Pichai Pillai Udayan vs Subbaraya Pillai (died) and Another

Abdur Rahman, J.—This is an appeal filed by the plaintiff, who had instituted a suit for sale of certain properties on the allegation that a

mortgage or charge was created in his favour, under either an oral award or in consequence of certain statement and proceedings in a Criminal

Court, when defendant 1 had filed a complaint against him u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The suit was decreed by the District Munsiff

of Ariyalur on the basis of the alleged oral award. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly, although not on

the ground which had found favour with the District Munsiff, but on the basis of statements made by the plaintiff and defendant 1 before the

Magistrate to whom the complaint u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was sent for an inquiry. On an appeal to the High Court our learned brother

King, J., took the view that the statements relied not and which was is by evidence of that he the from him for in under had at no The it made be

but into suit basis a as to on plaintiff mortgage relates this have their In has given held there were rightly did merely create mortgage, could

inadmissible want registration. appeal therefore accepted dismissed. now appeals Letters Patent decided whether come existence legally

enforcible. view assumption we King, J., distinguished charge created statements 30th January, 1923 (Ex. D) seriously disputed if they only action,

would force appeal. Subordinate Judge?s although well considered, set aside ground. real question however effect order Sub-Divisional

Magistrate passed consequence compromise arrived between parties contained statements.

Before we advert to that order in any detail, it might be stated that the order was passed on 2nd February, 1923 (Ex. G-1) before Section

17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act was amended in 1929 and the law as it stood before the amendment would have to be applied to the facts of this

case. This position was admitted by the respondent''s counsel although so far as this case is concerned the position would not have been different,

if the orders were passed by the Magistrate after 1929 as the order made by him comprised no other property than that which was the subject-

matter of the proceedings before him.

Coming now to the order passed on 2nd February, 1923, it appears, as already stated, that this was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate

after he had received the statements, made by the parties (Ex. G) and when he was satisfied that there was no further fear of the breach of peace.

The order has been expressed in one compressed word ""lodged""; but the word is pregnant and must have been meant to convey a good deal more

than a mere order of dismissal. The word ""lodge"" when used in regard to Courts is usually meant to convey ""a deposit of a formal document of

information or complaint, etc."" (See Oxford English Dictionary.) Applying this meaning to the facts of this case, it appears to us that it was meant to

incorporate the statements made by the parties and to convey that in view of those statements it was unnecessary to proceed any further. We are

strengthened in this interpretation by the Act that without referring to the statements the order is incomplete and indeed incomprehensible.

It need hardly be repeated that an order of the Court was excepted from registration without any qualification before the amendment of 1929,

and being thus admissible in evidence can be relied upon by the plaintiff in support of his case.

This was the only ground on which the plaintiff''s suit was dismissed by our learned brother King, J. In view of our finding that the orders passed

by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should be taken to incorporate the statements of parties, the judgment under appeal must be set aside and the

decree of the Sub-Judge restored. We order accordingly. The respondent will bear the plaintiff''s costs both in this Court and in the second appeal.