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Judgment
Particulars,Assessment Years,,,,,,
,2012-13,2013-14,2014-15,2015-16,2016-17,2017-18,
ITA No.,69/2021,71/2021,72/2021,73/2021,70/2021,68/2021,
Date of filing of
return of income",31.10.2013,11.03.2015,01.04.2015,31.03.2017,29.12.2017,29.12.2017,
Addition u/s 68 on a/c
of share
capital/premium:
48,19,87,000 NA NA NA NA NA
(i) Unrelated parties
14,92,00,000 NA NA NA NA NA
(ii) From alleged
associated parties:
- M/s. Mahalaxmi
Traders
- M/s. Sri Balaji
Enterprise NA 15,20,00,000 NA NA NA NA
- M/s. Vishal Traders NA 34,79,50,000 65,30,99,000 24,81,49,800 17,86,74,750 NA
- Rustagi Exim P. Ltd NA NA 09,55,55,000 11,60,00,100 37,60,99,650 52,23,87,900
- M/s. Vikas NA NA 06,48,90,000 NA NA NA
International 02,31,66,700 NA NA NA NA NA
(iii)From alleged
unknown parties
Total addition 65,43,53,700 49,99,50,000 81,35,44,000 36,41,49,900 55,47,74,400 52,23,87,900
Alleged commission
expenses @ 2% on 01,30,87,074 99,99,000 1,62,70,880 72,82,998 01,10,95,488 01,04,47,758
the above
Total addition u/s
68 on account of
66,74,40,774 50,99,49,000 82,98,14,880 37,14,32,898 56,58,69,888 53,28,35,658
share capital/
premium (1)
Disallowance of
alleged bogus
purchases (being
88,31,23,282 65,25,24,882 179,46,43,207 2,67,93,04,397 2,99,56,36,930 1,21,763
25% of purchases
from alleged related
parties) (2)
Addition u/s 68 on a/c
of cash deposited in
NA NA NA NA NA 150,53,24,000
bank a/c post
demonetisation (3)
Total Additions
1,55,05,64,056 1,16,24,73,882 2,62,44,58,087 3,05,07,37,295 3,56,15,06,818 2,03,82,81,421
(1+2+3)
Income as per 68,18,55,98
6,02,85,750 7,22,89,816 13,16,41,113 15,87,75,950 35,50,09,894
Return (4) 0
Assessed Income 1,61,08,49,806 123,47,63,69 275,60,99,20 3,20,95,13,24 3,91,65,16, 2,72,01,37,4
(1+2+3+4) 8 0 5 712 01
AY Addition u/s 68 on a/c of share capital/ premium Disallowance on a/c of alleged bogus purchases
& alleged commission expenses @ 2% thereon
Made by the A.O. Sustained by the C.I.T.(A) Made by the A.O. Sustained by the C.I.T.(A)
2012-13 66,74,40,774 66,74,40,774 88,31,23,282 54,43,23,729
2013-14 50,99,49,000 50,99,49,000 65,25,24,882 23,50,36,945
2014-15 82,98,14,880 82,98,14,880 1,79,46,43,207 54,71,66,863
2015-16 37,14,32,898 37,14,32,898 2,67,93,04,397 72,00,54,941
2016-17 56,58,69,888 56,58,69,888 2,99,56,36,930 1,08,45,52,031
2017-18 53,28,35,658 53,28,35,658 1,21,763 4,87,053
Total 3,47,73,43,098 3,47,73,43,098 9,00,53,54,461 3,13,16,21,562
The record shows that, during the search and seizure operations, the statement of the Managing Director, Mr Arpesh Garg was recorded under Section 132(4)
of the Act. The assessment was made under Section 153A of the Act.
4.1. It is also relevant to note that the statement made by Mr Arpesh Garg i.e., the Managing Director of the assessee on 22.03.2017 (which is referred to above)
was retracted by him on 24.03.2017, that is, within two days.
4.2. What is of some significance is that a deviation report dated 20.12.2018 was prepared by the AO, which was, markedly different from the assessment orders
passed by him. This aspect of the matter has been adverted to at great length by the Tribunal in the impugned order and shall also be alluded to by us in the latter
part of the judgment.
4.3 Suffice it to state that the Deputy Director of Investigation Wing had submitted a written appraisal report on 04.01.2018. Despite the stand taken by the Deputy
Director (Investigation) in the appraisal report and the communication dated 24.12.2018, at the meeting held on 28.12.2018, the AO and the Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax (ACIT) reiterated the position taken in the deviation report.
4.4 Briefly, in the deviation report, the AO concluded that since the source of the cash movement concerning receipt of money by the assessee in the form of
share capital/share premium amounting to Rs.365.28 crores was traceable directly to the assessee’s bank accounts, the addition of the said sum was not
justified.
4.5 Likewise, insofar as the issue concerning addition of Rs.941.86 crores qua bogus purchases was concerned, the AO in the deviation report made the following
significant observations:
(i) Contrary to what the appraisal report had held, all purchases made by the assessee were not bogus.","Addition u/s 68 on a/c
of share
capital/premium:
(i) Unrelated parties
(ii) From alleged
associated parties:
- M/s. Mahalaxmi","48,19,87,000
14,92,00,000","NA
NA","NA
NA","NA
NA","NA
NA","NA
NA
,"Traders
- M/s. Sri Balaji
Enterprise
- M/s. Vishal Traders
- Rustagi Exim P. Ltd
- M/s. Vikas
International
(iii)From alleged
unknown parties","NA
NA
NA
NA
02,31,66,700","15,20,00,000
34,79,50,000
NA
NA
NA","NA
65,30,99,000
09,55,55,000
06,48,90,000
NA","NA
24,81,49,800
11,60,00,100
NA
NA","NA
17,86,74,750
37,60,99,650
NA
NA","NA
NA
52,23,87,900
NA
NA
,Total addition,"65,43,53,700","49,99,50,000","81,35,44,000","36,41,49,900","55,47,74,400","52,23,87,900
,"Alleged commission
expenses @ 2% on
the above","01,30,87,074","99,99,000","1,62,70,880","72,82,998","01,10,95,488","01,04,47,758
,"Total addition u/s
68 on account of
share capital/
premium (1)","66,74,40,774","50,99,49,000","82,98,14,880","37,14,32,898","56,58,69,888","53,28,35,658
,"Disallowance of
alleged bogus
purchases (being
25% of purchases
from alleged related
parties) (2)","88,31,23,282","65,25,24,882","179,46,43,207","2,67,93,04,397","2,99,56,36,930","1,21,763
,"Addition u/s 68 on a/c
of cash deposited in
bank a/c post
demonetisation (3)",NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,"150,53,24,000
,"Total Additions
(1+2+3)","1,55,05,64,056","1,16,24,73,882","2,62,44,58,087","3,05,07,37,295","3,56,15,06,818","2,03,82,81,421
,"Income as per
Return (4)","6,02,85,750","7,22,89,816","13,16,41,113","15,87,75,950","35,50,09,894","68,18,55,98
0
,Assessed Income,"1,61,08,49,806","123,47,63,69","275,60,99,20","3,20,95,13,24","3,91,65,16,","2,72,01,37,4
,(1+2+3+4),,8,0,5,712,01
Month,FY 2014-15,FY 2015-16,FY 2016-17,,,,
,,,,,,,
,,,,,,,
,Cash Sales,"Cash
Deposits",Cash Sales,Cash Deposits,Cash Sales,"Cash
Deposits",
November,16.49,14.46,45.18,47.12,47.73,113.52,
December,22.26,28.08,97.35,94.36,69.83,89.75,
(i) Firstly, out of the 36 shareholders, photocopies were found only qua 12 shareholders.",,,,,,,
(ii) Secondly, that such transfer forms and documents even when recovered in original, as per its [i.e., the Tribunal] own precedents [See ACIT, Central Circle-5,",,,,,,,
New Delhi vs M/s Gee Ispat Pvt. Ltd., A-28, Sector 19, Rohini, Delhi-110085, passed in ITA Nos. 4256-59/Del/2014, dated 31/5/2018; M/s Brahmaputra Realtors",,,,,,,
(P) Ltd. vs Dy. Commissioner Of Income-Tax 2018 (3) TMI 1598 - ITAT Delhi; M/s M.L. Singhi & Associates (P) Ltd. vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income,,,,,,,
Tax, Central Circle-7, New Delhi, 2018 (10) TMI 50 - ITAT Delhi; M/s Galaxy Rice Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. D.C.I.T., Central Circle, Karnal, passed in ITA",,,,,,,
Nos.1451-53/Del/2013, dated 1/3/2018], had not been considered as incriminating material to unravel a concluded assessment.",,,,,,,
(iii) Thirdly, photocopies do not constitute primary evidence and, in the absence of any other material, it could not be treated as secondary evidence as well.",,,,,,,
Importantly, it was not the stand of the revenue that the photocopy had been made from an original document.",,,,,,,
(iv) Lastly, the revenue ought to have summoned all those investors who ostensibly had executed the documents, whose photocopies were produced, to",,,,,,,
substantiate its stand that they constituted incriminating material.,,,,,,,
10.7 Based on the aforesaid, the Tribunal concluded that since for AYs 2012-2013, 2013-2014 and 2014-2015, no incriminating material concerning the share",,,,,,,
capital was found, no additions could have been made by the revenue.",,,,,,,
10.8 As noted above, a coordinate bench of this court in the Kabul Chawla case on the aspect concerning the jurisdiction tax authorities to disturb the concluded",,,,,,,
assessments has made the following observations:,,,,,,,
“37…..vii. Completed assessments can be interfered with by the AO while making the assessment under Section 153 A only on the basis of some,,,,,,,
incriminating material unearthed during the course of search or requisition of documents or undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of,,,,,,,
search which were not produced or not already disclosed or made known in the course of original assessment.â€,,,,,,,
First Issue,,,,,,,
Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid observations made in the Kabul Chawla case, the only aspect that the Tribunal had to examine was whether the",,,,,,,
statement made by Mr Arpesh Garg, Managing Director of the assessee under Section 132(4) of the Act and the photocopies of the documents found during the",,,,,,,
search and seizure action constituted incriminating material.,,,,,,,
11.1. The Tribunal, in our view, has correctly analysed the statement of Mr Arpesh Garg. The statement does not allude to the fact that the assessee had",,,,,,,
introduced “unaccounted money†in the form of share capital/share premium through investor entities. The retraction letter, as noted by the Tribunal, also did",,,,,,,
not advert to the introduction of investment of money in the assessee in the form of share capital/share premium.,,,,,,,
11.2. Furthermore, as noticed above, based on past precedents, the Tribunal noted that the photocopies of documents such as blank share transfer forms, blank",,,,,,,
receipts and blank power of attorney did not constitute incriminating material. Mr Sharma was not able to draw our attention to any authority, which has taken a",,,,,,,
contrary view. According to the Tribunal, even in those cases where originals of such documents were found, they were not construed as incriminating material,",,,,,,,
based on which assessment could be made under Section 153(A) read with Section 143(3) of the Act. Significantly, the revenue chose not to examine those, who",,,,,,,
had ostensibly executed these documents. It was not argued before us that the finding returned by the Tribunal on this aspect of the matter was perverse.,,,,,,,
11.3. Thus, having regard to the aforesaid, we concur with the view of the Tribunal that assessments concluded in respect of AYs 2012-2013, 2013-2014 and",,,,,,,
2014-2015 under Section 143(3) of the Act could not be disturbed, as no incriminating material was found.",,,,,,,
11.4. Besides this, on merits, the Tribunal, after detailing out in paragraph 76 of the impugned order the trail of the money received from various entities in the form",,,,,,,
of share capital/share application money, concluded that the assessee had been able to place before the A.O. sufficient documentary evidence which established",,,,,,,
that the money which the assessee had paid to the investor entities was routed back to it in the form of share capital/share premium.,,,,,,,
11.5. That being the position, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee had been able to prove the identity of the investors, their creditworthiness and genuineness,",,,,,,,
which are the ingredients of Section 68 of the Act. The relevant observations made in paragraph 86 by the Tribunal read as follows :,,,,,,,
“86. Considering the facts of the case in the light of material on record in voluminous paper books and confirmations of the parties and the summary,,,,,,,
of transfer of funds reproduced above, it is clear that assessee produced sufficient documentary evidences before the A.O. to prove that money routed",,,,,,,
from the assessee itself which came back to the assessee in the form of share capital/premium, therefore, assessee proved identity of the Investors, their",,,,,,,
creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter and as such have been able to prove ingredients of Section 68 of the I.T. Act. The,,,,,,,
A.O. however did not make any further enquiry on the documentary evidences filed by the assessee. The A.O. did not verify the trail of the source of,,,,,,,
funds received by assessee through various entities as explained above. We may also note that during the course of hearing of these appeals, A.O. was",,,,,,,
present in the Court, but, did not make any adverse comment upon the documentary evidences filed in the paper book filed by the assessee. The A.O.",,,,,,,
thus, failed to conduct scrutiny of the documents at assessment stage and merely suspected the transaction between the Investor Companies and the",,,,,,,
assessee company despite the fact that in the deviation report the A.O. expressed doubts in making addition into the matter. It may also be noted here,,,,,,,
that no cash have been reported to have been deposited in the accounts of the assessee, the Investor Companies and other related parties. Considering",,,,,,,
the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and material on record, we are of the view that assessee has been able to prove that it has",,,,,,,
received genuine amounts which is routed through various companies. Therefore, there was no justification to make any addition under section 68 of",,,,,,,
the I.T. Act.â€,,,,,,,
11.6. The moot point which the Tribunal, thus, dealt with, as noted by us hereinabove, was- that as long as there was no material on record which established that",,,,,,,
unaccounted money (i.e., income generated which was not recorded in the books of accounts) had been funnelled in the form of investment by way of share",,,,,,,
capital/share premium, it could not be made the basis for making addition under Section 68 of the Act.",,,,,,,
11.7. It is important to bear in mind that Section 68 empowers the AO (provided all others ingredients are met) to tax credits found in the books of accounts,,,,,,,
maintained by the assessee for any previous year, for which he offers no explanation about its nature and source. The first proviso, which was inserted by Finance",,,,,,,
Act, 2012 in the context of share application money, share capital, share premium or any other amount by whatever name called, engrafted a deeming section as to",,,,,,,
when the explanation would be considered satisfactory. Pertinently, motivation of the assessee in routing its own money (which was given to the investor entities in",,,,,,,
the form of loan, etcetera) as an investment in share capital/share premium has not been adverted to therein. That motivation is not the basis for attracting the",,,,,,,
provisions of the Income Tax Act, if otherwise, an assessee does not fall within its net, is a well-established principle. This principle, in our view, should also apply",,,,,,,
to Section 68 of the Act. [See Aruna Group of Estates, Bodinayakanur v. State of Madras, 1961 SCC OnLine Mad 252; Commissioner of Income-tax v. A.",,,,,,,
Raman & Co. [1968] 67ITR11 (SC); Commissioner of Income-Tax v. T.K.E. Ibrahimsa Routher, 1928 SCC OnLine Mad 21; S. Raghbir Singh Sandhawalia v.",,,,,,,
Commissioner of Income-tax [1958] 34 ITR 719 (Punjab & Haryana).],,,,,,,
“……The Tribunal seems to have been considerably obsessed by the supposed motive of Subbaraj and his sons of lessening the incidence of taxation in holding,,,,,,,
that there was no partition between them. A partition cannot be vitiated by a bad motive or a mala fide object. It may be an obstacle to a creditor seeking remedies,,,,,,,
in the execution of a decree or to a taxing authority levying a tax but nonetheless it is effective and cannot be put aside. Let us assume that Subbaraj and his sons,,,,,,,
desired to lighten their tax burden by exercising their undoubted right to disrupt the joint family, and let us also assume that the giving effect to the partition will",,,,,,,
reduce their tax liability. But there is nothing wrong or illegal about it. Avoidance of tax is not tax evasion and it carries no ignominy with it for it is sound law and,",,,,,,,
certainly, not bad morality for anybody to so arrange his affairs as to reduce the brunt of taxation to a minimum......",,,,,,,
xxx xxx xxx,,,,,,,
The next question for consideration is whether registration can be refused on the ground that Suppan Chettiar's sons have not validly derived their respective,,,,,,,
shares by any transfer of title from Suppan Chettiar. It is true that the only evidence on record which enables the sons of Suppan Chettiar to claim his share is the,,,,,,,
letter already referred to. It is always open to any partner to retire from the firm yielding his place to his nominee or nominees. If all the other partners of the firm,,,,,,,
agree to this retirement and substitution of the new partner or partners, a new partnership springs into existence. The absence of any valid document of transfer",,,,,,,
from Suppan Chettiar to his sons, we do not say that the letter of Suppan Chettiar is not enough, cannot really affect the question whether the sons of Suppan",,,,,,,
Chettiar became partners of the new partnership each holding 1/48 share. The terms of the partnership deed dated 23rd November, 1955, do not indicate that the",,,,,,,
sons of Suppan Chettiar were mere dummies either for the other partners or for Suppan Chettiar, who was not eo nomine a partner.",,,,,,,
The formation and constitution of a partnership can in no way be affected by the fact that one of the partners is a benamidar for a stranger or that a partner holds,,,,,,,
his share as a manager of his joint family, or that a partner has agreed to give a portion of his share to another by constituting a sub-partnership with him. These",,,,,,,
are Incidents which are outside the scope of partnership arrangement and have no bearing on the truth or reality of the partnership as such…â€,,,,,,,
“….Avoidance of tax liability by so arranging commercial affairs that charge of tax is distributed is not prohibited. A taxpayer may resort to a device to divert,,,,,,,
the income before it accrues or arises to him. Effectiveness of the device depends not upon considerations of morality, but on the operation of the Income-tax Act.",,,,,,,
Legislative injunction in taxing statutes may not, except on peril of penalty, be violated, but it may lawfully be circumvented…..â€",,,,,,,
“......There can be no question also in this case of the motives of the assessee in bringing about a particular arrangement, because as has been pointed out by",,,,,,,
the House of Lords in more than one case it is not proper to take such motives or objects into consideration, and a subject is entitled, if he can in any legal manner,",,,,,,,
to circumvent the incidents of a particular taxing or financing Act.,,,,,,,
…..No doubt as indicated in the question itself the land subject to the mortgage is leased back again by the mortgagee to the mortgagor and therefore even reading,,,,,,,
both the instrument of mortgage and the instrument of lease together as indicated by the Judicial Committee in Abdullah Khan v. Basharat Husain(1) it must,,,,,,,
appear that the amount sought to be assessed is legally only rent. If it be rent and in this case these is nothing to show that it is anything else, then on the",,,,,,,
considerations set out already it follows that it is not assessable.â€,,,,,,,
“….A taxpayer has full liberty to decrease what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether to avoid them, by means which the law allows. The fact that a",,,,,,,
certain transaction has been entered into with the ulterior object of enabling the taxpayer to avoid payment of income-tax would not render the transaction void, for",,,,,,,
motive alone cannot make unlawful what the law allows. In such a case the transaction should be examined with the object of seeing whether it is in reality what it,,,,,,,
appears to be in form. As pointed out by an American jurist, purpose may be the touchstone, but the purpose which counts is one which defeats or contradicts the",,,,,,,
apparent transaction, not the purpose to escape taxation. If therefore a taxpayer alters the basic facts affecting his liability to taxation by legal means available to",,,,,,,
him but for the purpose of avoiding taxation, the court will uphold the changes unless it is satisfied that the changes are not actual, but merely simulated. The",,,,,,,
question is not whether the motive for the transaction was proper or otherwise but whether what the taxpayer has done actually accomplishes the result,,,,,,,
anticipated….â€,,,,,,,
11.8. It may well be that the assessee, by wrongly padding his accounts, has violated other Statutes but that by itself cannot be the reason to make addition under",,,,,,,
section 68 of the Act. Mr Sharma was not able to demonstrate as to how such a transaction, though rather curious, would come within the ambit of Section 68 of",,,,,,,
the Act.,,,,,,,
The other argument of the revenue that once photocopies of documents such as blank share transfer forms, blank receipts and blank power of attorney were",,,,,,,
found, the onus shifted on to the assessee, in our view, does not have weight, as onus is a relevant factor only till such time the entire evidence is not placed before",,,,,,,
the adjudicating authority. Since, in this case, according to the Tribunal, the assessee had given its explanation about the nature and source of money; it was",,,,,,,
incumbent upon the revenue to carry out further investigation to bring it within the ambit of Section 68 of the Act. [See Koppula Koteshwara Rao and Anr. v. Dr,,,,,,,
Koppula Hemantha Rao, 2002 AIHC 4950, cited with approval in Rangammal v. Kuppuswami (2011) 12 SCC 220]",,,,,,,
12.1. In this case, insofar as the assessee is concerned, it placed the evidence on record, which established the trail of the money, the mode through which the",,,,,,,
money had travelled from the assessee to the investor entities and back to the assessee, and the fact that each of the investor entities was in existence. Therefore,",,,,,,,
once the assessee claimed (and it was found as a fact) that it was its own money which was routed back to it in the form of share capital/share premium, the",,,,,,,
traditional test which is sought to be applied by the revenue, for triggering the provisions of Section 68 of the Act, which is, that the assessee had to establish the",,,,,,,
creditworthiness, genuineness and identity of the transactions would have to adapt to the circumstances obtaining in the present case.",,,,,,,
Although the judgement of the Bombay High Court in Royal Rich Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT [MANU/MH/3859/2019] was not cited by the revenue,,,,,,,
before us, it is referred to in the appeal. A perusal of the facts obtaining in that case, whereby addition under Section 68 of the Act was sustained, would show that",,,,,,,
they are distinguishable from the facts which obtain in the instant matter. In that case, the assessee-company had claimed that it had received money in the form of",,,,,,,
share capital/share premium from certain investors; however, the assessee was unable to produce before the AO the concerned investors; who had made the",,,,,,,
investment. Furthermore, during the search action, one of the directors of the assessee had made a categorical statement that the entire investment was bogus and",,,,,,,
that blank receipts were obtained from shareholders as also signatures were obtained on blank share transfer forms. Pertinently, this statement made by the",,,,,,,
director of the assessee was not retracted.,,,,,,,
13.1. As noticed in the instant matter, the Tribunal found that it was the assessee’s money which was routed back to it, albeit, through banking channels. The",,,,,,,
director of the assessee i.e., Mr Arpesh Garg retracted his statement, within 48 hours. More importantly, the AO in the deviation report, inter alia, made the",,,,,,,
following observations :,,,,,,,
“b) About 50% of the purchases made by the assessee from different persons have been verified by issuing notices u/s 133(6) of the IT Act and on,,,,,,,
account of confirmatory letters as well as copies of ledger accounts presented by the assessee and no any variation has been found so far.â€,,,,,,,
13.2. In the backdrop of this, the Tribunal made the following observations:",,,,,,,
“86. Considering the facts of the case in the light of material on record in voluminous paper books and confirmations of the parties and the summary,,,,,,,
of transfer of funds reproduced above, it is clear that assessee produced sufficient documentary evidences before the A.O. to prove that money routed",,,,,,,
from the assessee itself which came back to the assessee in the form of share capital/premium, therefore, assessee proved identity of the Investors, their",,,,,,,
creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter and as such have been able to prove ingredients of Section 68 of the I.T. Act. The,,,,,,,
A.O. however did not make any further enquiry on the documentary evidences filed by the assessee. The A.O. did not verify the trail of the source of,,,,,,,
funds received by assessee through various entities….â€,,,,,,,
13.3. Therefore, this judgment would have no applicability in the present matter.",,,,,,,
At this point, it may be relevant to note that, in order to make addition under section 68 of the Act, the following broad principles would have to be borne in",,,,,,,
mind :,,,,,,,
(i) Amounts should be found credited in the books of the assessee.,,,,,,,
(ii) The assessee should be unable to offer a satisfactory explanation about the nature and source of the sum so credited.,,,,,,,
Assessment Year,Amount,,,,,,
2012-13,"63,12,00,000",,,,,,
2013-14,"49,99,50,000",,,,,,
2014-15,"81,35,44,000",,,,,,
2015-16,"32,36,88,800",,,,,,
2016-17,"55,47,74,400",,,,,,
2017-18,"52,23,87,900",,,,,,
(viii) Insofar as the abated AYs were concerned i.e., AYs 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, it was, as per the Tribunal, apparent that the assessee had",,,,,,,
purchased goods, which were in value less than the sum for which they were sold. Therefore, as held by the A.O. in the deviation report, if the purported bogus",,,,,,,
purchases were to be disallowed then necessarily the sales shown in the assessee’s regular books of accounts would also have to be excluded which would,,,,,,,
result in the assessee’s income falling below the returned/declared income. In this regard, the Tribunal recorded that for the AYs 2012-2013 to 2017-2018, the",,,,,,,
total sales recorded by the assessee was Rs.36,20,60,89,783/-, as against purchases made from the same very parties amounting to Rs.36,02,14,17,848/-.",,,,,,,
Resultantly, for the said period, the assessee had shown a profit of Rs.18,46,71,935/-.",,,,,,,
15.2. Thus, according to the Tribunal, if as portrayed by the revenue, the purchases were bogus then it was unlikely that the assessee would have recorded a profit",,,,,,,
against the same in its books of accounts. The Tribunal notes that the revenue cannot blow hot and cold i.e., cannot portray the purchases as bogus, even while",,,,,,,
holding that the sales made to those very parties were genuine.,,,,,,,
15.3. Furthermore, according to the Tribunal, the A.O. had not placed on record any material to justify the disallowance of 25% of the purchases on the ground",,,,,,,
that they were bogus without carrying out any inquiry or investigation. In particular, the Tribunal also flagged the issue that the purported shortage of stock",,,,,,,
amounting to Rs.450 crores was based on a reference made qua that aspect in the appraisal report which, as noted above, did not find mention in the remand",,,,,,,
report, as during the search it was found that the stock worth the aforementioned value was lying at the assessee’s warehouse in Sonipat; something which",,,,,,,
was completely ignored. This position, according to the Tribunal, was fortified by the fact that no addition in respect of any excess or shortage of stock had been",,,,,,,
made in the assessment orders of any of the years. In effect, according to the Tribunal, the stock found in the books reconciled with the stock which was found",,,,,,,
physically.,,,,,,,
15.4. Insofar as the CIT(A)’s approach with regard to bogus purchases was concerned, the Tribunal noted that it had concentrated on related parties and",,,,,,,
attempted to quantify the disallowance by applying the gross profit ratio in respect of transactions entered by the assessee with unrelated parties. The Tribunal,",,,,,,,
however, returned a finding of fact that the approach adopted by the CIT(A) was not consistent. In this context, the Tribunal made the following observations :",,,,,,,
“99. When the matter reached before the learned CIT â€" A, he rejected the action of the learned assessing officer so far as addition with respect to",,,,,,,
the alleged bogus purchases are concerned. He applied the provisions of section 145 (3) of the income tax act. He segregated the transactions of,,,,,,,
purchase and sales from the alleged bogus parties and applied the gross profit ratio, which is earned by the assessee from transactions with other",,,,,,,
parties. He applied such ratio for making an addition for assessment year 2012-13, 2013 â€" 14 2015 â€" 16 and 2016â€" 17. For assessment year",,,,,,,
2014 â€" 15, the gross profit ratio of the assessee from other parties (other than the alleged parties) was only 4.13 percentages. However, the learned",,,,,,,
CIT â€" A did not apply this percentage but took average gross profit ratio for assessment year 2012 â€" 13 and 2013 â€" 14 of 16.20 percentage,,,,,,,
and 9.41 percentage. He applied the average, which is 12.80 percentages to the sales for that year for making an addition. For assessment year 2017",,,,,,,
â€" 18 the gross profit on transactions other than alleged related parties were found to be 6.02 percentage however the learned CIT â€" A did not,,,,,,,
apply that ratio but made an addition of INR 4 87053/â€" as there was loss. Therefore, wherever it was beneficial to the revenue, the learned CIT â€"",,,,,,,
A applied higher percentages and made the addition. Wherever it was against the revenue, he applied average gross profit of last 2 years or made on",,,,,,,
ad hoc addition. Thus, it is apparent that the learned CIT â€" A was not at all consistent in his approach.â€",,,,,,,
15.5. Although, the Tribunal concluded that CIT(A) could take recourse to the provisions of Section 145(3) of the Act he/she finds that the A.O. had failed to",,,,,,,
apply his/her mind to the said provisionâ€"however, before embarking on that course, the CIT(A) would have to form a view, after examining the books of",,,,,,,
accounts, that he/she is not satisfied with the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee. The Tribunal was of the view that the CIT(A) was also",,,,,,,
required to examine the method of accounting followed by the assessee.,,,,,,,
15.6. It appears, as has been recorded by the Tribunal, that the CIT(A) did not call for the books of accounts i.e., to examine the same. Furthermore, the Tribunal",,,,,,,
records that the A.O., in the remand report, did not advert to the fact that the books of accounts were either incorrect or incomplete. According to the Tribunal, the",,,,,,,
books of accounts could not have been rejected till such time the revenue found “patent, latent and glaring defects in the books of accountsâ€. The revenue,",,,,,,,
according to the Tribunal, made no such attempt and simply relied upon the statement of the Managing Director, which was retracted and in any event, did not",,,,,,,
relate to the booking of “bogus expenditureâ€. Therefore, insofar as the Tribunal was concerned, the rejection of books of accounts by the CIT(A) did not meet",,,,,,,
the legal standards.,,,,,,,
15.7. Given this background, thus, in effect, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts were rejected without crystalizing the defect in the books of accounts,",,,,,,,
which could have been done only after examining the same. Furthermore, according to the Tribunal, even if it is assumed that the books of accounts could be",,,,,,,
rejected, the profit had to be estimated based on proper material. As noted above, the Tribunal recorded the inconsistent approach adopted by the CIT(A) in",,,,,,,
applying the gross profit ratio concerning non-related parties to purported bogus transactions i.e., those involving related parties, resulting in unsustainable",,,,,,,
conclusions.,,,,,,,
15.8. According to us, the observations made by the Tribunal are pure findings of fact, which cannot be interdicted by us in appeal. The inconsistency in the",,,,,,,
approach adopted by the A.O., while preparing the deviation report and framing the assessment order with regard to purported bogus purchases is an aspect,",,,,,,,
which cannot be ignored and has been correctly highlighted by the Tribunal.,,,,,,,
15.9. If the revenue chooses to disallow bogus purchases, it would necessarily have to, in our view, ignore the corresponding sales recorded against the very same",,,,,,,
parties. As pointed out by the Tribunal, the CIT(A) could have rejected the books of accounts only, after it had examined and come to the conclusion that he was",,,,,,,
not satisfied as regards their correctness or completeness. The finding of fact returned by the Tribunal is that books of accounts were not examined by the,,,,,,,
CIT(A). If that be so, then, Section 145(3) of the Act could not have been triggered by the CIT(A), based on the mere statement of the Managing Director of the",,,,,,,
assessee. Besides this, as noted by the Tribunal, the CIT(A) had attempted to quantify the profit by resorting to a methodology, which was incomprehensible. The",,,,,,,
relevant observations made by the Tribunal read as :,,,,,,,
“105. ……Nevertheless, they are not entitled to make a pure guess in making assessment with reference to any evidence or material at all. There",,,,,,,
must be more than a mere suspicion to support an assessment u/s 143 (3) of the act. Against this, the assessee has supported his books of accounts with",,,,,,,
adequate evidences of his own business as well as also supported it with the balance sheet and profit and loss account of comparable 3rd parties. The,,,,,,,
assessee has demonstrated that gross profits earned by those parties in the similar line of business are less than the gross profit declared by the,,,,,,,
assessee.,,,,,,,
Further, the quantification of the profit by the learned CIT â€" A, has been made on in comprehensible assumptions. He applied the gross profit",,,,,,,
rate of other parties to the sales of allegedly bogus parties. He has application of the gross profit rate also changed from the year to year. In 1 of the,,,,,,,
years, he adopted the gross profit rate being average of gross profit of 2 preceding years on by the assessee from other parties and applied the same",,,,,,,
rate to the sales from allegedly bogus parties. We fail to understand that how the gross profit ratio of one year can be applied to another year for,,,,,,,
determining the profit of some of the transactions of another year.,,,,,,,
In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the learned assessing officer has incorrectly disallowed 25% of the purchases from the",,,,,,,
alleged bogus parties without finding any evidence and ignoring the sales paid by them to the assessee. Further, the learned CIT â€" A applied the",,,,,,,
provisions of section 145 (3) of the income tax act by rejecting the books of accounts of the assessee partially, without even looking at the books of",,,,,,,
accounts is also incorrect……..â€,,,,,,,
Third Issue,,,,,,,
Insofar as the third issue is concerned, the revenue’s stand has been that the cash deposits made post demonetization represented unaccounted income of",,,,,,,
,F.Y.2014-2015,,F.Y.2015-2016,,F.Y.2016-2017,,
,"Cash
Sales","Cash
Deposits","Cash
Sales","Cash
Deposits","Cash
Sales","Cash
Deposits",
Total
Rs.(Cr.)",237.44,242.65,412.52,428.19,633.86,633.74,
17.1. The Tribunal also seems to have accepted the explanation that the gross profit ratio for the AY in issue i.e., AY 2017-2018 (relevant F.Y.2016-2017) was in",,,,,,,
line with the earlier years. In this context, the Tribunal took note of the fact that, at the time when the search and seizure action had taken place, the data had not",,,,,,,
been finalized as adjustments towards depreciation, interest and provisions for expenses could be made only after the end of the relevant financial year.",,,,,,,
17.2. Besides this, the Tribunal also appears to have accepted the explanation given by the assessee that the purported misalignment of the gross profit ratio",,,,,,,
occurred, as unaudited data of the year in issue was compared with the audited data of the previous years. It is in this context that the Tribunal took note of the",,,,,,,
gross profit percentage of AYs 2015-2016 (6.14%), 2016-2017 (4.19%) and 2017-2018 (5.85%), as also the respective net profit ratio for the very same years,",,,,,,,
which, according to the assessee, were 0.72% 0.81% and 1.35% respectively. The sense that the Tribunal derived from the data presented to it, which was based",,,,,,,
on documentary evidence, was that there was no substantial variation in either the gross profit or net profit in the relevant year i.e., A.Y. 2017-2018, as compared",,,,,,,
to the previous years.,,,,,,,
17.3. Furthermore, based on details furnished by the assessee for the AY 2017-2018 concerning its closing stock, list of debtors, details of purchases and sales",,,,,,,
made, list of creditors, copies of bank statements and books of accountsâ€"the Tribunal concluded that it was not a case where it could be said that the assessee",,,,,,,
had purchased or sold goods to unidentified parties. 17.4. The CIT(A)’s emphasis on the fact that, although the assessee had undertaken liabilities in the form",,,,,,,
of loans, it chose to keep a large amount as cash in hand was repelled by the Tribunal, while, broadly, accepting the explanation given by the assessee that the",,,,,,,
long-term loans taken by it had to be repaid at regular intervals, which obliged the assessee had to bear commitment charges, and, thus, repayment of loans, as",,,,,,,
suggested by the revenue, was not a viable option.",,,,,,,
17.5. Insofar as short-term borrowings was concerned, the Tribunal appears to have accepted the assessee’s explanation that most of these were liabilities",,,,,,,
that were outstanding against bills payable under the letter of undertaking and cash credit, which were secured by closing stock maintained by the assessee.",,,,,,,
According to the assessee, these were available at a lesser rate of interest. Besides this, certain funds were secured by a hundred per cent margin, supported by",,,,,,,
fixed deposits. These funds bore a small rate of interest. In addition, thereto, certain advances were received also in the form of packing credit, which again bore a",,,,,,,
small rate of interest. In a nutshell, the explanation of the assessee, which found favour with the Tribunal, was that outstanding loan liabilities had no relationship",,,,,,,
with the cash held in hand by the assessee.,,,,,,,
17.6. Having regard to the extensive material which has been examined by the Tribunal, in particular, the trend of cash sales and corresponding cash deposited by",,,,,,,
the assessee with earlier years, we are of the view that there was nothing placed on recordâ€"which could have persuaded the Tribunal to conclude that the",,,,,,,
assessee had, in fact, earned unaccounted income i.e., made cash deposits which were not represented by cash sales. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal",,,,,,,
correctly found in favour of the assessee and deleted the addition made by CIT(A) of Rs.73.13 crores, under Section 68 of the Act.",,,,,,,
Before we conclude let us deal with the submissions advanced by Mr Sharma in the context of the three issues discussed The submission made by Mr Sharma,,,,,,,
that because there was a huge variation in the share premium i.e., the rate at which share premium was paid by the investor entities and the rate at which it was",,,,,,,
sold, and therefore addition concerning amount received as share capital/ share premium, should be sustained, is not tenable. The answer, to our minds, lies in what",,,,,,,
has been held by the Tribunal, which is, that at the end of the day it was found that it was the assessee’s own money, which had been routed through the",,,,,,,
investor entities. As indicated above, as a matter of fact, in AY 2012-2013, addition on this account was sought to be made by the A.O., which was deleted by",,,,,,,
CIT(A) in appeal. The revenue, for reasons best known, did not carry the matter in appeal.",,,,,,,
18.1. We agree with the Tribunal, as observed above, that since no incriminating material was found qua AYs 2012-2013 to 2014-2015 vis-Ã -vis share",,,,,,,
capital/share premium, the addition under Section 68 could not have been made, apart from the fact that the revenue was unable to dislodge the conclusion arrived",,,,,,,
by the Tribunal that the money invested in the assessee was the assessee’s own money.,,,,,,,
18.2. Insofar as the submission made by Mr Sharma that, one Mr Praveen Agarwal i.e., the purported accommodation entry provider had denied making any",,,,,,,
investment in the assessee, and, therefore, it was a factor that the Tribunal ought to have taken into account, is a submission which fails to appreciate the following",,,,,,,
facts:,,,,,,,
(i) That Mr Praveen Aggarwal’s statement was recorded in a separate search action on 12.11.2012; which, as is obvious from the record, occurred before the",,,,,,,
search action that was carried out vis-Ã -vis the assessee on 21.03.2017.,,,,,,,
(ii) Share capital was received from three companies controlled by Mr Praveen Agarwal i.e., Abhilasha Exports Pvt. Ltd., Subhshree Hirise Pvt. Ltd. and",,,,,,,
Pushpanjali Commotrade Pvt. Ltd. in AY 2012-2013.,,,,,,,
(iii) The total amount, which the assessee received, as share capital/share premium in AY 2012-2013 amounted to Rs.48.20 crores, which included monies",,,,,,,
received from the aforementioned three companies controlled by Mr Praveen Agarwal.,,,,,,,
(iv) These transactions were examined by the A.O. in A.Y.2012-2013, and an assessment order dated 24.03.2015 was passed under Section 143(3) of the Act",,,,,,,
whereby, the addition of Rs.18.50 crores was made by the A.O. under Section 68 of the Act, as unexplained credits. As indicated above, in appeal, the CIT(A), by",,,,,,,
an order dated 31.03.2016, set aside the deletion and, while doing so, observed that due confirmations were received from investor entities against notices issued to",,,,,,,
them under Section 133(6) of the Act.,,,,,,,
(v) The revenue did not point to any part of the record which would show that the statement made by Mr Praveen Agarwal was furnished to the assessee and,,,,,,,
was allowed to cross-examine or rebut the statement. Since the assessee was not allowed to cross-examine or rebut the statement made by Mr Praveen Agarwal,",,,,,,,
the said statement could not be used against the assessee. Furthermore, there is no ground taken in the appeal which makes any such assertion.",,,,,,,
(vi) The failure on the part of the revenue to demonstrate from the record that the aforesaid person i.e., Mr Praveen Agarwal was examined by the A.O. in the",,,,,,,
assessment proceedings concerning the assessee. Nothing was shown to us, which could establish that the A.O. conducted an independent enquiry to test the",,,,,,,
veracity of the statement made by Mr Praveen Agarwal.,,,,,,,
18.3. Therefore, given the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that no cognizance can be taken of the statement made by Mr Praveen Agarwal. 18.4. As",,,,,,,
regards Mr Sharmas’s contention that although the Tribunal has relied upon the deviation report in support of certain conclusions arrived at by it, it has ignored",,,,,,,
certain other parts of the deviation report. For instance, reference is made to the fact that the deviation report prepared by the A.O. concluded that the assessee",,,,,,,
had introduced unaccounted cash to the extent of Rs.99.04 crores, which is liable to be added to its total income for AY 2017-2018. We have already discussed",,,,,,,
this aspect at length in the earlier part of the judgment. Suffice it to reiterate that the assessee’s explanation that the banks had advised deposit of money in,,,,,,,
tranches, does not appear to be unreasonable.",,,,,,,
18.5. Besides this, as noticed above, the Tribunal, after a detailed analysis, has concluded that the cash deposits made post demonetization were in line with the",,,,,,,
cash deposits made in the earlier years, against corresponding cash sales.",,,,,,,
18.6. As regards the other observations made in the deviation report on which Mr Sharma has placed reliance i.e., that addition on account of share premium",,,,,,,
should be made under Section 68 of the Act, in cases where money was not sourced from the assessee is answered by the Tribunal after noticing the fact that",,,,,,,
investments from unrelated parties were received only in AY 2012-2013. The addition made by the A.O. for AY 2012-2013, as observed above, was deleted by",,,,,,,
CIT(A) in the assessee's appeal. It would be relevant to note that, insofar as related parties were concerned, the deviation report clearly stated in paragraphs 3(iii)",,,,,,,
to (ix) that the ultimate source of money was the assessee itself. As a matter of fact, the observation made by the A.O., in paragraph 3(ix) of the deviation report,",,,,,,,
was different from what was understood by the revenue:,,,,,,,
“ix) As the source of share capital/premium can be traced directly to the bank account of the assessee company and there is no cash movement,",,,,,,,
addition of entire share capital/premium of Rs, 365.28 Crs is not justifiable and may lead to allegation of high pitch assessment. Only where there is no",,,,,,,
direct trail of money being sourced from the bank account of the assessee, the introduced share capital/premium needs to be added to the income of the",,,,,,,
assessee.â€,,,,,,,
18.7. Concededly, the Tribunal, in its analysis, has adverted to the trail of money (which is something we have noticed above), and, therefore, its conclusion that it",,,,,,,
was not unexplained credit, and thus, not liable to be added under Section 68 of the Act to the income of the assessee, cannot be disturbed.",,,,,,,
18.8. Insofar as the submission of Mr Sharma that the deviation report adverts to rejection of books of accounts and refers to the shortage of stock amounting to,,,,,,,
Rs.450 crores, is concerned, the same has already been alluded to by us, and, therefore, needs no further elaboration.",,,,,,,
18.9. Likewise, the aspect concerning cash deposits made post demonetization and bogus purchases/sales have also been discussed hereinabove at length.",,,,,,,
Conclusion:-,,,,,,,
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the revenue has not been able to persuade us that a substantial question(s) of law arose for our",,,,,,,
consideration.,,,,,,,
19.1. The result of the appeals filed before the Tribunal was turned on appreciation of evidence placed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is the final fact-finding,,,,,,,
authority. We have not been able to conclude that the findings returned by the Tribunal are perverse. Importantly, neither in the grounds nor in the questions of law",,,,,,,
as suggested in the appeals, the revenue has averred that the findings of the Tribunal are “perverseâ€. This fact imposes a limitation on this court while",,,,,,,
entertaining an appeal under Section 260A of the Act. In a nutshell, this court cannot revaluate the findings of fact returned by the Tribunal, except on the limited",,,,,,,
ground of perversity/complete lack of evidence. [See K. Ravindranathan Nair v. CIT, (2001) 1 SCC 135.]",,,,,,,
“7. …. A decision on fact of the Tribunal can be gone into by the High Court only if a question has been referred to it which says that the finding of,,,,,,,
the Tribunal on facts is perverse, in the sense that it is such as could not reasonably have been arrived at on the material placed before the Tribunal. In",,,,,,,
this case, there was no such question before the High Court. Unless and until a finding of fact reached by the Tribunal is canvassed before the High",,,,,,,
Court in the manner set out above, the High Court is obliged to proceed upon the findings of fact reached by the Tribunal and to give an answer in law",,,,,,,
to the question of law that is before it.,,,,,,,
The only jurisdiction of the High Court in a reference application is to answer the questions of law that are placed before it. It is only when a finding,,,,,,,
of the Tribunal on fact is challenged as being perverse, in the sense set out above, that a question of law can be said to arise.â€",,,,,,,
19.2. As has been, repeatedly, noted hereinabove, and as is also observed by the Tribunal, the A.O. shifted his position vis-Ã -vis the assessee. This is clearly",,,,,,,
evident if one were to compare the deviation report prepared by the A.O. (pursuant to the submission of the appraisal report by the investigation wing) with the,,,,,,,
assessment order(s) framed by him.,,,,,,,
19.3. It is disconcerting to note that the investigation wing directed the A.O. to frame the assessment in a manner that would protect the revenue’s interest.,,,,,,,
The A.O. performs a quasi-judicial function while framing an assessment. The revenue cannot dictate the manner, in which, the A.O. frames the assessment",,,,,,,
order. In this case, the investigation wing appears to have crossed the Rubicon, when it advised the A.O. to frame the assessment to protect the interest of the",,,,,,,
revenue. [See CIT v. Greenworld Corpn., (2009) 7 SCC 69; P. Palaniswami case]",,,,,,,
“53. ……. No doubt in terms of the circular letter issued by CBDT, the Commissioner or for that matter any other higher authority may have supervisory",,,,,,,
jurisdiction but it is difficult to conceive that even the merit of the decision shall be discussed and the same shall be rendered at the instance of the higher authority,,,,,,,
who, as noticed hereinbefore, is a supervisory authority. It is one thing to say that while making the orders of assessment the assessing officer shall be bound by",,,,,,,
the statutory circulars issued by CBDT but it is another thing to say that the assessing authority exercising quasi-judicial function keeping in view the scheme,,,,,,,
contained in the Act, would lose its independence to pass an independent order of assessment.",,,,,,,
xxx xxx xxx,,,,,,,
When a statute provides for different hierarchies providing for forums in relation to passing of an order as also appellate or original order, by no stretch of",,,,,,,
imagination a higher authority can interfere with the independence which is the basic feature of any statutory scheme involving adjudicatory process.â€,,,,,,,
“5. The respondent then filed a Letters Patent Appeal. By this time the decision of this Court in B. Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal,,,,,,,
[AIR 1964 SC 1573 : (1964) 7 SCR 1 : (1964) 2 SCJ 570.] had been rendered and by that decision GO No. 1298 dated April 28, 1956, which was the previous",,,,,,,
direction issued by the State Government under Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, was set aside. It was held that it was legitimate to assume that the",,,,,,,
Legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law that in exercising their authority and discharging their quasi-judicial functions,",,,,,,,
the tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment guided only by the statutory light. It was,,,,,,,
pointed out that it was of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of judges or tribunals must be absolutely unfettered by any,,,,,,,
extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. It was true that Section 43-A empowered the State Government to issue directions to the,,,,,,,
Regional Transport Authority and the authority was bound under that Section to give effect to all such directions. But since the Government Order purported to,,,,,,,
give directions in respect of matters which had been entrusted to the authorities constituted under the Act and which have to be dealt with in quasi-judicial manner,,,,,,,
the Government Order to that extent was outside the purview of Section 43-A. The result was that the decisions of the Transport Authorities which were based,,,,,,,
upon the Government Order and not on an independent assessment of the matters referred to in Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act were liable to be set,,,,,,,
aside.…..’,,,,,,,
xxx xxx xxx,,,,,,,
…..When there is a Government Order in existence and parties applying for permits come to know that the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, were",,,,,,,
disposing of their applications for permits in accordance with the Government Order, matters not referred to in the Government Order but which may be very",,,,,,,
germane for consideration under Section 47 get automatically excluded during the hearings. The Government Order, instead of Section 47, becomes the last word",,,,,,,
on the subject. That is the real vice of such Government instructions. The authorities feel bound by these instructions and the parties before them feel equally,,,,,,,
bound by them. They, naturally exclude from the controversy other matters which though relevant under Section 47 do not find a place in the Government Order.",,,,,,,
As pointed out by this Court in R.M. Subhraj v. K.M. Union (P) Ltd. [(1973) 3 SCC 871 : AIR 1972 SC 2266] “Once it is found that a Tribunal which under the,,,,,,,
statute has to deal with applications for permits in a judicial manner is directed by the Government to adopt any specified method for assessing the merits of the,,,,,,,
applicants and the Tribunal takes into consideration such direction of the executive, the judicial determination by the Tribunal is pollutedâ€. It is polluted not merely",,,,,,,
because those instructions have a tendency to interpret Section 47 in their own way but also because considerations other than those in the instructions get,,,,,,,
automatically excluded although they are quite relevant for the purpose of Section 47. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in remanding",,,,,,,
the case to the Tribunal for a re-hearing without the constraint of the Government Order.â€,,,,,,,
Accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, the appeals are dismissed.",,,,,,,
20.1. Pending applications shall also stand closed.,,,,,,,
There shall be, however, no order as to costs.",,,,,,,