Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh vs Ramesh Chander Tuli and others

Satish Kumar Mittal, J.—Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh has filed the instant writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 14.7.2011 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as ''the Tribunal'') whereby the petitioner Institute was directed to release an amount of Rs. 2 lacs forthwith to respondent No. 1 out of the gratuity amount of Rs. 4 lacs; as well as the order dated 2.12.2011 (Annexure P-8) passed by the Tribunal, vide which the inquiry proceedings pending against respondent No. 1 were held to be vitiated and the petitioner Institute was restrained from further proceeding with the said inquiry. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Institute and gone through both the impugned orders.

In the present case, respondent No. 1 was working as Hospital Engineer in the petitioner Institute. He retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.4.2007. After his retirement, a charge sheet was served on him on 12.11.2009 with regard to delivery of 420 bags of cement to the contractor at Government rates without actual receipt and consumption of the cement. The total amount, involved in the charge sheet, as mentioned in the order dated 14.7.2011, is Rs. 58,000/-. Due to pendency of the said inquiry, the entire gratuity of respondent No. 1 to the tune of Rs. 4 lacs was withheld. Respondent No. 1 approached the Tribunal by filing Original Application No. 266-CH of 2011, seeking direction to the petitioner Institute to release the amount of gratuity, as withholding of the entire amount of gratuity for an amount of Rs. 58,000/- was not justified.

The Tribunal, vide order dated 14.7.2011, directed the petitioner Institute to release an amount of Rs. 2 lacs forthwith to respondent No. 1 out of the gratuity amount of Rs. 4 lacs. By the same order, the petitioner Institute was also directed to complete the inquiry expeditiously. The time was fixed upto 31.8.2011. The petitioner Institute did not challenge the said order.

When the inquiry could not be completed within time fixed by the Tribunal, the petitioner Institute filed an application before the Tribunal seeking extension of time. The said application was allowed and the time was extended. When within the extended time, the inquiry was not completed, second application for extension was filed. The time was again extended, but still the inquiry was not completed within the time extended for the second time. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer did not bother either to get the time further extended or to complete the inquiry. Ultimately, respondent No. 1 approached the Tribunal raising his grouse by filing application (MA No. 941 of 2011 in Original Application No. 266-CH of 2011) that the petitioner Institute has not completed the inquiry within the time fixed by the Tribunal. On issuing notice of the said application, when the petitioner Institute appeared, even by that time, the inquiry had not been completed, though one or the other reason was given for not completing the inquiry within the extended time.

Ultimately, when no final decision was taken in the inquiry, the Tribunal vide order dated 2.12.2011 declared the inquiry proceedings as vitiated and restrained the petitioner Institute from further proceeding with the inquiry, while observing as under:-

There is, thus, no controversy that the inquiry proceedings have not come to be concluded within the timeframe granted by the Tribunal. In support of that plea that, in such like eventuality, the proceedings would stand vitiated, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the applicant upon the following rulings :-

i) Tilak Ram Singh and others v. Cane Commissioner, Lucknow and others, 1999(2) A.T.J. 301; and

ii) K. V. Gnanasampandan v. Union of India and others, 2001(2) A.T.J. 65

The judicial pronouncements relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant are fully supportive of the view advocated on behalf of the applicant. In Tilak Ram Singh''s case (supra), the relevant regulation of the U.P. Cane Cooperative Service Regulations provided that disciplinary proceedings must be concluded within a particular period. The proceedings were not concluded within that period. It was under those circumstances that the Allahabad High Court held that the proceedings which concluded thereafter stood vitiated and the consequential order granted on the basis thereof was wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity.

In K. V. Gnanasampandan''s case (supra) too, it was held that if a direction had been granted by the Tribunal for the grant of final order by the competent authority within a time-bound frame and the latter defaulted in granting it, the only way the riddle could be got over was by applying for extension of time. If the competent authority did not apply for the extension of time, any orders granted thereafter would be null and void.

No law taking a contrary view of the facts has been cited on behalf of the respondents during the course of the hearing.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is held that the inquiry proceedings against the applicant stand vitiated. The Inquiring Authority shall further stand restrained from proceeding with the proceedings aforementioned.

During the course of arguments, it has not been disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner Institute that till the date of decision of the Tribunal on 2.12.2011, the inquiry had not been completed. However, while referring to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and others v. V. Appala Swamy, (2007)14 SC 49, he submits that only on the ground of delay, inquiry proceedings against a delinquent official should not be quashed, when no prejudice is caused to the employee.

After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner Institute and particularly in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned orders in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.

As stated above, the inquiry proceedings were initiated after the retirement of the employee and the total amount of alleged embezzlement, involved in the inquiry was only Rs. 58,000/-. Due to initiation of the said inquiry, the entire gratuity amount of Rs. 4 lacs of respondent No. 1 was withheld. When the inquiry was not completed by the petitioner Institute, respondent No. 1 approached the Tribunal, and the Tribunal, vide order dated 14.7.2011 ordered partial release of the gratuity amount and further directed the petitioner Institute to complete the inquiry by 31.8.2011. The strange fact in this case is that in spite of obtaining extension of time to conclude the inquiry twice, the inquiry was not completed by the petitioner Institute. Thereafter, neither the extension of time was sought nor the inquiry was concluded. Subsequently, when the petitioner Institute received notice of the application filed by respondent No. 1 for violation of the order of the Tribunal, still the inquiry was not completed. The amount of respondent No. 1 was withheld by the petitioner Institute for a long time, which could have been utilised by him, if the inquiry had been expedited. Definitely, delay in the present case has caused prejudice to respondent No. 1. If the petitioner Institute would have been conscious against the right of respondent No. 1, the inquiry could have been completed before passing the impugned order. This fact shows that the petitioner Institute was not serious at all in completing the inquiry, as there might be no sufficient material against the delinquent official. That is why, no effort was made to conclude the inquiry. It is true that normally, on the ground of delay, inquiry proceedings against a delinquent official should not be quashed, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in our view, the Tribunal has rightly quashed the inquiry proceedings against respondent No. 1, keeping in view the deliberate and conscious delay on the part of the petitioner Institute to complete the departmental inquiry within the extended time and even thereafter, before passing the order. It appears that the casual attitude of the petitioner Institute in not completing the inquiry was in order to deprive respondent No. 1 of his retiral benefits. Thus, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned orders.

No merit. Dismissed.