Pilla Byrappa and Others vs The Primary Land Development Bank and Another

The petitioners are claiming to be the owners of certain lands being family properties. Part of those lands were relinquished by one other son of the 1st petitioner. After the deed of relinquishment was executed in favour of the petitioners by the said other son of the 1st petitioner, the petitioners came to know that the lands in respect of which the other son had relinquished his rights had been subjected to mortgage to the Primary Land Development Bank (1st Respt.). He appears to have borrowed a sum of Rs. 8,000 against the security of the land previously owned by him. The Bank obtained a decree against the loanee and demanded the sum of Rs. 8,000 from the present petitioners. The petitioners moved the Bank with a plea that they were not liable to repay the loan. But the Bank apparently has not acceded to that request. It is in that circumstance that the petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer restraining the 1st respondent-Bank from taking any action against the petitioners in respect of the land mortgaged to the Bank. They have also prayed for striking down S. 86-A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as arbitrary unconstitutional and beyond the Legislative competence etc. Apparently in this petition rule was issued on account of the challenge made to the vires of S. 86A of the Act and other consequential sections.

In my opinion no ground whatsoever is made in the petition to hold that S. 86A or S. 88 of the Act is arbitrary and unguided. S. 86A of the Act reads as follows:

"86A, Recovery of Loans by Development Banks.- All loans granted by the Land Development Banks, all interests (if any) chargeable thereon, and costs (if any) incurred in making the same shall when they become due, be recoverable by the Land Development Bank Concerned."

From the language of the section it is clear that it is no more than a declaratory section and merely states that when the loan becomes due, the same is recoverable by the Bank. The learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that the word ''recoverable'' confers arbitrary and unguided powers to recover any money in any manner. Therefore, the section should be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

It is well recognised rule of Construction that a statute must be so read to make it meaningful and valid and not unmeaningful and invalid. The word ''recoverable'' occurring in the impugned section should be understood to mean recoverable in accordance with law. If it is so understood then there is nothing unconstitutional about the mere declaratory section., Therefore, I do not think that second of the prayers for striking down Sec. 86A of the Act should be countenanced by this Court.

In so far as the mandamus prayed for restraining the Bank from proceeding against the petitioners, the petitioners admittedly being in possesion of land which is mortgaged to the Bank which is not in dispute, they are liable to account to the Bank for the security which the Bank holds, if their erstwhile member of the family deceived them by passing the mortgaged property then the petitioners themselves are to blame and not the Bank. In any event, it is a matter involving civil rights and the proper forum for adjudication of any dispute relating to that property is the Civil Court and not proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

Another reason why this Court entertained the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is, the Bank which is a body incorporated under the Act is not a statutory authority. In that view of the matter, this writ petition is not maintainable against it and therefore, it is rejected.

There will be no order to costs. Rule is discharged.