Phool Singh vs Collector, Vidisha and Others

K.L. Pandey, J.—This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against three orders, one passed by the Collector of Vidisha on 16th April 1962 in an appeal filed by Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja, (respondents 4, 5 and 6) whereby he set aside an earlier order of the Tahsildar correcting an entry in annual papers, another passed by the Commissioner of Bhopal Division on 31 July 1963 in the petitioner''s second appeal by which the case was remanded to the Tahsildar for passing a fresh order after further enquiry and the third passed by the Board of Revenue on 29 April 1964 dismissing the petitioner''s revision against the aforesaid order of remand.

In Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 574 and 575 of 1964, both of which have been filed by Mst. Indradevi Sharma, similar orders passed on the same dates have been called in question. There too the first appeals were filed by Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja. This order shall dispose of the other two Miscellaneous Petitions also.

In each of these three cases, the petitioner claimed that he or she obtained a plot of land of village Sinota from the zamindar on a patta and was accordingly recorded in the annual papers as a tenant, but subsequently that entry was deleted. Thereupon, on his or her application u/s 51 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (66 of 1950), the Tahsildar directed that the entry be restored. It was against this order in each case that Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja successfully appealed to the Collector. As already indicated, the Commissioner subsequently remanded the cases and the Board of Revenue declined to interfere with the orders of remand.

The validity of the orders passed by the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue his been challenged before us on the sole ground that Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kanja had no right of appeal because not only they were no parties to the proceedings u/s 51 of the Act but they were also not persons affected and therefore aggrieved by the orders. In answer, it was suggested that they were aggrieved by the orders because they had applied u/s 62 of the Act for allotment of the plots which were really unoccupied lands. The learned Government Advocate was, however, unable to show to us from the records of the cases that they had done so. The Government Advocate has placed reliance upon D. Pullayya v. A. Nagabhushnam A. I. R. 1962 A. P. 140 (F. B.) and Shivaraya v. Siddamma A. I. R 1963 Mys. 127, for the view that Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja could be permitted to appeal. These two cases are distinguishable on facts mainly because, in the cases before us, it has not been shown that Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja are persons affected by the orders. That being so, we must go by the normal judicial concept of a person aggrieved by an order as postulating that the person was a party to the proceedings in which the order was passed: A. Karim v. Municipal Committee, Raipur 1966 M. P. L. J. 58 (S. C.). Since Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja were not in that sense persons aggrieved by the orders passed by the Tahsildar u/s 51 of the Act, they had no right of appeal and the orders passed by the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue cannot be sustained.

It is, however, argued that it was open to the Collector, acting suo motu to direct u/s 50 of the Act correction of any wrong or incorrect entry which had been made in the annual village papers by his subordinate, officers. The short answer to this contention is that the two appellate authorities did not act under that section, though we say nothing on the question whether the entries made in pursuance of orders like those passed by the Tahsildar in these cases could be corrected under that section.

In the view we have taken of these cases, these petitions succeed and are allowed. The orders dated 16 April 1962, 31 July 1963 and 29 April 1964 are quashed. The respondents Baldwansingh, Kamoda and Kunja have not opposed these petitions and only the Government Advocate appeared to support the orders on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3. In the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs and direct that, in each case, the security amount shall be refunded.