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Judgment
Sujoy Paul, J
In this petition filed under article 226 of Constitution of India, the challenge is mounted to the order dated 03.02.2021, whereby the learned Appellate Authority entertained the appeal preferred by the respondent nos.1 and 2 and directed the petitioner and respondent no.3 to vacate the accommodation of respondent nos.1 and 2.
In short, the facts narrated by the petitioner is that the petitioner solemnized marriage with the respondent no.3 Chintan Gupta on 21.04.2003. The respondent no.1 and 2 are in-laws of the petitioner. Out of the said wedlock, two daughters namely Srishti and Surbhi aged about 16 years and 09 years respectively were born.
The petitioner is residing in the same house in which respondent nos.1,2 and 3 are residing. The petitioner resides in a different room in the same house.
Shri Avinash Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the house of respondent nos.1 and 2 is a three story building in which in the first floor, commercial shops are available. There is a complete discord in matrimonial relation between the petitioner and respondent no.3. A petition seeking divorce is pending consideration before the Family Court. The respondent nos.1 and 2 filed an application under section 22(1) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizen Act, 2007 (Act of 2007) before the competent authority/Sub-divisional Officer, Indore. The said authority passed the order dated 14. 12.2019 and held that the application is not maintainable for want of jurisdiction. However, considering the fact that the respondent nos.1 and 2 are senior citizens, directed the Conciliation Officer of police station to visit the house of applicant therein atleast once in a month and shall provide necessary help to them. Aggrieved, the respondent nos.1 and 2 preferred an appeal before the Learned District Magistrate, which was registered as Case No.22/Appeal/2019-2020. The learned District Magistrate passed the impugned order dated 03.02.2021, which is assailed in this petition by contending:-
(i) The house of respondent nos.1 and 3 is big enough to accommodate the present petitioner.
(ii) If the petitioner is thrown out of the house with her young daughters, in absence of any roof/shelter, it will be difficult for her to survive.
(iii) The petitioner preferred various complaints before the competent authority/CM Helpline regarding atrocities being committed by her in-laws. The petitioner's husband is also not having good relation with the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner needs to be protected.
(iv) By placing reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No.2483/2020 (Satish Chandar Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja) decided on 15.10.2020. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is bad in law.
(v) Lastly, it is submitted that the present petitioner filed reply/response before both the authorities below, but while passing the impugned order no heed is paid to the stand of the present petitioner.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 supported the impugned order. It is urged that the learned District Magistrate has passed the order in accordance with law as per the Act of 2007. The reliance is also placed on the Madhya Pradhesh Maintenance and Welfare of Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 (Rules of 2009). It is urged that these rules were introduced in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 1 of section 32 of the Act of 2007. By placing reliance on Rule 19(2)(i), it is submitted that the learned District Magistrate is under a statutory obligation to ensure the life and property of senior citizen. In order to protect them, he has passed the impugned order, which cannot be said to be without authority of law. In support of submissions, reliance is placed on the judgments of High Court of Madhya Pradesh passed in WP No.13471/2015 (Rajesh Kumar Tamrakar Vs. State of MP) decided on 24.08.2016, High Court of Chhattisgarh passed in CRMP No.600/2018 (Pramod Ranjankar and Others Vs.
Arunashankar and Others) decided on 18.07.2018 and High Court of Delhi passed in CM (M) Nos.1582/2018 and 53645/2018 (Vinay Varma Vs. Kanika Pasricha and Others) decided on 29.11.2019 .
Shri Rakesh Singh Bhadoria, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 submits that although respondent no.3 does not have good relation with the petitioner, as a law abiding citizen and on humanitarian consideration, he has decided to provide a shelter to the petitioner. Reliance is placed on a rent agreement entered into between the respondent nos.3 and one Nalini W/o Rakesh Nagdeve R/o 228-A, Sahakar Nagar, Indore. It is submitted that this rent accommodation will be provided to the petitioner. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner will be without there being any shelter.
Learned government advocate also supported the impugned order passed by the learned District Magistrate.
The parties confined there arguments to the extent indicated above.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
I deem it proper to first take up the last point raised by learned counsel for petitioner i.e. non consideration of petitioner’s response while passing the impugned order. Along with this petition, the petitioner has filed Annexure P/24 and Annexure P/42 which is stand of petitioner in writing.
The petitioner has filed aforesaid written submissions which are running in three and seven pages respectively. In the impugned order dated 3/2/2021, the learned Magistrate has not considered the said written submissions at all. In other words the learned Magistrate has not taken pains to consider the stand of the present petitioner. No iota of reasons are assigned as to why the written submissions filed by petitioner’s were not found trustworthy.
It was the minimum expectation from an adjudicatory body to assign some justifiable reasons if stand taken by a particular party is not acceptable. The reasons are held to be heart beat of conclusions. In the absence of reasons, the conclusion cannot be permitted to stand judicial scrutiny. The Apex Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 emphasized the need of assigning reasons in administrative, quasi judicial and judicial orders. The relevant portion reads as under:-
“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.
(emphasis supplied)
If impugned order dated 3/2/2021 is tested on the anvil of the principles laid down in the case of Kranti (supra), there will be no cavil of doubt that the impugned order does not contain reasons relating to non acceptance of written submissions of the petitioner. Thus, decision making process adopted by learned District Magistrate cannot be continenced. Resultantly, the order dated 3/2/2021 Annexure P/1 is set aside. The matter is remitted back before the learned District Magistrate with the direction to re-hear the parties and decide the matter in accordance with law afresh. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.
Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.
