Pinaki Roy vs Dipali Roy & Ors

The Court :- This is a thoroughly misconceived appeal.

The appellant suggests that in course of dealing with a contempt petition arising out of an interlocutory order passed in the partition suit, the interlocutory order has been modified. The appellant relies on a judgment reported at (2012) 1 CHN 607 for the proposition that when the substantive rights of the parties to the proceedings are prejudiced in course of an order passed in contempt proceedings, an appeal may lie from such part of the order under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

On October 7, 2013 an interim order was passed in the suit in terms of prayer (a) of the notice of motion. Prayer (a) of the relevant notice of motion provided as follows:

"The respondents, their men, servants,agents, assigns, heirs and/or representatives be restrained from transferring and/or letting out and/or dealing with and/or parting with possession and/or encumbering and/or creating any third party interest with the joint family properties mentioned in Schedule "B" hereto in any manner whatsoever."

However, the order dated October 7, 2013 must be seen in its entirety to appreciate exactly what was implied by the operative part thereof. In the discussion in the relevant order preceding the directions contained therein, the interlocutory Court recorded that the parties opposing the application had indicated that the petitioner had only the 1/20th share in the property, that the petitioner (the appellant herein) did not reside at the joint family dwelling house, that it was such opposing defendants who were in occupation of the property at 8B and 9, Abhoy Mitra Street, Kolkata-700005, and that for the purpose of paying the Corporation rates and taxes and to maintain the relevant building, it was necessary to allow commercial exploitation of the building by letting out the same for shooting, whether for television serials or for films. The order dated October 7, 2013 also noticed that the substance of the appellant's claim in the relevant petition was that no share of the money earned from the commercial exploitation of the building was ever paid to the appellant. The Court also noticed prayer (b) of the petition which was a direction sought by the appellant herein on the resident defendants to forthwith pay the appellant's proportionate share of the rental income that had been derived from the said property. It was in such context that the order dated October 7, 2013 came to be made. The operative part of the order reads as follows:

"Accordingly, there will be an order in terms of prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion. Ms. Shreya Basu Mullick and Mr. Haimaja Prasanna Basu, advocates are appointed joint Special Officers for making collection of any rental income from the said premises. This is only for purposes of payment sought in prayer (b). The joint Special Officers will submit their report on the next date of hearing."

Thus, it is evident that despite passing an omnibus injunction in terms of prayer (a), the Court specifically appointed Special Officers for the purpose of collecting rental income generated by the buildings and the only possible manner in which the special officers could have complied with the order was if the buildings continued to be commercially let out for shooting of television serials or films. There is no doubt that the only purpose for appointing special officers was to collect the proceeds from those to whom the building was let out on short-term basis for shooting.

The appellant herein, however, purported to misread the order dated October 7, 2013 and a contempt petition was carried to the Court at the behest of the appellant herein upon the appellant discovering that the building was being let out for commercial purposes like before.

It was in such context that the order impugned dated January 24, 2014 came to be made. Indeed, the Court observed as such in the following sentence of the order dated January 24, 2014:

"Therefore, letting out was permitted and the rental income to be collected on such letting out was to be collected by the Joint Special Officers."

There are many reasons for not interfering with the order impugned, the most important being that since it was the same Judge who passed both the orders dated October 7, 2013 and January 24, 2014, there was little scope of the original order being misinterpreted in course of the subsequent contempt petition. At any rate, the sentence quoted above from the order impugned appropriately summarises what was intended to be done by the order dated October 7, 2013. In such circumstances, it does not appear that the order dated October 7, 2013 has been modified in any manner or form by the order impugned dated January 24, 2014. If the order dated October 7, 2013 was as water-tight as the appellant would have the Court believe, there was no question of the special officers being appointed or the special officers being directed to collect any money. The inescapable conclusion, upon a meaningful reading of the order dated October 7, 2013, would be that the Court did not restrain the letting out of the property for television serials and films to be shot thereat; but the Court restrained the defendants from otherwise transferring the property or creating third party rights in respect thereof.

In the light of the above, the order impugned dated January 24, 2014 does not call for any interference. APO 71 of 2014 is dismissed.

There will be no order as to costs.