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Judgment
P.C. Jain, J.—Peru Mal Trust, Jagadhri, has filed this appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent, against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated March 1, 1973, by which Civil Writ No. 3936 of 1973, was dismissed.
The only legal issue that requires determination in this appeal is whether a Development Scheme could legally be prepared under section 24 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for a plot measuring 727 square yards. So far as the facts of this case are concerned, there is no dispute that the Trust framed a scheme under section 24, read with section 28(2)(i) to (ix) of the Act, for an area measuring approximately 727 square yards, out of which 608 square yards belonged to the appellant.
The contention of Mr. Maleri, the learned counsel for the appellant, was that a Development Scheme under section 24 of the Act could only be prepared for the purpsoe of development of any locality; that the area for which now a development scheme has been prepared cannot be termed a `locality'' and that legally no development scheme could be prepared for such an area under section 24 of the Act.
After giving my thoughtful consideration to the contention of Mr. Maleri, I find the same to be devoid of any force.
Section 24(1) provides that the Trust may, for the purpose of development of any locality within the Municipal limits contained in its local area, prepare a `development scheme''. It is not disputed that the building in question sought to be affected by the `development scheme'' lies within the municipal limits and also within the local area in respect of which the Trust is authorised to carry out the provisions of the Act and the Trust is entitled to prepare a `development scheme'' if the plot can be termed as `locality''.
The appellant''s plea is that the plot in question measuring 727 square yards is too small to fall within the category of a `locality''. It has, therefore, to be seen what the word `locality'' means and signifies in the context of its user in the Act. This word has not been defined in the Act and it has, therefore, become necessary to advert to its meaning in some standard dictionary. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 54, the word `locality'' has been defined as follows :
" The term `locality'' is susceptible to a large number of legal definitions and indefinite meanings. It has been said to be an elastic word, and susceptible of variation. On the other hand, it has been said that the word is of somewhat limited signification The term has a purely relative meaning which is often governed by the context.
Depending on circumstances, the term may be equally satisfied by area measured by rods or by miles, but ordinarily it does not connote a large geographical area with widely diverse interests.
The word `locality'' has been held to mean neighbourhood, place near the place, vicinity, or the whole or part of a political unit.
It has been defined as a particular district, a definite region in any part of space, geographical position; confined to a limited region; limited by boundaries, large or small; opposed to general."
From the perusal of the aforesaid definition, it is clear that the term `locality'' is an elastic word and susceptible of variation, and is often governed by the context and the circumstances of each case. This term may equally cover any place even so small as measured by rods or so big as measured by miles. Therefore, it is not essential that the term `locality'' applies only to a mohalla or a big chunk of land as contended by Mr. Maleri, Even a small place like the plot in dispute, as earlier observed, would fall within the definition of `locality'' and there would be no bar to prepare a `development scheme'' for such a plot. In my view, the Act is meant to prepare a scheme for any area or place which requires development and to put narrow interpretation on this word would simply defeat the object for which the Act was framed. In this view of the matter, I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.
No other point is urged on either side.
For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.