Pradeep vs State of H.P. and Anr.

“[6] Now it is obvious that the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption, but a fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is therefore of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as would lead to the 'conviction of an innocent person '; similarly, the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial, and so there can be no possible doubt that, if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is an occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the High Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial; and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial, Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked. In regard to non-bailable offences, there is no need to invoke such power because S. 497 (5) specifically deals with such cases. The question which we have to decide in this case is whether the exercise of inherent power under S. 561-A against persons accused of bailable offences, who have been released on bail, is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of S. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

17.

Now, in this sub-section (2) of Section 436 of the New Code, if a person has failed to comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may refuse to release him on bail, and if on a subsequent occasion in the same case the accused appears before the Court or is brought in custody and any such refusal would be without prejudice to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof. So, this provision is brought in help by the prosecution to show that even for a bailable offence under Section 436(2) of the New Code, powers of the Court to refuse to release a person on bail would be there.

18.

Now, it is a fact that so far as the bond about the concerned accused is there, it is the bond executed by him on 8-11-1974 assuring to attend the Court on 15-4-1975. The question, therefore, would be whether, after he had attended the Court in pursuance of that bond, whether recourse to the condition of that bond can be taken. Now, in that bond, over and above appearing before the Court on 15-4-1975, there is also an undertaking that he would remain present on all occasions so long as the case would be conducted in that Court or even in Sessions Court, if the case is sent for trial to the Sessions Court. Therefore, this is an all-embracing condition and, if on another occasion the concerned accused remained absent even in a bailable offence, the Court can exercise its power under Section 436(2) of the new Code.

“13.

We deferentially concur with these directions, and emphasise that since these directions flow from the right to life and personal liberty, enshrined in Articles 21 and 22(1) of our Constitution, they need to be strictly complied with. However, we may hasten to add that these are only broad guidelines and not rigid rules of universal application when facts and behavioural patterns are bound to differ from case to case. Since discretion in this behalf is entrusted with the court, it is not advisable to lay down immutable formulae on the basis whereof discretion could be exercised. As aforesaid, it is for the court concerned to assess the situation and exercise discretion judiciously, dispassionately and without prejudice…..”

7.

“6. … [Section 482] does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section that merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the [report], the court may examine the question of fact. When a [report] is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the [report] has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

7.

In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR para 6)

(i)

where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;

(ii)

where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii)

where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

8.

In dealing with the last [category], it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

‘102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2)

Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3)

Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4)

Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5)

Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6)

Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7)

Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.’

9.

As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in the exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court, being the highest court of a State, should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court, and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.” [Ed.: State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, pp. 94-96, paras 6-9.]

(See State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar [(2006) 4 SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: AIR 2006 SC 1937].)