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Judgment
K.N. Basha, J.—The petitioners have come forward with this petition to quash the FIR relating to Crime No. 171 of 2007 dated 7.8.2007
on the file of the second respondent.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been arrayed as A1 to A4 and have been implicated for the alleged
offences under Sections 294(b) and 498A of I.P.C. r/w Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ ST Act, 1989. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the
petitioners that the matter was amicably settled between the parties. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submits that in view of the
advice given by the elders, both the first petitioner and the de facto complainant, the third respondent herein, have joined together and they are
leading a happy married life. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that a Joint Memo was also filed by the petitioners
and the third respondent, the de facto complainant in this case dated 14.2.2008. The learned Counsel would also submit that both the parties
namely the de facto complainant, the third respondent and the first petitioner and others-in-laws, are also present before this Court today.
I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and also perused the materials available on record.
It is seen that the petitioners have been arrayed a A1 to A4 and they have been implicated for the alleged offences under Sections 294(b) and
498A of IPC r/w Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act, 1989. The petitioners as well as the third respondent/de facto complainant appeared before this
Court in person and both the parties submitted that the matter was amicably settled and the first petitioner-A1, husband of the third respondent and
the de facto complainant came together before this Court and appeared and stated that they joined together and leading a happy married life. The
petitioners as well as the de facto complainant R3 also filed a joint memo dated 14.2.2008, which reads hereunder:
JOINT MEMO FILED BY THE PETITIONERS AND THIRD RESPONDENT
The petitioners above named respectfully beg to submit as follows:
It is submitted that the first petitioner is the husband of the 3rd respondent and other petitioners are father-in-law and monther-in-law of the 3rd
respondent. Now, there is no dispute whatsoever between the parties, the Ist petitioner is leading a very happy matrimonial life with the 3rd
respondent.
It is further submitted that the 3rd petitioner has delivered a female child on 8.10.2007 out of wedlock and named as ""Brindha.
Since all the disputes have been settled amicably by the elders of both families, the 3rd respondent express her no objection to quash the FIR
No. 171 of 2007 pending investigation on the file of the 1st respondent.
It is submitted that the marriage between the 1st petitioner and 3rd respondent was solemnized and registered before the Marriage Registrar in
Sl. No. 42 of 2007 on 15.11.2007.
In the interest of justice and welfare of the family life of petitioners and 3rd respondent, it is just and necessary to quash the FIR No. 171 of
2007.
The Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, has held that:
The decision of Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of
quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the
exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or
not such a power.
In the same decision, the Apex Court has held that in matrimonial matters, it is the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlement of disputes.
It is also observed by the Apex Court in the very same decision that:
...the hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interest of women and against the object for which this
provision was added. There is very likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would
prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.
The Hon''ble Supreme Court of India ultimately quashed the First Information Report registered on the basis of the complaint given by the wife
against her husband and his relatives for the alleged offence u/s 498A, IPC in view of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties.
In yet another decision in a similar state of facts and situation in Mohd. Shamim v. Nahid Begum reported in 2005 AIR SCW 332. The Apex
Court has held that the proceedings initiated against the husband for the alleged offence under Sections 406 and 498A read with Section 34, IPC
is liable to be quashed in view of the agreement of settlement arrived at between the parties.
In both the decisions cited supra, the Apex Court quashed the proceedings in spite of the fact that Section 498A is not compoundable.
The facts of the above said two decisions of the Apex Court cited supra, are squarely applicable to the facts of this case and in both the cases the
accused were facing the charge for the alleged offence u/s 498A, IPC and the Apex Court has quashed the proceedings considering the amicable
settlement between the parties.
In view of the development took place in this case and in view of the admitted fact that both the first petitioner and the de facto complainant
third respondent have rejoined and they are leading a happy married life as per the statement made before this Court in person and as per the joint
compromise memo dated 14.2.2008 filed by both the parties namely the petitioners and the third respondent, this Court is constrained to quash the
FIR pending in Crime No. 171 of 2007 dated 7.8.2007 for the alleged offence under Sections 294(b) and 498(A) of IPC r/w Section 3(1)(x) of
SC/ST Act, 1989. Accordingly, the same is hereby quashed.
