AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Deka, J.—This rule was obtained by the plaintiffs in relation to Title Suit No. 16 of 1951 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Lower Assam Districts at Dhubri. Though the suit was instituted on 19-6-1951, it was finally held by the Subordinate Judge concerned in deciding a preliminary issue on 11-10-55 that the plaint; was not properly stamped and the (maximum court-fee of Rs. 10,000/- had to be paid on a proper valuation. Against this order the plaintiffs have moved this Court.
The suit was for declaration of plaintiffs title to -/2/11 53-56 pies share of the Mechpara Estate and -/2/6 pies share of Parbat Jowar Estate in the district of Goalpara on the allegation that the plaintiffs are the heirs of late Jaga-dindra Narayan Chaudhury who died possessed of these shares in these two zamindaris.
Defendant 1 Sreemati Sulochana Choudhurani, who is O.P. No. 1 in this rule, is the mother of late Jagadindra Narayan Choudhury, and the plaintiffs case is that according to customs by which these parties are governed, a mother is not eligible to inherit her son and they have asked for a declaration to this effect. The plaintiffs have further made an alternative case that in case Sulochana Choudhurani is found to be eligible to succeed to the estates left by her son for her life time, the plaintiffs be declared the next reversioners.
It is further stated in the plaint that there was an earlier litigation in which it was decided--so far as the Mechpara estate was concerned--that the mothers were eligible to inherit to their sons. The plaintiffs have alleged that this decree was obtained by collusion and fraud and it was not an effective decree to bind the plaintiffs in the present suit.
There is a further fact that Jayanta Kumar Choudhury has since been adopted as a son by Sreemati Sulochana Choudhurani in place of her deceased son Jagadindra. Jayanta Kumar chudhury has since been made a party to the suit and is a party to this proceeding.
It is, therefore, imperative for the plaintiffs to succeed in. this suit, to have Jayanta''s adoption either set aside or have it declared void. The plaintiff cannot succeed in case it is found that jayanta was validly adopted. Therefore, it is necessary for the plaintiff to have a declaration'' in an event to the effect: (1) that the decree in the earner suit relating to succession by mother in Mechpara, estate was not binding on the plaintiffs and (2) that Jayanta is not validly adopted.
It may as well be argued, as has been done in this case by the learned Advocate for the opposite party that a further declaration shall be necessary as to the validity of the custom pleaded affecting the bar to inheritance by the mother. In any event there can be no doubt as to the necessity of a declaration or declarations to the effect that the decree in the earlier suit where the mother''s right to succeed to her son was declared was an inoperative decree and that Jayanta could not have been validly adopted by opposite party No. 1.
Much of the argument that has been addressed before us as well as in the Court below, is on the point as to whether the Court-lee in this case will have to be paid u/s 7(iv)(c), or u/s 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. The plaintiffs'' contention has been that the court-fee should be assessed u/s 7(v)(a), Court-fees Act, and at ten or twenty times the revenue payable for the respective estates.
It has been argued for the plaintiffs-petitioners that when a definite ''share of the estate is claimed, a definite or proportionate share of ten or twenty times the revenue payable by the estate is the sum on which the court-fee should be paid. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has placed certain rulings in support of this contention. It is, however, not necessary for us to discuss about those rulings unless we hold that the case comes u/s 7(v), Court-fees Act.
We should first decile whether the court-fee in this case is payable u/s 7(iv)(c) or u/s 7(v), Court-fees Act, Section 7(iv)(c) relates to suite to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed and Section 7(v) relates to suits for possession of land, houses, etc., and the method how to calculate the court-fee is indicated in the sub-sections that follow.
We have, therefore, to consider first whether a declaration or declarations are essential for the purpose of the plaintiffs to succeed in this suit. We have to examine the plaint in this case, because the reliefs have to be valued in the light of the statements and prayers made in the plaint.
It appears from the plaint as indicated already that at least some declarations or some declaratory orders will have to be obtained from this Court without which the plaintiffs cannot succeed,--and they have evidently asked for consequential reliefs,--and it is not mere suit for possession. Therefore, in our opinion, Section 7(iv)(c) is the section under which the court-fee in this suit is to be paid and the learned Subordinate Judge was right in this respect.
The other contention that is raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioners before us is as to whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to give a fresh valuation of the reliefs sought or the Court has the right to assess the valuation, as has been done in this case. We might profitably refer to the amendment to Section 7, Court-fees Act, by the Local Government,--which provides u/s 7A
If the Court is of opinion'' that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly valued, it may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation, and may hold such inquiry as it thinks fit for such purpose.
The course taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, was not improper in case the reliefs were not properly valued by the plaintiffs.
Before examining the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as to correct valuation, I think, it need be mentioned that some properties consisting of, Lakheraj Mahals and houses and other properties form the subjects-matter of this suit, apart from the lands comprised in the Zamindaris and those properties have not at all been valued in the plaint. The learned Subordinate Judge has come to a finding that these properties should be valued at about Rs. 99,000/- roughly.
Therefore, on the face of it, the valuation of Rs. 5,750/- or even Rs. 25,000/- as given by the plaintiffs for the purpose of jurisdiction cannot be supported and it was a wrong valuation. We have, however, examined the calculation by which the learned Subordinate Judge has come to a finding that the valuation is Rs. 19,57,358/- for the purpose Of court-fee for the shares of the zamindaris claimed.
The learned Subordinate Judge has drawn his inference as to valuation so far as Mechpara estate is concerned from the plaint in Title Suit No. 3 of 1022 where the valuation of the Estate was given at Rs. 53,25,000/- and for the shares claimed by the plaintiffs Rs. 9,90,000/-, was the proportionate value. For the purpose of valuation of the -/2/6 share of the Parbatjowar estate the figure has been obtained from the valuation given in Title Suit No. 6 of 1928.
The proportionate valuation of the share claimed according to that estimation comes to Rs. 9,67,358/-. The learned Subordinate Judge says that this valuation covered the Lakheraj properties as well. Therefore, according to him the present reliefs asked for by the plaintiffs as consequential relief to a declaration should be valued at Rs. 19,57,358/- and court-fees paid accordingly.
Mr. K.P. Sen for the petitioners has contended that it does not appear on what basis these valuations were given in the earlier plaints and whether there was any sound basis for these valuations. But it is common knowledge that the value of properties has much increased since 1922 and rip matter on what basis these figures were given, which are not disputed, they must be comparatively low in consideration of the present valuation'' or the valuation as in 1951 when the suit was field
The learned Subordinate Judge says that for the purpose of the maximum court fee of Rs. 10,000/- the valuation required is at least Rs. 11,05,000/-, and this calculation is not challenged by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. In this case the value of the; properties surely exceeds Rs. 11,05,000/-much more and therefore the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the maximum court-fee of Rs. 10,000/- less the amount that has been already paid, should be paid forthwith for the purpose of this suit before the suit could be proceeded with.
In this view of things we do not find any illegality, or irregularity in the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and we accordingly discharge the rule with costs of Rs. 100/-. The records of the case should go back at once, & we leave to the discretion of the learned Subordinate Judge to fix a time for payment of the arrears of court fee.
Sarjoo Prosad, C.J.
I agree.