Pranesh Chandra Gupta vs Panchanani Devi

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—This is an application for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution.

The judgment of this Court from which the appeal is proposed to be taken to the Supreme Court, was a judgment of affirmance. The test, however, of valuation in the instant case, which arose out of a suit for ejectment from a property, which bore a monthly rental of Rs. 150 per month and which, according to the affidavit of the Petitioner, was valued at much above Rs. 20,000, would be prima facie satisfied under Clause (1)(b) of Article 133 of the Constitution, as it may well be said that the decision in such a case would indirectly affect property of that value.

That, however, by itself, would not be sufficient for the Petitioner, as the instant case being a case of a judgment of affirmance, it would be necessary for him to establish further that it involves a substantial question of law. For that purpose, our attention has been drawn by Mr. Mitter, counsel for the Petitioner, to one aspect of the matter, namely, that the dispute between the parties concerned the question of validity of the notice to quit and raised the point whether the said notice, in the instant case, which asked the tenant Petitioner to quit and vacate the disputed property "by the last day of September, 1958" would be a good notice according to law, expiring with the month of the tenancy which, admittedly, was according to English Calendar months. The whole question, therefore, is whether the word "by" in the above expression would include the last day of September, mentioned therein.

In our judgment, we have answered this question in the affirmative. We have stated, in our judgment, that the said interpretation would be supported by the dictionary meaning of the expression "by" in such context, the appropriate meaning from that point of view being "on or before". That view seems to be supported by the decision of this Court, reported in Mozam Shaikh v. Annada Prosad Bhadra (1941) 46 C.W.N. 366 (367). It is also supported by the recent English decision in Eastanagh v. Macpherson (1954) 3 All E.R. 214 (215), where the Master of the Rolls Sir Raymond Evershed expressed himself on this point, after referring to the different dictionary meanings of the word "by" as follows:

As a matter of definition, therefore, I should be inclined to think that "by the date" ought to mean "on or before the date".

The same view also follows from the more recent decision of this Court, reported in E.M. Davidson (Mrs.) v. Asma Khatun (1966) 70 C.W.N. 967. No decision to the contrary has been placed before us.

As we have already said, the dictionary meaning, as quoted above, supports the view taken by us in our judgment and bearing in mind that such notices are to be construed liberally, vide Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy (1916) L.R. 45 I.A. 222 and not with a fault finding attitude, the acceptance of that meaning would be well supported and would not be open to any serious objection.

In the above view, we hold that no substantial question of law arises in this case so as to entitle the Petitioner to the grant of a certificate under Clause (1)(b) of Article 133 of the Constitution.

We would, accordingly, dismiss this application, although, in the circumstances, we would not make any order for costs in this proceeding.

The operation of this order, however, will remain stayed for two months to enable the Petitioner to take further steps in the matter if he is so advised.

D. Basu, J.

I agree.