PL. CT. SP. Subramanian Chettiar vs Meenakshi Achi and others

Janarthanam, J.—This appeal arises out of an order dated 10th day of February, 1982 by a learned single Judge in application No. 1718 of

1981 in C.S. No. 83 of 1965 on the file of this court.

C.S. No. 83 of 1965 was one in partition action of the estate of late Chidambaram Chettiar. Out of seven heirs, one of the heirs, namely,

Meenakshi Achi, figuring as plaintiff, brought the said partition action, im-pleading the rest of the heirs as defendants 1 to 6. By consent, a

preliminary decree had been passed declaring the entitlement of 1 / 7th share in the said estate to each of them. The estate was burdened with the

obligations of meeting the pressing demands of huge arrears of Income Tax, Wealth Tax, Urban Land Tax, Property tax and what not. In order to

relieve the pressure on the estate, this Court on 26-4-1977, directed an Advocate-Commissioner to sell two items of immovable properties

belonging to the estate, namely, house, ground and premises bearing Nos. 5, 5-A and 6-B, Williams Road, Tiruchirapalli and a vacant site known

as Kallukuzhi, Tiruchirapalli.

Pursuant to the said orders the Commissioner invited tenders for the purchase of the said items of the properties. He filed a report into court

stating that he received two tenders, one from Muthu-lakshmi Achi, and the other from one Mohammed Ibrahim. Muthulakshmi Achi offered Rs.

3,85,000 -- for the house and 60 paise per square foot for the vacant site. The said Mohammed Ibrahim Offered Rupees 3,90,000/- for the house

alone and he was not willing to purchase the vacant site on account of certain technical difficulties arising out of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land

(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (for short ''the Act'').

Accepting the offer of the said Muthulakshmi Achi on 28-6-1978, the Advocate-Commissioner was directed to sell the house and the vacant

site to her granting her two months lime to deposit the sale price. The Commissioner also took steps to get clearance from the Urban Land Ceiling

Authorities; but the efforts so taken ended in dismal failure.

Meanwhile, one of the heirs Pl.CT.SP. Subramanian Chettiar (first defendant) was adjudicated insolvent on 12-8-1977 in I.I. No. 75 of 1975

and all his assets and other effeets vested in the Official Assignee. On 14-11-1980, the said order of adjudication was annulled and all his assets

and effects were revested in him. He filed Application No. 1718 of 1981 to modify the order passed by this Court on 28-6-1978 and direct the

Commissioner to divide the house and the vacant site by metes and bounds into seven specific parts and allot one such part to him. He also took

out Application No. 1719 of 1981 for stay of issuance of sale certificate in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, her nominee or nominees, as per the

memo of the Commissioner dated 7-4-1981, pending disposal of the main application.

The said Muthulakshmi Achi, who is a third party, filed Application No. 1936 of 1981 to implead her as a parly in Application No. 1718 of

1981. She was ordered to be impleaded as additional respondent in the said application.

Respective learned Counsel appearing for Subramanian Chettiar (first defendant/ applicant) and Meenakshi Achi (plaintiff/ first respondent)

raised various grounds before learned single Judge, in support of the relief prayed for in Application No. 1718 of 1981 and they are as follows:

(1) Muthulakshmi Achi did not at all deposit the sale consideration, as directed in the order dated 28-6-1978 and consequently she is not entitled

to enforce the same.

(2) It is the duty of the Court to see that in such matters, the best price is obtained for the estate and since the applicant/first defendant is now

prepared to pay Rs. 10 lakhs for the house alone, his offer should be accepted, in preference to the price of Rs. 3,85,000,''-originally offered by

Muthulakshmi Achi, which was grossly inadequate and detrimental to the estate.

(3) Since Muthulakshmi Achi is prepared only to purchase the house for Rs. 3,85,000/-and not the vacant site, on account of the bar, if any, that

might affect the sale by virtue of the provisions of the Act, the sate should not be confirmed in her favour, by issuance of the sale certificate, as

respects the house.

(4) On !hc date when the direction was issued to the Commissioner for the sale of the said two items of properties in favour of Mathulakshmi Achi,

the applicant, first defendant had been declared as an insolvent and the order so passed, without impleading the Official Assignee, as a party, is

bad in law.

Learned Counsel appearing for Mushulakshmi Achi (respondent 8) would repd the submissions as raised above and state as follows:

Hie valid and conclusive acceptance of the offer of Muthulakshmi Achi to purchase the him and the vacant site cannot at all be later resended and

Muthulakshmi Achi is even not prepared to deposit into Court the entirety of the amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- and take the sale certificate, without

even insisting on the clearance certificate from the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities.

Learned single Judge had given anxi-out consideration to the rival submissions as above and ultimately held that there was no warrant for any

modification of the order dated 28-6-1978 and consequently dismissed application No. 1718 of 1981, giving rise to the present action, by the first

defendant.

Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, leaving aside the tenability or otherwise of the reasons adverted to by learned single Judge for the

dismissal of the application, would however submit that the impugned order of dismissal, culminating in the issuance of the sale certificate in favour

of Muthulakshmi Achi, on her depositing the entirety of the sum, is not at all sustainable in law, inasmuch as there arc no provisions in the Code of

Civil Procedure, (for short ""the Code) for effecting such sale and issuance of a sale certificate through Court, when especially such sale

tantamounts to causing flagrant violation of the sanguine provisions of the Act. In amplification of this argument, he would further submit that though

this was not raised as a ground, in the grounds of appeal, yet it cannot be stated that such a ground revolving on pure question of law cannot at all

be raised for the first time during the course of arguments.

He would, however, reenforce and reiterate the submission, as raised by him before learned single Judge resolving on the question of non-

impleading the Official Assignee and state- thus:

Though the appellant/1st defendant had been represented by his effective participation in the proceedings at the time when there was direction

issued to the Commissioner for the sale of the said two items of properties, yet it could not he said that at the time when the order dated 28-6-

1978 had been passed, he was duly represented, inasmuch as on that date the order adjudicating him as an insolvent was in force, vesting his

estate in the Official Assignee who was not impleaded as a party representing his estate and, therefore, the order so passed, in his (Official

Assignee''s) absence, could not be said to be valid in law on the (sic) principle of natural justice having been violated in passing an order behind the

back of the person affected by the order.

He would also make an incidental submission that though Muihulakshmi Achi wears the look of a third party bona fide purchaser, yet on the facts

and circumstances of the case, it cannot at all be ruled out of consideration that an assiduous attempt had been made to secret the fact of her being

the wife of the third defendant and this startling and puzzling circumstance of suppression of vital facts has, on the grounds of equity, to be

construed as an insurmountable obstacle in affixing the seal of approval to the sale in her favour and the issuance of the requisite sale certificate

therefor.

Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents would strenuously repeal such submissions.

We will now delve deep and give our anxious considerations to the rival submissions of either Counsel, in the light of the provisions contained

in the Code and the Act.

There are certain specific provisions in the Code as respects the sale of movable and immovable properties. Order XXXIX Rule 6 invests the

power to the Court to order interim sale of movable property and the said rule reads as follows:

The Court may, on the application of any party to a suit, order the sale by any person named in such order, and in such manner and on such terms

as it thinks fit, of any movable property, being the subject-matter of such suit, or attached before ""judgment in such suit, which is subject to speedy

and natural decay, or which for any other just and sufficient cause it may be desirable to have sold at once.

There are also other provisions regarding the sale of movable property found traceable to Order XXI Rules 74 to 81 and the details of those

provisions need not at all be required to be elaborated here for the purpose of the instant case. The sale of immovable property, in execution of the

decree is legally permissible and to this effect, there is a provision under Order XXI Rule 82, which prescribes:

Sales of immovable property in execution of decrees may be ordered by any Court other than a Court of Small Causes.

Order XXI Rules 83 to 96 prescribe the procedure to be followed in such sales. Barring these provisions, there is no other provision, except

the provision, as adumbrated in S. 151 of the Code, dealing with the inherent powers of the Court. Section 151 does not confer a new power in

the Court, but makes astatutory recognition of the inherent power of the Court 10 do certain things ex debito justitiae. Such a power is not to be

exercised casually and if at all exercised with circumspection and not to violate any rule of law or equity. There can be no justification in applying

the powers of the inherent jurisdiction to introduce a new form of procedure, for which no provision is made by law.

For the direction by the Court, in the instant case, to the Commissioner to order sale of two items of the suit properties in final decree

proceedings, for meeting the pressing demands of the estate in discharging the huge tax arrears, the aforesaid provisions of Order XXI and

XXXIX cannot at all be made applicable and further, no other provision is available, except the invoking of the luherent jurisdiction under S. 151,

which, in our new is also not applicable, as the inhering of such a power to the Court would tantamount to introducing a new form of procedure,

for which no provision is made in the Code and if at all, any provision is traceable for such sale of property in partition action, reference may be

made to S. 2 of the Partition Act (Act IV of 1893), wherein, it is legally permissible to effect such sale, in case a division of the property cannot

reasonably or conveniently be made. The case on hand is not one falling within the purview of S. 2 of the Partition Act.

In this context, useful reference may be made to the decision in Muthuswami Gounder v. A.P. Kaithamalai Gounder 1976 TLNJ 191. In that

case, the lower Court. after taking into consideration the Commissioner''s repcrt and the objections filed by the respondent, directed the

Commissioner to sell the property, among the sharers, after giving one month''s notice to the Counsel of both the parties and the successful bidder,

among the sharers, shall be permitted to set off his share to the sale price and deposit the balance Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant

preferred a revision to this Court which considered the question as to whether the Court has inherent jurisdiction, apart from the Partition Act, to

pass an order as it thinks just and convenient. This Court, after placing implicit reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in O.S.A. No.

108 of 1966, which was affirmed by the apex of the Judicial Administration of the country in R. Ramamurthi Iyer Vs. Raja V. Rajeswara Rao, said

thus:

It js clear from the discussion and the decision rendered in O.S.A. No. 108 of 1966 that this Court will not have inherent powers, apart from the

Partition Act, to pass orders in respect of a partition suit. I am in complete agreement with the arguments advanced by the petitioner''s Counsel to

the effect that O.S.A. No. 108 of 1966 is the authority for the proposition that the Court will not have any inherent powers, apart ""from the

Partition Act, in respect of partition suits. It is clear the court below has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law. The Lower Court ought to

have decided the case as per the provisions of S. 2 of the Partition Act and should not have ordered auction of the suit property in between the

sharers.

In the light of the above decision, it goes without saying that this court is not clothed with the power to order sale of immovable property

through advocate-Commissioner appointed by Court in final decree proceedings and issue sale certificate therefor. Consequently, it follows that all

proceedings taken and orders passed for the sale of the two items of properties through Advocate-Commissioner are ab initio void, as being done

without any jurisdiction and no sale certificate in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, in the instant case, could be granted.

Even assuming for argument''s sake that the sale effected by Court is valid, pertinent it is to point out at thisjuncture, the issuance of a sale

certificate, on the facts and circumstances of the case, would have the effect of tarnishing the image of the Court, being the guardian of law.

Admittedly, the ''said two items of properties are in excess of the ceiling area, as per the provisions of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the

strenuous efforts taken by the Advocate-Commissioner to get exemption from the provisions of the Act ended in dismal failure. In such a situation,

if the Court descends to issue the sale certificate in respect of the two items of properties, coming within the purview of the Act, massacre of law is

at the altar of the precincts of the Court. In other words, it tantamounts to scuttling the law-in-action and fostering law''s inaction.

This apart, the passing of the order dated 28-6-1978, without impleading the Official Assignee, representing the estate of the appellant/first

defendant, an insolvent then, cannot at all be said to be valid in law, on the violation of principle of natural justice, in passing an order behind the

back of the person affected by the order, as rightly contended by learned Counsel for the appellant.

Top of all, there are materials available on record to point out that Muthulakshmi Achi is not a bona fide third party purchaser and on the other

hand, she is none-else than the wife of the third defendant and this aspect of the matter had been suppressed by the ingenious device of furnishing

particulars regarding her address in all material records such as affidavits, official correspondence etc. by stating that she is ""so & so'' with a prefix

''smt'', thereby indicating her marital status, but without disclosing her husband''s name and what she would do in a queer way is that she chooses

to identify her as the daughter of ''so & so'' and despite such assiduous attempt of concealment, her real status of her being the wife of the third

defendant emerged to the surface, on the facts and circumstances of the case.

The first defendant would file objections to the memo filed by the Commissioner dated 7-4-1981 for direction to issue sale certificate and

therein he would make a categorical assertion that she is the wife of the third defendant and this aspect of the matter had not at all been

controverted by the said Muthulakshmi Achi and from this, we are not far wrong in coming to the conclusion that she had taken all precautions to

conceal her identity as the wife of the third defendant right through, with a sinister purpose and that perhaps was the reason that she chose to

describe her status as the daughter of ''so & so'', without mentioning her husband''s name, who in the circumstances of the case, cannot be anyone

other than the third defendant and this sort of a device, we feel, is nothing but a clever attempt made in a dexterous fashion to retain the properties

within the family-fold by scuttling the provisions of the Act, without seemingly making an appearance to the outside world therefor.

It is stated at the Bar that Muthu-lakshmi Achi had deposited into Court the entirety of the amount and the same had been utilised in

discharging the tax burden and other liabilities of the estate. All canons of fairness, justice, equity and good conscience demand that the third party

the so-called bona fide purchaser, Muthulakshrni Achi should be adequately compensated by making the said amount, stated to have been parted

by her, available to her with a reasonable rate of interest. This can be done, only in the adjustment of equities at the time of final decree

proceedings, in allotting specific portions in the two items of the suit properties to the individual sharers. As already indicated, each of the sharers is

entitled to 1/7th share in the said two items of properties and in working out equity, each sharer has to bear the brunt of equal burden in

discharging the dues of Muthulakshrni Achi with reasonable rate of interest, which we fix, in the circumstances of the case, at 15 per cent per

annum from the date of deposit till realisation.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly, but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.

Order accordingly.