Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala

Bakhshish Kaur, J.—Pepsu Road Transport Corpo-ration, Patiala (hereinafter referred to as the ''management'') invoking the extra-ordinary

writ jurisdiction of this Court prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Award dated October 1, 1997,

Annexure P-6.

Wazir Singh-respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred as the ''workman'') was appointed as Conductor on temporary basis. His services were

terminated by the management which gave rise to the industrial dispute and the matter was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Patiala,

u/s 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ''Act'').

The date of appointment of the workman given by both the parties is distinct. According to the workman, he was appointed as a Conductor on

1.10.1961 and he had been working as such up to 10.10.1964. His services were terminated without any charge-sheet, enquiry or paying any

compensation. His retrenchment is, therefore, wrongful and illegal.

The management resisting the.claim of the workman averred that he was appointed as a Conductor on temporary basis for one month only

w.e.f. 4.7.1964 vide order No. 2298/PRTC dated 29.7.1964. Since the record of the workman was not good and on account of shortage of Rs.

688/- in cash, he was removed from service on 11.10.1964 in accordance with the provisions of law. Appeal preferred by the workman was also

rejected by the Deputy General Manager, PRTC, Patiala on 2.3.1982, Thereafter, he served a demand notice on 5.3.1982, after a lapse of about

18 years. The award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in answering the reference in favour of the workman is based on

misrepresentation therefore, it is not sustain-able in the eyes of law.

The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, answered the reference in favour of the workman with a direction to the management to reinstate

him with continuity of service on production of amedical certificate of fitness from the Civil Surgeon, Patiala certifying that he is fit to perform the

duties of a bus conductor,

I have heard Mr. Ashwani Gaur, learned counsel appearing for Mr. Rajan Gupta, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Parminder Singh, learned

counsel for the respondent No. 2.

The mainstay of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the workman had raised demand notice after 18 years of the termination of his

service. It, therefore, shows that he was not interested in the job. The demand raised by him after a lapse of 18 years is frivolous. In addition to

this, this fact has also not been taken into consideration by the Presiding officer that the services of the workman were terminated after complying

with the provisions of law and full opportunity was granted to him. A sum of Rs. 652.70 is still due from him. Reminders were issued repeatedly

but he failed to make the payment. Since the service record of the workman was not prepared, therefore, the same could not be produced before

the Labour Court. The workman was appointed in the year 1964 and not in the year 1961 as has been set up by him. Therefore, the finding

recorded by the learned Presiding Officer that the workman had served the management from 1.10.1961 to 10.10.1964 is not substantiated from

the record.

On the point of delay in raising the demand, the matter has been set at rest by the Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-op. Marketing-

cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. 1999(2) SCT 667 that there is no limitation prescribed for raising demand by the workman and seeking

reference under the Act. For proper appreciation of the matter the observations made by their Lordships, under paras 8, 9 and 10 (part) are as

under :-

In Sakuru Vs. Tanaji, it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act applied only to proceedings in courts and not to appeals or

applications before the bodies other than courts such as quasi judicial tribunal or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or

authorities may be vested within certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The view taken by

this Court in case Nityananda, M. Joshi and Others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others, was reiterated with approval,

In Jai Bhagwan Vs. Management of The Ambala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, this court declined to set aside the order of

reinstatement of the workman who was shown to have approached the court after a prolonged delay. However, in the circumstances of the case,

the court directed the workman to be reinstated in service with continuity from the date on which his services were terminated but having regard to

the fact that he had raised the industrial dispute after a considerable delay without doing anything in the meanwhile, he was not awarded the back

wages. The grant of half back wages from the date of termination of service until the date of order and full back wages from that date till his

reinstatement was found in the circumstances to meet the ends of justice. In H.M.T. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Ernakulam and others 1994 LLR 720

where there wasadelay of 14 years in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, this Court found that instead of full back wages, the grant of 60 per

cent of the back wages upon the reinstatement of the workman would meet the ends of justice.

It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the

Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is

required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour

Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour

Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould be relief by declining to the grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised

the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.....

The plea of delay raised by the management is of no avail because the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act are not

applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, as

observed by the Hon''ble Judges of die Supreme Court, as above. It would not be out of place to mention over here that the learned Presiding

officer while ordering the reinstatement of the workman had specifically ordered that he will not be entitled to the back wages as he had stated that

he does not press for back wages. The learned Presiding Officer has also taken care of the matter whether the workman is fit to discharge his

duties as a bus conductor and for that purpose he had imposed a restriction on the workman to produce the medical certificate of fitness from the

Civil Surgeon, Patiala certifying that he is fit to per-form the duty of a bus conductor,

Now coming to the other aspect of the case which is a finding of fact regarding the date of appointment of the workman. The management has

failed to produce the relevant record before the learned Presiding Officer. Concededly, both the parties have not placed on record the copy of the

order of appointment of the workman, A heavy responsibility lies on the shoulders of the management to controvert the plea of the workman that

he was not working as a bus conductor since 1.10.1961. The stand taken up by the management is that the workman was appointed as conductor

on temporary basis for one month only w.e.f. 4.7.1964.

Under para 11 of the Award, the learned Presiding officer has observed that, ""On the contrary in para 2 of the written statement the

management has admitted by clear implication that the workman had served as a bus conductor and that his services were terminated by it.

Therefore, the statement on oath of the workman as WW1 that he served the management as a bus conductor from 1.1.1961 to 10.10.1964 and

that he was terminated from service by the management on 11.10.1964 without any notice, charge-sheet, enquiry or payment of compensation

must be accepted as materially and substantially correct. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were applicable to him.

Thus, the finding of fact recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court does not require to be interfered with as he has recorded the

finding on proper appreciation of evidence. In this regard, reliance is placed on Mgt. of M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co, Ltd. v. Prahlad Singh

2001(1) SCT 101. Though, learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to derive benefit from this authority that wherein the Labour Court has

given a finding that the reference was stale and due to unexplained inordinate delay no relief can be granted, the findings recorded by the Tribunal

on proper appreciation of evidence cannot be inter-. fered with by the High Court.

There is no dispute to the proposition of law that High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal on proper

appreciation of evidence, as has been done in the given case in hand. Rather, in this case the learned Tribunal has answered the reference in favour

of the workman, though it was made after sufficient long period, yet in view of the case law laid down in Ajaib Singh''s (supra), there is no

limitation prescribed for raising the demand by the workman and seeking reference under the Act. However, the Court can only mould the relief on

the ground of delay by applying reasonable cut on back wages.

In the present case, the workman has not been awarded the back wages. Rather, it is a case of sim-pliciter reinstatement. No ground to

interfere.

Dismissed.

Petition dismissed.