Pranab Deb vs State Of Tripura And Ors.

[1] Heard Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Advocate General assisted by Ms. A. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

[2] By means of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the decision as contained in the communication dated 01.02.2021 [Annexure-4 to the writ petition] issued by the Sub Divisional Police Officer, the SDPO in short, Sadar. For purpose of reference, the entire communication is reproduced hereunder:

GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA

OFFICE OF THE SUB-DIVISIONAL POLICE OFFICER (SADAR)

WEST TRIPURA:AGARTALA

No.368-71/SDPO(SDR)/AGT/2021, Dated 01-02-2021

To

Sri Pranab Deb On behalf of

Joint Movement Committee 10323 Agartala, Tripura

Mob-7005324570

Reference:- Your application number- Nil Dated 31-01-2021

Subject:- Sit-in-Demonstration for indefinite period from 03.02.2021 in front of City Centre, Agartala-regarding.

Please refer to your application dated 31-01-2021 submitted to the undersigned through proper channel seeking permission for Sit-in-Demonstration for indefinite period from 03-02-2021 in front of City Centre, Agartala.

Your application is carefully examined but the same is regretted due to prevailing Law & Order situations.

This refers to section 78(3) and 79 of Tripura Police Act 2007.

Sd

Illegible

Sub-Divisional Police Officer (Sadar)

West Tripura: Agartala SDPO (Sadar) Agartala, West Tripura

Copy to:-

The Superintendent of Police (DIB) West Tripura, Agartala for favour of kind information.

The Additional Superintendent of police (Urban) West Tripura, Agartala for favour of king information.

The Officer-in-Charge, West Agartala P.S. for information and necessary action please.

Sub-Divisional Police Officer (Sadar)

West Tripura: Agartala

[3] This decision was admittedly taken on the basis of the intimation dated 31.01.2021. Again for purpose of better reference, the entire text of the letter dated 31.01.2021 [Annexure-3 to the writ petition] is reproduced in full :

Dated, 31st January, 2021

To

The SDPO

Sadar, Agartala

(Through Proper Channel)

Subject: Permission for Sit In Demonstration for Indefinite period from 3rd February 2021 by Joint Movement Committee 10323-Prayer thereof.

Sir,

Solicit your king cooperation to the Sit In Demonstration by Joint movement Committee 10323 and we shall remain grateful to you forever.

In no response from the State Administration we hereby would like to inform you that out Sit In Demonstration will continue for another indefinite period till our permanent solution is solved. We request the State Govt. to give us in writing.

This is for your kind perusal and granting us permission and for onward transmission if necessary.

Yours faithfully Pranab Deb, 7005324570

Venue: City Centre, Agartala Date of Demonstration: 3rd February 2021

[4] Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that as a citizen of India, the petitioner has an inherent right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India which eminently creates right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and (f) ** [deleted by way of amendment] (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. A challenge has been raised by the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner even though an individual has asserted that he is a member of an organization called, Joint Movement Committee 10323 which has been formed by the 'victimized' teachers, who had been terminated by the state-government. Those 'victimized' teachers are widely known and referred to as 10323 as they have been terminated from Government services in consequence of the judgment and order dated 07.05.2014 passed by this court in Tanmoy Nath & Ors. vs. State of Tripura & Ors. In Para-5 of this writ petition, the petitioner has asserted as follows:

That, the terminated Teachers, under the banner of JMC, have been observing continuous peaceful Sit-in- Demonstration in front of Agartala, City Center from 07.12.2020, without disturbing the movement of traffic and pedestrians, in the vacant place, in front of the fencing of the Agartala City Center. The hundreds of Teachers have been participating in the sit-in-demonstration peacefully and lawfully demanding restoration of their job.

[5] However, in the cause title, the following has been inserted:

Directing the Respondents to give permission to the petitioner, who is representing the Joint Movement Committee formed by 10323 Teachers to hold peaceful sit in demonstration in front of Agartala City Centre & ensure safety of all protesters, and provide basic amenities for all participants, especially women, children and elderly.

[Emphasis added]

But in the main body of the writ petition, the petitioner has not stated that he has been representing the Joint Movement Committee [JMC] which has been formed by the terminated teachers. The petitioner has however, stated that on 27.01.2020 in the early morning at about 5 am., a huge contingent of TSR and CRPF personnel brought by a fleet of vehicles under the command of Superintendent of Police, West Tripura and other police officers arrived at the place of sit-in-demonstration. At that time, the male and female teachers who had been participating in the sit-in- demonstration were sleeping and many of the female teachers had children with them. They were pulled up from their sleep and they were 'kicked' out, in order to remove them from that place. But the said action of the police has not been challenged in this writ petition. What has been further urged in this writ petition, precisely is to quash the letter dated 01.02.2021 issued by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, West Tripura and to direct the respondents to give permission to the petitioner, who is representing the Joint Movement Committee formed by 10323 teachers to organize peaceful sit in demonstration in front of Agartala City Centre. It has been further urged to ensure safety of all protesters and provide basic amenities for all participants, especially women, children and elderly persons. No further relief has been urged.

[6] When this court has asked Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner, whether the petitioner is representing the Joint Movement Committee, he has categorically stated that the petitioner is not representing the Joint Movement Committee. This court has again and again asked Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel whether he will go by that statement or not. He has repeated 'yes' and reiterated that the petitioner will maintain the writ petition as an individual. Further question that had been asked by this court is that if that stand is taken by the petitioner, how he could send the intimation to the SDPO, Sadar on 31.01.2021 which had obviously been written for the Joint Movement Committee 10323. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has emphatically submitted that this writ petition should be treated as a petition by an individual, not by any organization. Despite being asked repeatedly and given enough time, even the matter was deferred to the post-lunch session and again the matter was deferred second time. On completion of all the matters on board, when the matter was taken up for hearing, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel, has not changed his stand and continued with that position as stated before. According to the petitioner, the decision of the SDPO, Sadar is entirely arbitrary, unreasonable and without being alive to the petitioner's right as guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. In the writ petition, as regards the word as typed as 'petitioners', Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that this word be read 'petitioner's' as the petitioner's constitutional right to peaceful assembly and right to free speech has been denied by a non-speaking and cryptic order in a cavalier manner showing utter disrespect to the right enshrined under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has fairly submitted that the right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution is not an unbridled right. It can be restricted in terms as provided under Articles 19(2) & 19(3) of the Constitution of India. That apart, the operation of that right has been sought to be regulated by Tripura Police Act, 2007. In Section 78 of the of Tripura Police Act, it has been provided as under:

"78. Regulation of public assemblies and processions :

(1) The District Superintendent of Police or an officer not below the rank of Assistant/Deputy Superintendent of Police may, where necessary, direct the conduct of all assemblies and processions on any public road, street or thoroughfare, and prescribe the routes by which and the time at which such procession may pass.

(2) It shall be duty of any person intending to organize a procession on any road, street or thoroughfare, or to convene an assembly at any public place, to give intimation in writing to the officer in charge of the concerned Police Station.

(3) The District Superintendent or any officer not below the rank of Assistant/Deputy Superintendent of Police, on receipt of such intimation or otherwise, and upon being satisfied that such an assembly or procession, if allowed without due control and regulation, is likely to cause a breach of peace, may prescribe necessary conditions including making provisions for satisfactory regulatory arrangements, on which alone such assembly or procession may take. Under special circumstances to be recorded in writing, the concerned officer may also prohibit the assembly or procession in public interest. All orders and directions should be given within 48 hours of receipt of intimation, as far as possible."

[7] Even Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that in terms of Section 78(1) of the Tripura Police Act, 2007, the District Superintendent of Police or an officer not below the rank of Assistant/Deputy Superintendent of Police may, where necessary, regulate the conduct of all assemblies and processions on any public road, street or thoroughfare, and prescribe the routes by which and the time, such procession may pass. Section 78(2) of the said Act provides the duty of any person intending to organize a procession on any road, street or thoroughfare, or to convene an assembly at any public place, to give intimation in writing to the officer in charge of the concerned Police Station. The said information will be verified from the different angles. Having regard to Section 78(3) of the said Act, the necessary nod be given by the police, as Section 78(3) provides that the District Superintendent or any officer not below the rank of Assistant/Deputy Superintendent of Police, on receipt of such intimation or otherwise, and upon being satisfied that such an assembly or procession, if allowed without due control and regulation, is likely to cause breach of peace, may prescribe necessary conditions including making provisions for satisfactory regulatory arrangements, on which alone such assembly or procession may take. Only under special circumstances to be recorded in writing, the concerned officer may also prohibit the assembly or procession in public interest. All orders and directions should be given within 48 hours of receipt of such intimation, as far as possible. Since Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has insisted to consider this writ petition as an action filed by one individual citizen, the court will confine its consideration within that borders.

[8] Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel in order to buttress his contentions has relied on a few decisions. He has referred the following passages from State of West Bengal and others vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and others, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 571 :

(i) The fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, are inherent and cannot be extinguished by any Constitutional or Statutory provision. Any law that abrogates or abridges such rights would be violative of the basic structure doctrine. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account in determining whether or not it destroys the basic structure.

(iii) In view of the constitutional scheme and the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 32 and on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution the power of judicial review being an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution, no Act of Parliament can exclude or curtail the powers of the Constitutional Courts with regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights. As a matter of fact, such a power is essential to give practicable content to the objectives of the Constitution embodied in Part III and other parts of the Constitution. Moreover, in a federal constitution, the distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislature involves limitation on legislative powers and, therefore, this requires an authority other than the Parliament to ascertain whether such limitations are transgressed. Judicial review acts as the final arbiter not only to give effect to the distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislatures, it is also necessary to show any transgression by each entity.

(v) Restriction on the Parliament by the Constitution and restriction on the Executive by the Parliament under an enactment, do not amount to restriction on the power of the Judiciary under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution.

The other parts of the same passage are not relevant in the context and for this reason, those have not been reproduced.

[9] Based on the said observation made by the apex court, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has contended that even if the provisions of Section 78 of Tripura Police Act has not been challenged, if the court finds that provision has come in conflict with the provisions of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India, that can be declared ultra vires for being in conflict with the fundamental right protected under Part-III of the Constitution.

[10] Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has referred to Bimal Gurung vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 480 where the apex court has reproduced a passage from Anita Thakur vs. State of J & K, reported in (2016) 15 SCC 525 in which it has been observed as under:

"12. We can appreciate that holding peaceful demonstration in order to air their grievances and to see that their voice is heard in the relevant quarters is the right of the people. Such a right can be traced to the fundamental freedom that is guaranteed under Articles 19(1) (a), 19(1)(b) and 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers freedom of speech to the citizens of this country and, thus, this provision ensures that the petitioners could raise slogan, albeit in a peaceful and orderly manner, without using offensive language. Article 19(1)(b) confers the right to assemble and, thus, guarantees that all citizens have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Right to move freely given under Article 19(1)(d), again, ensures that the petitioners could take out peaceful march. The "right to assemble" is beautifully captured in an eloquent statement that "an unarmed, peaceful protest procession in the land of "salt satyagraha", fast-unto-death and "do or die" is no jural anathema". It hardly needs elaboration that a distinguishing feature of any democracy is the space offered for legitimate dissent. One cherished and valuable aspect of political life in India is a tradition to express grievances through direct action or peaceful protest. Organised, non- violent protest marches were a key weapon in the struggle for Independence, and the right to peaceful protest is now recognised as a fundamental right in the Constitution."

[Emphasis added]

Thus, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that it is the right of the petitioner to get the permission notwithstanding what has been provided in Section 78 of Tripura Police Act.

[11] Appearing for the State, Mr. S. S. Dey, learned Advocate General has very stoutly contended that the writ petition is 'imposter's' petition inasmuch the petitioner did conceal his identity, this remark as understood by this court, has been made in reference to the petition made before the SDPO, Sadar and the stand taken by the counsel for the petitioner. He has concealed his identity while he had filed the writ petition. In view of Section 78 of the Tripura Police Act, the petitioner has fundamental duty to file the information or intimation before the police that how as an individual he would hold the demonstration and how the place of such demonstration would be managed by him. Thus, it is apparent that he had taken the brief for one organization which has not legally authorized him. Neither the said organization [JMC] has any legal character to approach this court. Therefore, if the petitioner's petition is taken as filed by one individual, there had been no decision by the SDPO so far an individual seeking permission to hold sit-in-demonstration. On reading of the application filed to the SDPO, Sadar, it appears that it was designed to be the continuation of the earlier demonstration of the Joint Movement Committee. The said intimation was only to continue such demonstration till the permanent solution was made. It has been stated therein 'we request the government to give us in writing'. This cannot be considered as the information by the petitioner herein.

[12] Having appreciated the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this court is totally unhappy the way the jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 has been invoked. It may be observed that the petitioner has not come with clean hands, particularly, in absence of authorization, he is not supposed to state on oath that he has been representing the Joint Movement Committee 10323. That apart, the permission as sought for the sit-in- demonstration was rejected on 03.02.2021. The writ petition has been filed on 10.02.2021. There is no averment that the petitioner would hold 'his demonstration' on any other date. Moreover, as stated earlier, that if this petition is alienated from the said organization, as urged by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner, this court will be persuaded to hold that there was no intimation that a single individual will hold sit-in-demonstration.

[13] So far the right is concerned, the law is settled in Amit Sahni [Shaheen Bagh, in Re] vs. Commissioner Of Police and others, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 439. The apex court has in that report dwelled upon the issue of reasonable restriction in the interest of public order quite elaborately. It has been held in Amit Sahni (supra) inter alia that what must be kept in mind, however, is that the erstwhile mode and manner of dissent against colonial rule cannot be equated with dissent in a self- ruled democracy. Our Constitutional scheme comes with the right to protest and express dissent, but with an obligation towards certain duties. Article 19, one of the cornerstones of the Constitution of India, confers upon its citizens two treasured rights, i.e., the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to assemble peacefully without arms under Article 19(1)(b). These rights, in cohesion, enable every citizen to assemble peacefully and protest against the actions or inactions of the State. The same must be respected and encouraged by the State, for the strength of a democracy such as ours lies in the same. These rights are subject to reasonable restrictions, which, inter alia, pertain to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India and public order, and to the regulation by the concerned police authorities in this regard. Additionally, as was discussed in the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan case, each fundamental right, be it of an individual or of a class, does not exist in isolation and has to be balanced with every other contrasting right. It was in this respect, that in this case, an attempt was made by us to reach a solution where the rights of protestors were to be balanced with that of commuters.

The apex court did not leave any space to be filled up by any other interpretation and thus, made it unequivocally clear that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied creating disadvantage to the people and that too indefinitely. Democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but then the demonstrations expressing dissent have to be in designated places alone. In that case, that was not only one of protests taking place in an undesignated area, but was carried creating blockade of a public way which caused grave inconvenience again to commuters [in respect of Saheen Bagh protest]. The apex court has further observed that the plea is not acceptable that an indeterminable number of people can assemble whenever or anywhere they choose to protest.

Serious reservation has been expressed by the apex court and finally, it has culled out the core of the discourse in the following words:

We have, thus, no hesitation in concluding that such kind of occupation of public ways, whether at the site in question or anywhere else for protests is not acceptable and the administration ought to take action to keep the areas clear of encroachments or obstructions.

In view of the above decision of the apex court, the challenge as circuitously projected against the provision of Section 78, sub Section 3 of the Tripura Police Act, 2007 in particular, has become thin and fragile. But that cannot be read as providing power to the state in curbing the constitutional right to assemble peaceably. This right is the distinguished feature of any democracy and provides well- arched spaces for legitimate dissent and encompasses the right to express grievances through direct action or peaceful protest. These rights are highly crucial for democracy which rests on participation of an informed citizenry in governance by evolving participation in public affairs. It permits individuals or groups to express dissent and grievance against the state, expose the flaws in governance and demand accountability from the state authorities and powerful entities. In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 324 has expressed the similar view.

[14] Having appreciated the purpose of challenge and the backdrop of denial to allow the sit-in-demonstration to be held as sought by the petitioner for one association, as noted above, this cause has to be gravitated on the aspect whether the police has disclosed the reasons for such denial. The reasons for such denial as provided is that due to prevailing law and order situations 'for indefinite period from 03.02.2021 in front of City Centre, Agartala, such permission cannot be granted.' This court had failed to understand whether the police can embark this reason for denying a proposal for holding sit-in-demonstration in an eminent place or not. The court does not have any expertise in its command to assess the law and order situation and even there is no input, placed before this court, to infer that the law and order situation is in the normal state or the other way round. Unless such input is placed in the proceeding, it would be improper for the court to direct to permit the petitioner to hold demonstration in a particular place.

[15] While making this observation, this court is conscious of the technical objection raised by Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General that the petitioner cannot represent the association without authorities. Moreover, this court has taken a note that after 5 [five] days from the day of proposed sit-in- demonstration, this writ petition has been filed. But nowhere the petitioner has disclosed whether the petitioner has any further plan to hold such demonstration on a future day. Be that as it may, this court is of the considered view that if the petitioner as an individual or as the representative of any other organization intends to get response from the police in view of Section 78 of Tripura Police Act, the petitioner may file the information or intimation before the police so that the police may respond on proper appreciation within the stipulated time. From the day of filing such information, the police shall respondent within 48[forty eight] hours, as stipulate, as regards whether the petitioner or any organization whom he may represent can hold such sit-in- demonstration or any form of protest within the knowledge of the police. It is observed further that while making their decision, the police shall not deny or unreasonably restrict. The police shall show the fullest regard to the right of the petitioner as guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The restriction or prohibition as provided under Articles 19(2) and 19(3) of the Constitution is for preserving public order and/or internal security of the country etc. The law in this regard has leaned towards the right to hold the assembly. The police cannot be permitted to suppress that right absolutely. The state must aid the right to assembly of the citizens. The government has the power to regulate to avoid any form of breakdown of the public order [See Kameshar Prasad vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1962 1166]. How can we forget that it is the state's onus to safeguard such right and not to become a state where the democratic rights are suppressed on fall of a hat. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. [of the US Supreme Court] once commented that the conflict of interests arise as the state on the one hand is the guardian of the fundamental right of its citizens to protest by providing the places for expressing their displeasures and dissents, whilst the state has the duty at the same time to ensure that it fulfill its function of maintaining the public order. In Himmat Lal K. Shah vs. Commissioner of Police, reported in (1973) 1 SCC 227, the apex court has laid down the obligation of the state in aiding the said right. It has been observed that the state and local authority have virtual monopoly over open space at which outdoor meetings can be held. There persists an obligation upon the state to provide adequate spaces for public meeting or demonstration to ensure the right to peaceful assembly.

[16] In Ramleela Maidan Incident in re, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 1, the said view as reflected in Himmat Lal K. Shah (supra) has been restated and that sprit has been carried forward Amin Sahni (supra) though the apex court has observed that the demonstrations expressing dissent have to be in the designated places alone subject to the control by the authority in task of maintaining the public order. The control does not mean arbitrary and unreasonable act. The said authority shall exercise their control to avert any inconvenience to the citizens who are not participating in such assembly or meetings. But a reasonable analysis of those proceedings as referred before, some general principles can be culled out for deciding the reasonableness of restriction:

[i] Restriction sought to be imposed on fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India must not be arbitrary or excessive in nature. Requirement in the interest of public order be balanced without eclipsing the right itself.

[ii] There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction imposed and the objects sought to be achieved.

[iii] No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal application in all cases. Such consideration on the question of reasonableness, therefore, is expected to vary from case to case. In interpreting constitutional provisions, the court should be clear about the felt need of the society. While applying such distinction, it must be kept in consideration on the complex issues faced by people. There should be vent of their opinion for a vibrant democracy. Even the judicial approach shall be dynamic, pragmatic and elastic.

[iv] It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness, restriction imposed by statute like Tripura Police Act, 2007, the court might examine whether the restriction as talked about in Article 19 of the Constitution is being given affect in a manner which intervenes the fundamental rights. The right dominates over statutory prescriptions as the statute itself has to be in conformity to the constitutional scheme.

[v] The reasonableness has to be tested from both procedural and substantive aspects. It should not be bound by the processional perniciousness or the jurisprudence of remedies.

In crux, any restriction imposed on the fundamental rights, guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, must not be arbitrary, unanalyzed and excessive. Therefore, restrictions are to be reasonable and must be consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution.

[17] If the police is guaranteed of the peaceful demonstration that there is no objection regarding the place, ordinarily such permission or nod shall be granted as this right is a valuable democratic right and if such right is truncated without deep analysis, the fundamentals of democracy will be at stake. But for making the balance as indicated, one of the important functions of the police are to seek cooperation of the person or the organization to promote and secure public order. The guiding light comes from Amit Sahni (supra). It is made absolutely clear that so far the granting permission is concerned, as it depends on the assessment of threat to the public order, it will be within the domain of the police authority to take a call but to extend due regard to the constitutional imperative is no less important.

[18] Having further regard to Section 78 of Tripura Police Act in respect of regulation of public assemblies and processions, this court would direct that the police authority to not act arbitrarily or as the despot. While taking a decision on whether the permission or whether they can give clearance to a proposal sent for their consideration for holding public assembly and demonstration in a place and or during the proposed time, they may prescribe the conditions in the interest of the public order. If it is found that one prominent place has to be intimated as the venue to the police authority for holding assembly or demonstration cannot be concurred, in that event a separate place of similar importance can be proposed to the person intimating the proposal for holding of public assembly or demonstration. The police cannot take a stand that they would not permit to hold assembly or demonstration. That would constitute total prohibition. Such prohibition is unconstitutional and inoperative. The police authority should engage in dialogue with the person or the organization intimating the proposal for public assembly or demonstration. Even before imposing the restriction, there may be a dialogue between the person or the organization intimating to hold a public assembly or demonstration and the police authority, so that the conditions can be discussed about and the difficulties or grievances which may emanate from those conditions can be reconsidered by the police authority. Thus, the police authority shall give the primacy to grant the permission, denial will be the exception and while exercising the said exception, all sorts of options be considered so that no section of the citizenry feels that the police of independent India is suppressing them in voicing their legitimate dissent against any action of the state or any law. The prayer of the petitioner for certain date is no more justiceable and as such, with the observations and directions as noted above, this writ petition stands disposed of.

No order as to costs.

[19] Before parting with the records, this court seriously records its displeasure the way the writ petition has been filed in this court without placing the relevant materials. When an issue of authorization is foundational, without placing any authorization how the petitioner can ventilate the grievance of an organization? He cannot. However, disposal of the writ petition will not create any embargo for the petitioner to intimate the police authority seeking their nod for convening or organizing an assembly or demonstration on some other day or days.