Ponnuswami Pillay vs Singaram Pillay

Ayling, J.—Appellant in this case takes the preliminary Ayling, J. ground that the judgment cannot be supported in view of the provisions of

Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The suit was brought u/s 77 of the Registration Act to enforce registration of a will which both the Sub-Registrar and District Registrar had

declined to register. The Subordinate Judge says (paragraph 4 of his judgment):

The parties filed the evidence adduced before the registering authorities as evidence in this case by mutual consent. None of them wanted any

further evidence to be adduced in this Court. They were content to argue the case on the evidence adduced before the registering authorities.

The evidence in question on a consideration of which the case was decided included the statements of nine witnesses for plaintiff and eight

witnesses for defendant recorded by the Sub-Registrar. These statements could only become relevant evidence in the present case, if the

conditions prescribed by Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act were found by the Subordinate Judge to exist. There is nothing to even suggest

and it cannot be contended that the Subordinate Judge applied his mind to the question and decided (for instance) that the presence of the

witnesses could not be obtained without un reasonable delay and expense; his judgment shows that he proceeded solely on the ground of the

consent of parties. That is to say, the statements recorded by the Sub-Registrar were not relevant u/s 33 of the Indian Evidence Act; and the

learned vakil for respondent is unable to suggest any other section under which they would be relevant. But Section 165 of the Indian Evidence

Act lays down that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act, to be relevant and duly proved, and the consent of parties cannot

take the place of a declaration of the Evidence Act.

Our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court in Sri Raja Prakasaravanim Garu v. Venkata Rao ILR (1915) Mad. 160, in which it

might appear that the consent of parties was held to be sufficient. But the attention of the learned Judges does not seem to have been drawn to the

stringent provisions of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act above quoted; and with all respect we think we are justified in declining to follow

their decision.

We must, therefore, set aside the decree and judgment of the lower Court and direct that the suit be restored to file and disposed of according

to law.