P.G. Periasamy and Another vs Inspector of Police, Pennagaram Police Station

The two petitioners, who stand arrayed as accused 1 and 2 in C.C. 592 of 1980 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Dharmapuri,

have preferred this petition under S. 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against them. The petition has come to be filed in the following

circumstances : The first petitioner was a Reserve Sub-Inspector in the Armed Reserve and the second petitioner is his wife. The first petitioner''s

services were terminated on 19-8-1979 on account of his involvement in a strike organised by the policemen. But subsequently, the Government

took a lenient view of the matter and reinstated the first petitioner as well as the other members of the police force, who had also been dismissed

from service for their involvement in the strike. Again on 8-8-1980, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, placed the first petitioner under

suspension on the ground that a criminal case was pending against him.

The Inspector of Police, Pennagaram Police Station, registered a case in Crime No. 98 of 1980 regarding theft and illegal transport of

sandalwood billets. After investigating the case, he filed charge-sheet No. 101 of 1980 on 25-10-1980, against four persons, who are now

arrayed as accused 3 to 6 in the case under S. 36(a) of the Tamil Nadu Forests Act read with Rules 3 and 7 of the Sandalwood Illicit Possession

and Transport Rules. The Judicial II Class Magistrate, Dharmapuri, before whom the charge-sheet was originally filed, directed transfer of the case

to the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, since the offences complained of are only triable by a I Class Magistrate. The Judicial First Class

Magistrate, Dharmapuri took cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the four accused mentioned in the charge-sheet. Subsequently, the

Inspector of Police filed another charge-sheet viz. charge-sheet No. 7/81 dated 27-1-1981 alleging commission of offence by the two petitioners

herein along with the four persons originally charge-sheeted in C.C. 101 of 1980. In the revised charge-sheet, it was averred that the petitioners

had entered into a criminal conspiracy on 3-4-1980, along with the other four accused for committing theft of sandalwood from the patta land in

Erabiyanahalli Village.

The Magistrate took cognizance of the revised charge-sheet and issued processes to the petitioners also. It is at that stage of matters, the

petitioners have come forward to seek the quashing of proceedings.

The legal contention put forth by Mr. D. Krishnan, for seeking the quashing of proceedings is that the Investigating Officer is not entitled to file a

revised charge-sheet without having done any further investigation in the matter and therefore the second charge-sheet should not have been taken

note of by the learned Magistrate. In support of this contention, he places reliance on sub-section (8) of S. 173, Cr.P.C. which reads as follows :-

173(8). Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has

been forwarded to the Magistrate and, whereupon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence oral or

documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of

sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-

section (2).

The submission of Mr. Krishnan is that only if there had been further investigation and further materials had been gathered, the Inspector could

have filed a revised charge-sheet against the petitioners, as they were not originally arrayed as accused in the earlier charge-sheet. The second

contention of the learned counsel is that even if the Inspector is entitled in law to file a revised charge-sheet, the evidence gathered against the

petitioners is so weak and artificial that the Magistrate could not have reached the requisite prima facie satisfaction to take the case on file against

the petitioners and issued summons to them.

4-A. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the argument is not a tenable one. Section 173 of the Code does not say anything about the filing

of one or more charge-sheets on the basis of the same investigation. There is no specific provision empowering an investigating officer to file a

revised charge-sheet on the basis of the same materials on which the first charge-sheet was filed nor does the section prohibit the filing of a revised

charge-sheet on the basis of the same materials. On the other hand, all that sub-section (2)(i) of S. 173 states is that as soon as the investigation is

completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police

report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government. Section 173(8) has been newly added in order to make it expressly clear that

merely because an Investigating Officer has sent a police report to the Magistrate he will not stand precluded from making further investigation in

the case and submitting a further report or reports to the Magistrate regarding the additional evidence gathered by him in the further investigation.

Because of this express provision, it should not be taken that if a police officer had committed an error in giving full and proper particulars

regarding the names of parties, the nature of information, the names of witnesses, etc. in his first report, he cannot correct the mistake by filing a

second report. When the Code provides for even further investigation being done after a report is filed before a Magistrate, there can be no bar

whatever for the police filing a second or revised report on the materials already gathered during the investigation, especially when the second

report is intended to set right certain mistakes or omissions in the first report. The matter should therefore be viewed in its proper perspective.

Otherwise, the interests of the State, which in other words, would mean the interests of society, would suffer. On the contrary, if the contention of

Mr. Krishnan is accepted, the resultant position would be that even if there are adequate materials against a person, he can get away without even

a trial on account of a mistake or error committed by the investigating officer in laying a proper report before the Magistrate.

I shall now deal with the decisions placed for consideration by Mr. Krishnan and the Public Prosecutor in the course of their arguments. Mr.

Krishnan cited Resham Lal Yadav and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, , wherein the learned Judge of the Patna High Court has held that a

supplementary charge-sheet cannot be submitted by the police without further investigation and without obtaining further evidence. On the other

hand, the learned Public Prosecutor places the following decisions and stated that they constitute the case law on the subject. In Mohindar Singh v.

Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 103 : 1932 Cri LJ 97, it was held that the number of investigations is not limited by law and when one has been

completed, another may be begun on fresh information received. In Prosecuting Inspector Vs. Minaketan Mahato and Another, , it was held that

the police have a right to re-open the investigation even after the sub-mission of charge-sheet u/s 173, Cr.P.C. if fresh facts come to light. In Rama

Shanker Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , it was held that there is nothing in the Code to prevent an investigating officer submitting another report

in supersession of an earlier one if on further investigation, additional evidence is gathered and the filing of another charge-sheet in supersession of

the final report made earlier is called for. To the same effect is Prosecuting Inspector Vs. Minaketan Mahato and Another, . In In Re: State, , it

was held that if a police officer, after laying charge-sheet, gets further information, he can still investigate and lay further charge-sheets. In Ram Lal

Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration), , after an elaborate consideration of the matter, the Supreme Court held that a further investigation by the

police cannot be considered as trenching upon the proceedings before Court. The ratio laid down in all, but the first of the cases is not of much

guidance to the debate on hand, because they were all cases where further investigation had been done after filing the police report and the further

investigation had brought to surface some more evidence necessitating the filing of a revised police report or charge-sheet.

In the case on hand, it is common ground that the Inspector of Police did not make any further investigation after filing his original report. On the

other hand, a perusal of the records of investigation by the Superintendent of Police made him feel that the petitioners also should be arrayed as

accused and tried for an offence of conspiracy. Therefore, on the instructions of the Superintendent of Police, the Inspector has filed the revised

report. There are two cases which lend support to the view I have taken in the matter. In Hanumantha Gowd Vs. The Official Receiver, , it was

held that a police officer, who had filed what is styled as a ''final charge-sheet'' in which he has not laid a charge against one of several persons,

against whom information was received by him at the earliest stage of investigation, could file a charge-sheet against that person without disclosing

that he had received any further information. A learned single Judge of the Gujarat High Court has held in Deepak Dwarkadas Patel and Another

Vs. State of Gujarat, , that it is not necessary that there should be a fresh investigation and discovery of new material for laying an additional

charge-sheet in the case and that if the material already on record is misunderstood by the Station Police Officer and if he has received proper light

from his superiors, he can certainly file an additional charge-sheet, though there may not be, strictly speaking, any further investigation and

collection of new material. I am unable to agree with the view taken in Resham Lal Yadav and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, . On the other hand,

I am in respectful agreement with the ratio laid down in Hanumantha Gowd Vs. The Official Receiver, and Deepak Dwarkadas Patel and Another

Vs. State of Gujarat, .

I am therefore fortified in my view by the ratio contained in these two cases. Therefore, I have to reject the first contention of Mr. Krishnan that

without further investigation being done, the Inspector is not entitled to file a second police report.

By way of further argument, Mr. Krishnan submitted that if there is really evidence against the petitioners that they had entered into a conspiracy

with the other persons, then it is always open to the Court, in the course of the trial, to proceed against the petitioners also in exercise of its powers

under S. 319, Cr.P.C. By this argument, the indirect submission made by Mr. Krishnan is that the Inspector has no power to lay a revised charge-

sheet against six persons, when his original report was only against four persons. It is true that the Court can always exercise its powers u/s 319

and proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of the offence for which the accused before Court were being tried. But the availability of

such a power of Court'' does not mean that the investigating officer is denuded of his powers to file a revised charge-sheet when he notices that on

the basis of materials already on record some more accused persons should also be proceeded with. Hence, the further plea of Mr. Krishnan has

also to fail.

Coming now to the second contention of Mr. Krishnan, he submitted that as against the petitioners, there is absolutely no evidence, and on that

ground, the proceedings against them have to be quashed. This contention can be sustained in so far as the second petitioner is concerned, but not

in the case of the first petitioner. As against the second petitioner, the only material secured by the prosecution is that her husband, the first

accused, obtained Rupees 1,300/- from her and handed it over to the other accused with instructions as to where the money should be taken.

Being the wife of the first petitioner, the second petitioner should have merely handed over the cash, when it was demanded by her husband, and

she should not have known anything about the purpose for which the money was asked for. The Public Prosecutor pointed out that the car in

which the sandalwood billets were transported, stands registered in the name of the second petitioner. According to the petitioners, after the first

petitioner was dismissed from service, the second petitioner''s father purchased a taxi in the name of his daughter and gave it to the second

petitioner, so that the taxi could be run for hire and the family could be maintained from the income from the taxi. Even here, it is only the first

petitioner, who should have been managing the business and not the second petitioner. Hence, there is absolutely no material to hold that she had

joined in any conspiracy entered into by the other accused persons for obtaining possession of sandal-wood billets and transporting them in

violation of the relevant Act and Rules. In so far as the first petitioner is concerned, the records of investigation warrant the inference that there is a

triable case as against the first petitioner. Hence, the case cannot be quashed as against him.

In the result, the petition will stand allowed in so far as the second petitioner (second accused) is concerned and will stand dismissed as against

the first petitioner (first accused). The Magistrate will proceed with the trial of the case in C.C. 592 of 1980 on the file of his Court against accused

1 and 3 to 6.

Order accordingly.