstrating that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, as contemplated under Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC. It is argued that the grant of an injunction without notice to the opposite party is an exceptional measure and that the statutory safeguards governing the exercise of such power are required to be strictly observed. Learned counsel further submits that Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC ordinarily requires the Court, before granting an injunction, to direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The proviso thereto permits the grant of an injunction without notice where the Court is of the opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. In such a situation, the Court is required to record reasons for its opinion and require the applicant to deliver or send to the opposite party, immediately after the order is made, copies of the application for injunction, the affidavit filed in support thereof, the plaint and the documents relied upon, besides filing an affidavit of compliance on the day on which the injunction is granted or on the immediately following day. It is contended that these safeguards are intended to ensure that an ex-parte injunction is granted only in appropriate circumstances and that the affected party is afforded an effective opportunity to contest the application at the earliest.

5.

It is further submitted that the requirements concerning the delivery of copies and the filing of the affidavit under the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC were duly complied with in the present case. It is, nevertheless, argued that the absence of adequate reasons for dispensing with prior notice rendered the ex-parte order legally unsustainable and justified interference by learned Lower Appellate Court. Reliance is placed upon A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu’s case (supra) to contend that an order granting an ex-parte injunction is appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC and that the affected party is entitled to seek appropriate redress against such an order. It is, thus, argued that learned Lower Appellate Court was justified in entertaining the appeal and setting aside the order passed by learned trial Court. Dismissal of the present revision petition is, accordingly, sought.

6.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully.

7.

Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the application for temporary injunction or the respective claims of the parties in the suit, the short question which arises for consideration in the present revision petition is whether learned Lower Appellate Court was justified in entertaining and deciding the appeal preferred by respondents No.1 and 2 against the ex-parte ad interim order dated 17.09.2026 when the application for temporary injunction was still pending consideration before learned trial Court, the date fixed for its consideration had not yet arrived at the time of institution of the appeal, and the period of thirty days contemplated under Order XXXIX Rule 3-A CPC had not expired.

8.

The relevant chronology assumes significance. Learned trial Court, vide order dated 17.09.2026, passed an ex-parte ad interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo and fixed the matter for 08.10.2026. Before the said date, respondents No.1 and 2 preferred an appeal on 30.09.2026, wherein a stay order was passed on 01.10.2026. The appeal was thereafter allowed by learned Lower Appellate Court vide order dated 08.10.2026, i.e on the very date on which the application for temporary injunction was fixed for consideration before learned trial Court. Thus, the appeal was instituted before the date fixed for consideration of the injunction application and was decided while the said application remained pending before learned trial Court.

9.

The controversy has to be examined in the light of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 3, 3-A and 4, read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu’s case (supra).

10.

Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC provides that, before granting an injunction, the Court shall, in the ordinary course, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The proviso empowers the Court to dispense with such notice where the Court is of the opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, subject to the recording of reasons and compliance with the other statutory requirements. These requirements are material safeguards governing the grant of an ex-parte injunction and cannot be treated as mere formalities.

11.

In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the interplay between Order XXXIX Rules 3 and 3-A and Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC. The Court recognised that an order granting an ex-parte temporary injunction is appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC. At the same time, the Court examined the course ordinarily to be followed by an aggrieved party when an application for temporary injunction or for vacation of an ex-parte injunction is pending before the Court which passed the order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, in the ordinary course, an aggrieved party cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of an application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction, except where the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3-A CPC is flouted.

12.

The distinction between the existence of an appellate remedy and the stage at which it ought to be pursued also finds support from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in M/S India Glycols Limited’s case (supra). In the said case, the appeal against an ex-parte ad interim injunction was held not maintainable in the circumstances noticed by the Court, including that the appeal had been filed before the date fixed before the trial Court and that the affected party had not first approached the trial Court for vacation of the injunction. The decision reinforces the principle that the existence of an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC does not, by itself, justify bypassing the proceedings already pending before the trial Court.

13.

Similarly, in Ghulam Ahmad Mir’s case (supra), the Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that an aggrieved party must first approach the trial Court for vacation, modification or alteration of an ex-parte interim order before filing an appeal. The Court, while dealing with the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, set aside the order of the Appellate Court and granted liberty to the aggrieved party to seek appropriate relief before the trial Court in accordance with law. The aforesaid judgment lends support to the proposition that the Court which passed the ex-parte order should ordinarily be afforded the first opportunity to consider the grievance of the affected party.

14.

The judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Intime Spectrum Registry Ltd. v. MCS Ltd., 2007(40) RCR(Civil) 8, also requires consideration. In that case, while examining an ex-parte ad interim injunction, the Court considered whether the trial Court had referred to the circumstances warranting urgent relief and held that the order could not be regarded as illegal merely on the ground urged against it where the circumstances indicating urgency had been considered. The decision underscores the importance of examining the reasons recorded by the trial Court in the context of the requirements of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC. It does not, however, dispense with the need to examine whether the appellate jurisdiction was invoked at the appropriate stage in the facts of a particular case.

15.

In Jaswinder Kaur and another v. Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sunam, Civil Writ Petition No. 12491 of 2020 (O&M), decided on 01.09.2020, this Court considered the remedy available under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC in the context of an application for temporary injunction and the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3-A CPC. The judgment recognizes that an aggrieved party has an efficacious remedy of appeal where the statutory circumstances warrant its invocation, including where the application for injunction or vacation of an ex-parte order is not decided within the prescribed period.

16.

The aforesaid judgments, read together, establish that an ex-parte injunction order is appealable, however, the exercise of the appellate remedy must be considered in the context of the statutory scheme and the stage of the proceedings before the trial Court. Where the application for temporary injunction has already been fixed for consideration within the prescribed period, and no failure on the part of the trial Court to comply with Order XXXIX Rule 3-A CPC has arisen, the ordinary course indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court requires the affected party to seek appropriate relief before the trial Court.

17.

In the present case, even if the respondents were aggrieved by the reasons recorded by learned trial Court for granting the ex-parte ad interim status quo order, such grievance could ordinarily have been brought before learned trial Court itself by seeking vacation, modification or alteration of the order under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC. Learned trial Court was seized of the application for temporary injunction and had fixed the matter for consideration on 08.10.2026. The respondents, instead of awaiting the date already fixed or seeking appropriate relief before the Court which passed the order instituted the appeal on 30.09.2026 and obtained a stay on 01.10.2026. The appeal was thereafter decided on 08.10.2026, before learned trial Court could consider the application on the date fixed for that purpose.

18.

It is significant that the period of thirty days from the order dated 17.09.2026 had not expired on 08.10.2026. Learned trial Court had fixed the application for consideration within the said period. Consequently, no failure to comply with the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3-A CPC had arisen on the date on which the appeal was decided.

19.

The legality and sufficiency of the reasons recorded by learned trial Court, as well as the merits of the application for temporary injunction, are matters which ought to be considered in the first instance by learned trial Court upon hearing both parties. This Court is, therefore, not expressing any opinion on the validity of the ex-parte ad interim status quo order dated 17.09.2026 or on the respective rights of the parties in the suit.

20.

Learned Lower Appellate Court was not justified in proceeding to decide the appeal on 08.10.2026, the very date fixed by learned trial Court for consideration of the pending application, without giving learned trial Court the opportunity to consider the application in accordance with law. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside, leaving all questions relating to the grant, continuation or vacation of the temporary injunction open for consideration by learned trial Court.

21.

In view of the above, the present revision petition is allowed. The order dated 08.10.2026 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Fazilka, is set aside.

22.

Learned trial Court is directed to decide the application for temporary injunction expeditiously, preferably within seven days from the date of appearance of the defendants and filing of their reply to the said application, after affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties.

23.

However, nothing observed herein shall be construed as an expression on the merits of the case.

24.

Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.