Prakash Keshao Harshe vs State of Maharashtra and Others

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

By the present writ petition the petitioner challenges the order passed by the Labour Court, Nagpur dated 29/01/1998 dismissing the complaint filed by him under provisions of Section-28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, the said Act). Aforesaid order has been confirmed by the Industrial Court in the revision application preferred by the petitioner.

It is the case of the petitioner that his father Keshav was in employment with the respondents and was holding a Class-IV post. He was to retire on superannuation on 31/05/1992 hence an application came to be moved by him for grant of employment to the petitioner who was his son on compassionate basis. On 01/10/1992, the petitioner came to be appointed on compassionate basis for a period of three months by referring to certain circulars issued by respondent No. 1. On the expiry of period of three months, the petitioner requested for being given fresh appointment. As the petitioner was not again appointed, he filed proceedings under provisions of Item-1 Schedule-IV of the said Act and challenged the action of termination of his services.

The respondents filed their reply and took the stand that the petitioner had been granted temporary appointment for a period of three months and that there was no right created in the petitioner to seek further appointment. The Labour Court after considering the material available on record came to the conclusion that the appointment of the petitioner was for a fixed period of three months and hence by not continuing the petitioner in employment, no unfair labour practice was committed. It further noted that the petitioner''s father had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed revision application and the Industrial Court held that in terms of order of appointment, the petitioner was not entitled for any relief.

Shri S. Borkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner came to be appointed on compassionate basis considering various exigencies and the fact that the petitioner was found eligible as per various circulars issued by the State Government. He submitted that as per circular dated 14/04/1981, a son or unmarried daughter of a Class-IV employee was entitled to be considered for appointment within period of one year from retirement by relaxing the requirement of the name of the candidate being recommended by the Employment Exchange. He also submitted that in absence of any restriction in aforesaid circular, the appointment could not have been only for period of three months. He referred to communication dated 05/01/1993 issued by office of the respondent No. 2 wherein case of the petitioner was referred for absorption on another post. He further submitted that two other employees who were similarly situated had been granted appointment and hence the petitioner was entitled for relief.

Shri P.B. Patil, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent No. 1 supported the impugned order. It was submitted that the appointment of the petitioner could not be said to be on compassionate basis as his father had retired after attaining the age of superannuation. It was submitted that no such right was created in the petitioner in terms of the order of appointment to claim that he was entitled for regular appointment. Shri Patil further submitted that as the appointment of the petitioner was not on compassionate basis, the relief was rightly refused by both the Courts.

I have considered the respective submissions and have gone through the documents filed on record. As per the circular dated 14/04/1981, it has been stated that in respect of a Class-IV employee who retires on attaining age of superannuation, the condition of the name of his son or unmarried daughter being sponsored by the Employment Exchange would stand relaxed. Clause-3 thereafter further stipulates that the name of the candidate was required to be registered with the Employment Exchange. The appointment order of the petitioner dated 01/10/1992 records that he was being appointed on compassionate basis for a period of three months. The aspect of such relaxation and the name being sponsored by the Employment Exchange was also mentioned vide Clause-8 in the appointment order. In terms of said order of appointment, the petitioner served for a period of three months and thereafter sought fresh appointment on permanent basis vide his letter dated 01/01/1993. The office of respondent No. 2 by its internal communication considered the aspect as to whether the petitioner could be absorbed on the post of ''Peon'' in some other office of respondent No. 2. However the petitioner was not granted any fresh appointment.

The Labour Court by considering the terms of the order of appointment found that the same was for a fixed period and held that his discontinuation after said period was not illegal. It also found that there was no specific evidence regarding the status of similarly situated employees. These findings were confirmed by the Industrial court in the revision application.

The reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on circular dated 14/04/1981 does not assist the case of the petitioner as it merely relaxes the condition of the name being recommended by the Employment Exchange. The requirement of registration with the Employment Exchange has not been dispensed with. There is no evidence on record to indicate that name of the petitioner was duly registered with the Employment Exchange. Hence mere relaxation of the condition as stipulated by Clause-2 of said circular would not entitle the petitioner for regular appointment. Though it is true that petitioner came to be appointed temporarily for a period of three months, the same cannot be converted into regular appointment on permanent basis in absence of any finding that the respondents were guilty of any unfair labour practice. The reference made to another employee indicates that said employee was the widow of an erstwhile employee who had died in harness.

In view of aforesaid aspects, it cannot be said that both the Courts committed any jurisdictional error while dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioner. There is no reason to interfere with the aforesaid orders. Hence the writ petition is dismissed but with no order as to costs.