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Judgment
By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 9/8/2005 (Annexure P/12) by which
after the departmental enquiry the penalty of reduction in basic pay by one stage has been imposed as also the order dated 8/2/2006 by which the
appeal has been dismissed by the Managing Director and the order dated 26/6/2006 by which the second appeal has been rejected by the
Chairman affirming the order of punishment.
The case of the petitioner is that during the relevant time he was working as Product Development Manager and was served with the charge
sheet dated 3/3/2004 for acting detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and violating the provisions of Staff Regulations. The petitioner had
filed the reply to the charge sheet on 17/5/2004 denying the charges, thereafter the enquiry officer and presenting officers were appointed and the
enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer had submitted the report dated 2/2/2005 and the petitioner was supplied a copy of the report along
with the notice dated 18th February, 2005. Thereafter the show cause notice dated 10/5/2005 was issued proposing the penalty of reduction in
the basic pay by one stage, to which the petitioner had filed the reply on 15/6/2005 and the disciplinary authority had passed the punishment order
dated 9/8/2005 imposing the penalty proposed in the show cause notice. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated
8/2/2006 by the respondent No.2 and the second appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the respondent No.1 by order dated
26/6/2006.
The respondents have filed the reply taking the stand that the petitioner was provided a Jeep under higher purchase agreement dated 10/8/1988
and was permitted to use the vehicle for the business of the Corporation and was precluded from parting with possession of the said vehicle, but
the petitioner had misused the said vehicle resulting into accident and causing loss to the respondent Corporation.
Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the charge sheet was issued belatedly on 3/3/2004 whereas the incidents were of the year 1989 and
1997, therefore, the departmental enquiry is liable to be quashed on the ground of delay. He further submits that in the mean while the petitioner
was promoted as Assistant Manager and Branch Manager, therefore, the charge itself stood waived and no departmental enquiry could be held on
that charge subsequently.
As against this, learned counsel for respondents submits that the cause of action for initiating the enquiry arose after the award of the claims
tribunal and that there was no delay in initiating the departmental enquiry and the charge did not stand waived in the circumstances of the case.
Having heard the learned counsel for parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the petitioner was charged for misusing the Jeep
which was given under higher purchase agreement for the development of the corporation''s business. The Jeep met with accident on 22/12/1988
when it was going with some passengers to Rajasthan outside the jurisdiction allotted to the petitioner and one of the passenger had died in the said
accident. A claim petition was filed by the legal heirs of the deceased before the tribunal in which the liability of Rs.1,20,000/- was fastened on the
respondent Corporation along with the driver. The petitioner was further charged for again misusing the Jeep on 17/5/1989 at Gujarat where also
the accident was caused. Therefore, the petitioner was charged for acting detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and prejudicial to good
conduct in violation of provisions of Regulations, 2 1, 24 and 31 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The enquiry
proceedings reveal that full opportunity was given to the petitioner to adduce the evidence. The enquiry officer had submitted the report dated 3rd
March, 2004 finding that the Charge No.1 regarding the use of the Jeep out of the operation area and other than for the purpose of the
Corporation business without prior permission was found to be proved, but it was not proved that the petitioner had left the head quarter on those
relevant dates, therefore, Charge No.1 was held to be partly proved. The Charge No.2 was found to be fully proved since the petitioner could not
produce any evidence that he has obtained prior permission for the trip and it was established that the Corporation had suffered the loss due to the
court verdict and the corporation was made a party to the litigation due to the act of the petitioner. The charge No.3 was also fully proved since it
was found that the petitioner had not obtained permission either for leaving head quarter or for utilizing the Jeep for the purpose other than the
business procuration of the Corporation and the Jeep had also met with the accident for the second time on 17/5/1989. The findings are not shown
to be erroneous or perverse. Thereafter due procedure has been followed by supplying the enquiry report and given the show cause notice before
imposing the punishment and the appellate authorities have also duly considered the appeal.
Supreme Court in the matter of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 while considering the
scope of judicial review and taking note of the earlier judgment on the point has held as under:-
""The High Court appears to have over-looked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge
of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate
the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of
evidence are recorded, the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded
findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the
evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual
findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking
substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty
or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either
impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other
punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that
even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of
judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are
reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or
irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the
decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Haltom in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans,
(1982) 3 All ER 141, observed : The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the
authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the
eyes of the court.
Judicial Review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while
exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the Administrative Authority
after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case
against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of
jurisdiction of that authority.
It is useful to note the following observations of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 :
Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the
officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an
independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be
canvassed before the High Court.
19.After a detailed review of the law on the subject, this Court while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court or Tribunal to interfere with the
disciplinary matters and punishment in Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, opined :
We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an
appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or Competent Authority where they are not arbitrary or
utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority
either by an Act of Legislature or Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the
rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter of exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power
to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority.
20.In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995 ) 6 SCC 749, this Court opined :
The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate
them evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.
Further it was held :
18.A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding
authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose
appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial
review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
21.Again in Government of Tamil Nadu and another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216, this Court opined :
It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a court of appeal over a
decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary
authority has accepted and which material reasonably supports the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the
Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this
case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by reappreciating the evidence and
reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority.
So far as the argument of learned counsel for petitioner that the charge sheet was issued for the incident of 1988 and 1989 in the year 2004 is
concerned, the record reflects that the cause of action arose for taking an action when the award dated 7/4/1997 was passed by the claims tribunal
recording the findings about the accident which forms the basis for the enquiry and fasten the liability on the respondent corporation as also when
the respondent had preferred appeal and was required to deposit part compensation amount. The supreme court in the matter of Chairman, Life
Insurance Corporation of India and others (2013) 6 SCC 530 has held that the court should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry and
quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. Since such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review and that
the court must take into consideration all the relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine if it is in fact in the interest of
clean and honest administration that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. In the
present case, the record further reflects that the petitioner had not raised any such objection of delay in initiating the enquiry before the enquiry
officer or till the stage the enquiry was completed.
So far as the another argument of learned counsel for petitioner that the charge stood waived on account of subsequent promotion as Assistant
Manager in the year 1992 and Branch Manager in the year 1996 is concerned, such an argument cannot be accepted because the award was
passed by the tribunal subsequently in 1997 and against this award, the appeal was preferred by the respondent Insurance company and it was
required to deposit the part amount in the appeal which had also resulted into financial loss. This development subsequent to the promotion of the
petitioner had formed the basis for departmental action. In view of this, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the judgment in the matter of
Audhrajsingh Vs. State of MP 1967 JLJ 630 relied upon by him because the misconduct of the petitioner in the facts of the present case has not
been condoned by promotion.
The supreme court in the matter of Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar, High Court of Delhi and another (2015) 16 SCC 415 in a case where the
petitioner was served with detailed charge sheet along with the documents referred to therein and had filed the reply to the charge sheet and parties
were given full opportunity to adduce the evidence and which they availed of by examining witnesses, has held that there was due compliance of
principles of natural justice and no interference is warranted in writ jurisdiction.
Learned counsel for respondents has also pointed out that in this case the punishment imposed is proper and has referred to the judgment of
the supreme court in the matter of Life Insurance Corporation of India and others Vs. S. Vasanthi (2014) 9 SCC 315 wherein it has been held that
the High Court cannot assume the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority while exercising the power of the judicial review and
substituting the punishment or reduce it.
Having regard to the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that no case for interference in the present writ petition is made out. The writ petition is
accordingly dismissed.