P.K. Gopalan vs Sipora

Heard both sides. The revision-Petitioner is the tenant of a building which comes under the category of non-residential buildings mentioned in Proclamation iv [4] Ct. 1122 (Cochin). The petition by the landlord, the counter-Petitioner here, was filed to evict the tenant alleging three grounds to substantiate the claim. The grounds alleged were that rent was left in arrears, that the tenant was committing waste in the property and that the building was required for residential purposes. Under Proclamation iv [4] of 1122 which was in force when this petition was filed and decided by the Kent Controller, the third ground i. e., that the building was required for residential purposes, was not a tenable one. The Rent Controller found against the tenant on the question of arrears of rent; but eviction was ordered on the ground that the tenant was committing waste in the building. Against this decision the landlord filed R .C. A. 107/1124 and tenant filed R. C. A. 113 of 1124 before the District Magistrate who was the appellate Authority. While the appeals were pending disposal Act xxiv [24] of 1124 (Cochin) was passed and u/s 9(8) (iii) of that Act a claim for eviction of a non-residential building was sustainable if the building was required for the occupation of the landlord or for the bona fide separate residence of any undivided member of his family or tarwad. Since this averment had been made by the landlord in the original petition, the learned District Magistrate thought it proper to remand the case to enable the parties to adduce evidence on this point. This revision petition is directed against the order of remand.

So long as Act xxiv [24] of 1124 was not given any retrospective effect the parties are to be governed by the law in force at the time the proceedings were started. The principle is thus laid down in In re Debtor No. 1936 1 Ch. D. 237 : 105 L. J. ch. 129.

It is a general rule that when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affact them.

Further at p. 243 it was observed thus: Thus while an appellate Court is able, and bound, to give effect to new remedies which have been introduced by enactments passed after the order appealed from was made by the Court of first instance, yet with regard to substantive rights it is well established that the Appellate Court must give effect to the same lew as that which was in force at the date of the earlier proceedings.

These principles were followed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the matter of In Re: Tripura Modern Bank Ltd.; Her Highness Maharani Regent Mohadebi of Tripura and Others, . The decisions of the Travancore High Court in 1 T.L.J. 100 : 2. T.L.J. 21 : 3 T.L.J. 66 : 6 T.L.J. 305 : 17 T.L.J. 229 : 19 T.L.J. 930 are also to the effect except in oases of statutes relating to procedure, other statutes would have no retrospective effect unless a dear intention to the contrary is manifested. It is therefore clear that the landlord cannot take advantage of the provisions in the statute passed while the appeal was pending. The order of remand thus passed by the Appellate Authority could not be sustained. It is set aside. The District Magistrate will restore the two appeals to his file and dispose them on the merits and in the light of the observations made above. The parties will suffer their costs of this petition.