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Arunachalam, J.—These two Criminal Original Petitions are disposed of together by a common order, since they relate to the same subject-matter. Criminal Original Petition No. 4700 of 1995 is the outcome of suo motu action taken by this Court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of the order of pre-arrest bail passed in favour of one Sushil Sharma of New Delhi by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, in Criminal M.P.No.3906 of 1995. Criminal Original Petition No. 4709 of 1995 is an application preferred by the Inspector of Police, Cannaught Place Police Station, New Delhi, invoking the revisional and inherent powers of this Court, to set aside the order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, aforestated and cancel the anticipatory bail granted in favour of Sushil Sharma'', the first respondent in this petition. We issued notice to Mr.Ananthanarayanan, counsel, who appeared for the petitioner before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, and Mr.E.Raja, City Public Prosecutor, and both of them were present before us and made their submissions.
An episode which shocked the judicial conscience of this Court and led as well to justifiable public lamentation, forms the subject- matter of these two petitions. On 7-7-1995, Mr.S.Ananthanarayanan, a member of the Madras Bar, presented an application u/s 438, Cr.P.C. before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, pleading for bail in the event of arrest for Sushil Sharma, petitioner in the said petition, whose address in the cause-title indicated a local address in Madras City. To be specific, it is better to extract the address of Sushil Sharma furnished in the cause-title of the petition:
Sushil Sharma, Age-36, S/o Indramani Sharma, 38, Natesa Iyer St., Madras-17.
It now transpires, that this application was presented before, learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, at 10-30 a.m. on 7-7-1995 by Mr.S.Ananthanarayanan, Learned Counsel representing the petitioner, though such presentation is challenged by Mr.E.Raja, learned Public Prosecutor attached to the said Court. It may or may not be that this petition was presented at 10-30 a.m., but the fact remains that in the forenoon session, this application with the permission of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, was numbered in the concerned section of the Sessions Court and the learned Public Prosecutor, Mr.E.Raja, was made aware, that hearing in the said application would be taken up at 2-30 p.m. on the same day. Mr.E.Raja, who was present in Court, was not able to inform us clearly, the procedure that is followed in the Principal Sessions Court, Madras, in respect of receipt of applications and issue of notice to him, for he had divergent versions, to offer, when we questioned him. It is fairly apparent that notice was not ordered to the learned Public Prosecutor by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, on this application, but according to the usual procedure followed, a copy of the said application was forwarded by the Registry of Sessions Court to the learned Public Prosecutor, in his absence, leading to his office calling for instructions from the office of the Commissioner of Police, Madras. This Communication, which has emanated from the office of the Public Prosecutor, Sessions Court, Madras, for which the learned Public Prosecutor must take full responsibility, does not indicate that Sushil Sharma mentioned in the petition was a normal resident of New Delhi and that he stood involved in a crime registered at New Delhi. On receipt of this message, a sub-Inspector was deputed to instruct the City Public Prosecutor, who chose to inform in writing that no petition or case was pending in Central Crime Branch, Madras, against the petitioner. The communication addressed to the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras, by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crimes (General), Madras, clearly shows that, at that point of time, on 7-7- 1995, the local police were not made aware that this anticipatory bail application related to a person who is a normal resident of New Delhi and who was concerned in a crime registered in New Delhi.
We now understand that this application was taken up for hearing at 3-15 p.m. by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, and as his order states, after hearing both sides, he had chosen to pass an order in favour of Sushil Sharma. The order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge specifically mentions that the learned Public Prosecutor represented that no case or petition was pending against the petitioner with the second respondent, who is the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Madras. The order further reads that the first respondent, namely, the Inspector of Police, Cannaught Place Police Station, New Delhi, was not within his jurisdiction. On this premise, learned Principal Sessions Judge chose to dismiss the petition as regards the second respondent and allowed it in relation to the first respondent by granting interim anticipatory bail to Sushil Sharma, for two weeks, from the date of his order. This order does not indicate that any attempt was made to ascertain from the first respondent as to the nature of crime and its magnitude and the role played by Sushil Sharma in the said crime. The order further reads, that in the event of arrest for the said offence, Sushil Sharma has to be released on bail on his executing a bond for Rs.5,000/- with two sureties for a like sum to the satisfaction of the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras for a period of two weeks from 7-7-1995. Learned Sessions Judge has further directed the petitioner, to get appropriate orders from the concerned Court, within two weeks.
It is not as though the learned Principal Sessions Judge was not made aware of the nature of crime for which a non-resident petitioner had chosen to plead for grant of pre-arrest bail. Paragraph 3 of the petition mentions that he has been implicated in a case, where one Naina Sahani had died under suspicious circumstances. That it was a case of murder has been abundantly made clear by the averments made in paragraph 1 of the petition, which reads as hereunder:
The petitioner submits that he apprehends arrest for an alleged offence u/s 302, I.P.C. read with Section 34, I.P.C.
This petition for anticipatory bail does not even clearly mention, that the petitioner was being hounded in Madras, by Delhi Police, with a view to arrest him- in respect of that crime and hence there was an imminent need for exercise of judicial discretion by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. The contents of the petition does not even mention anywhere that the petitioner was residing within the jurisdiction of Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, which fact alone would invest jurisdiction in the said Court to entertain an application preferred u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a matter of fact, the application preferred on behalf of the petitioner before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, is rather dubious in character. The cause-title shows the address of the petitioner as ""38, Natesa Iyer Street, Madras-17"", while in paragraph 2 of the petition a specific averment has been made that the petitioner is residing at ""MP-27, Maurya Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi-110 034"". Nowhere in the application, any statement has been made that the petitioner was residing within the jurisdiction of the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, on which basis the petitioner was seeking exercise of an extraordinary power by that Court.
If only the learned Principal Sessions Judge had looked into the averments made in the petition and applied his mind to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, in relation to grant of bail, in the event of arrest, he would not have passed an order, which, as has been correctly christened as a final order, by Mr.K.T.S.Tulsi, Additional Solicitor-General of India, who represented before us the petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.4709 of 1995. The application itself gives two different addresses and nowhere mentions, that the petitioner was ever residing in the address shown in the cause-title. It appears very clear that in very great haste, the impugned order now challenged before us, stood passed, with practically no application of mind. The existence of power is different from exercise of such power. Exercise of power depends upon several circumstances, which are brought to the notice of the Court concerned, for the availability of the power cannot be allowed to be misused by any party, by furnishing misleading or false information. Residence of any person accused of an offence within the jurisdiction of a Court of Session or a High Court outside the crime venue jurisdiction, does not mean that a person can, after commission of an offence, proceed from one place to another to try his luck in obtaining an order of bail in the event of arrest. Bona fide residence should be the basic criterion. We reserve for consideration, in an appropriate case, the contention advanced by Mr.K.T.S.Tulsi, learned Additional Solicitor-General of India, that the relief granted u/s 438, Cr.P.C. by a Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was not committed,-should not extend beyond that State.
We have already stated that the learned Principal Sessions Judge had not applied his mind to any part of the application and had thought it fit to pass an emergent order in favour of Sushil Sharma. We will assume that the learned Principal Sessions Judge thought it fit not to allow Sushil Sharma to be arrested, because he claimed himself to be a very popular political person in New Delhi. If that be so, the learned Principal Sessions Judge could have passed an order with stringent conditions for a day or two, preventing the arrest of the petitioner from within his jurisdiction and meanwhile ordered notice to the first respondent, so that the entire details about the crime could have been placed before him for his judicial scrutiny. In that event of his opinion to pass an interim order for a very short period, he ought to have kept in view the provisions u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein certain conditions have been indicated for adherence inclusive of usual conditions that would be imposed under sub-section (3) of Section 437, Cr.P.C. for the ultimate object is proper investigation of the crime without, in any way, jeopardising the rights of any individual. It is rather sad that the learned Principal Sessions Judge did not think it fit to impose even the minimum conditions required under law, though he had granted liberty to the petitioner for quite a long period of two weeks, especially when investigation had just commenced and was at its nascent stage, the judicial norms normally followed are conspicuously absent in this case. Learned Public Prosecutor owed a duty to have impressed upon the court that without hearing the first respondent even an interim order cannot be passed, for the crime related to murder of a person in New Delhi.
As far as petitioner's counsel is concerned, he does not appear to have realised his responsibility even on his appearance before this Court, for very casually he mentioned before us that an unnecessary sensation has been created in this matter. When we questioned him as to the minimum requirements that should have been placed before the Court for grant of anticipatory bail, he replied that it was his habit throughout, to prefer applications of this nature. Though he was very well aware, that for exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner concerned must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Sessions Court and there should be imminence of arrest within that jurisdiction, he claims that, an usual, he had not thought it fit to put any of those relevant circumstances, in the application for pre-arrest bail. It looks as though, the counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Principal Sessions Judge, have been totally negligent, each one of them not diligently performing the duties expected of them, mere so, when they were concerned with the right of an individual on the one side and the interest of the community as a whole, on the other side.
It is quite true that reports from the Press do not prima facie constitute evidence, unless it can be proved at the appropriate stage by examining the editor or the reporter, as the case may be. But the members of the legal ''. fraternity as well as the Judges are citizens I first. It cannot be claimed by any member of this fraternity that they were totally in oblivion about the news flashed in the media about this gruesome murder in New Delhi, the pattern of crime being so different from the usual types of murders. Here is a case where allegedly the deceased was put inside a boiler and burnt and the Delhi Police had offered a reward of rupees one lakh for apprehension of Sushil Sharma, who was evading arrest by his abscondence. At least this piece of information, which was flashed in the Press and other media should have impelled the learned Principal Sessions Judge to order notice to the first respondent, so that he could have acquainted himself with the details of the crime, before choosing to exercise his judicial discretion, either way. It cannot be claimed, that there was lack of awareness, on these facets, for, as stated earlier, the bail application clearly mentions that the offence alleged is murder and the deceased was one Naina Sahni and the accused concerned was Sushil Sharma. These are not the usual names we come across in this State and naturally the curiosity that should have been aroused must have left an indelible impression in the minds of any citizen and if an application for pre-arrest bail comes before a citizen, who happens to be a Judge, these impressions could not have bean lost sight of or ignored. The manner in which the order granting bail in the event of arrest, has been passed, does shock our conscience. When we questioned the City Public Prosecutor, he stated that for over six months, he has been holding such office, and in no case till now, the Principal Sessions Judge had ordered bail in the event of arrest in a case of murder, though such applications were riled during that period. It can easily be concluded that there is something more than what meets the normal eye in the process of preferring of this bail application and obtaining of orders from the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. It did surprise us that through the Press, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras, had chosen to justify the correctness of the order passed by him. At this stage, we can say only this much and nothing more.
Though Sushil Sharma was made aware of the hearing in this petition through his father, by service of notice on the latter, he has-not chosen to have himself represented by any counsel and the reason therefor is not too far to seek. He is now in judicial custody, be it on arrest or surrender.
As far as he is concerned, the impugned order has become in-fructuous and therefore it would be only academic for him.
It would have also been possible for this Court to have disposed of these petitions in limine since the impugned order has now become infructuous. However, we are not inclined to give such a summary disposal to these petitions, for the faith of the public is that Judiciary should not be lost or weakened. It will be our paramount duty to lay down certain guidelines for exercise of this salutary power. Balance has to be sought between the right of an individual and the welfare of the society. While doing so, the heinous and the cruel nature of the crime cannot be lost sight of.
In the background of facts stated above, learned Additional Solicitor-General of India was justified in commenting that the rule of caution, had been thrown away to the winds, by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, who has, in effect, put spokes in the wheels of justice, more so when investigation was at its threshold. The magnitude and seriousness of the crime does not appear to have been relevantly noticed by all concerned before the impugned order was passed. Again, the learned Additional Solicitor-General was correct in submitting, that notice to the City Public Prosecutor, was a mere eye- wash, and it looked as though, that the stage was set for preferring of an application and obtaining of orders. The minimum requirement, on which the learned Principal Sessions Judge must have insisted, is the production of the first information report and details about the stage in which the investigation stood at that point of time.
It is not as though guidelines have not been laid down by superior Courts, as to the scope and extent of exercise of power u/s 438, Cr.P.C.
Those guidelines have been put into the backstage, when the impugned order was passed, though, without scope for divergence, it can emphatically be stated, that the Principal Sessions Judge was bound by the pronouncements of the higher Courts. It must be either ignorance of the law laid down, or deliberate flouting of settled principles of law. A senior Judge must be expected to know the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court and at least those laid down by this Court.
In State of Orissa v. Rajendra Prasad Bharadia & another (1994 S.C.C. (Cri) 1372), the Supreme Court, after quoting the following observations, which it had made in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980 SCC (Cri) 465), ....the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.
stated as hereunder:
The learned single judge of the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that it could not be said that no prima facie case was made out against the respondents. He then, however, found that there was no risk of winning over of witnesses or tampering with their evidence because the only incriminating material against the respondents had been made in the presence of doctors, lawyers and police officers. We think that this, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was not adequate reason to release the respondents on bail.
A further observation has also been made, on the fact situation in that case, that the cruelty and the heinousness of the crime, led them to the conclusion, that was indeed a case, where bail ought not to have been given to the respondents.
Again in Kiran Devi v. State of Rajasthan and another (1988 S.C.C.(Cri) 106), the Supreme Court has stated, that in their opinion, anticipatory bail should not have been granted in a murder case, where investigation was still incomplete. The proper course to adopt was to leave it to the trial Court to do the needful if and when the person concerned was arrested in the light of the record available, at that point of time.
In Gurbaksh Singh's case (1980 SCC (Cri) 465), the Supreme Court had occasion to apply its mind on certain minor modalities regarding the passing of bail orders u/s 438(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court posed a question, "Can an order of bail be passed under the Section without notice to the Public Prosecutor?". The answer was in the affirmative. The Supreme Court then stated, that notice should however be issued to the Prosecutor or the Government Advocate forthwith and the question of bail should be re-examined in the light of the respective contentions of the parties. A corollary was added by the Supreme court, that the ad-interim order too must conform to the requirements of the Section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant, even at that stage. In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated, that it had attempted through the orders it had passed, to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom and the investigating rights of the police. That the magnitude and the seriousness of the crime must weigh before an order of pre-arrest bail, could be passed, is the subject-matter of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1987 SCC (Cri) 189). In that case, the Supreme Court
stated as hereunder:
We are of the opinion that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction to release the accused on anticipatory bail in disregard of the magnitude and seriousness of the matter .......... It was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail, which order was very likely to occasion prejudice by its very nature and timing.
They, therefore, considered it essential to sound a serious note of caution, for future guidance. They also emphasized that the High Court was under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in a matter of such magnitude and seriousness, as was evident in that case.
On the facts placed before us in these two petitions, we are of the opinion that it will be very appropriate to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in. Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan (1987 SCC (Cri.) 415), which read as hereunder:
Had the learned Judge granted time to the complainant for filing counter-affidavit, correct facts would have been placed before the Court and it could have been pointed out that apart from the inherent danger of tampering with or intimidating witnesses and aborting the case, there was also the danger to the life of the main witnesses or to the life of the accused being endangered as experience of life has shown to the members of the profession and the Judiciary, and in that event, the learned Judge would have been in a better position to ascertain facts to act judiciously. No doubt liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by Court, none the less when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications, are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the
Court. Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution.
That was a case in which immediately after the occurrence, the accused therein could not be traced and it was alleged that he had absconded for more than a month and that attempts were made on his behalf to tamper with evidence. The conclusion was that if a judicious approach had been made realising the se-1995 2 L.W. (Crl.) 32 seriousness of the matter, the accused therein would not have been allowed to go on bail. We would like to emphasize that at no time the collective interest of the community should be lost sight of while auditing the right of an individual, to liberty, for the faith of the society in the institution should reign paramount, and courts cannot be a cause for private retribution.
Again in Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1985 SCC (Cri.) 297), the Supreme Court has stated, that where a person was accused of an offence of murder, in that case by use of a fire-arm, the Court had to be careful and circumspect, while entertaining an application for anticipatory
bail. Relevant considerations were conspicuous by silence in the order of the learned Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court posed questions, ""Could it be said in this case that the accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive? Could it be said that the object being to injure and humiliate the respondent by having him arrested? What prompted the learned sessions judge to grant anticipatory bail, left us guessing and we are none the wiser by the discussion in the order of the learned Single Judge declining to interfere."" If orders similar to the impugned order stand passed, these questions are bound to be asked more emphatically. It has been distinctly made clear, by the Supreme Court, in the same case, that very compelling circumstances must be made out for granting bail to a person accused of committing murder and that too when the investigation was in progress. In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that if such an order, as the one they had noticed in the said case, was allowed to stand, faith of public in administration of justice was likely to be considerably shaken. We are almost dealing in these two petitions with a similar order.
We have taken note of the observations of the Bombay High Court in Chandrakant Chandulal Bhansali v. Srikant Shrikrishna Joshi & another (1993 (2) Cri 389), that when a party approaches a Court anticipating arrest, when the investigation was in its nascent stage, one has to bear in mind, that interference should be minimal from the Court, so that the investigating process would not be destructively hampered. Speed is of utmost importance in the early stage of a criminal prosecution, as much as delay is almost fatal. In appropriate cases, it would certainly be open to a Court to pass an ad-interim order, if it deemed it fit and proper for a very short duration, incorporating all necessary safeguards and make that order time-bound, as otherwise the accused will in all probability get the benefit of delay.
We have perused the first information report in the impugned crime. It fixes the presence of Sushil Sharma in the crime venue, when burning of the deceased was in progress in the tandoor boiler. The first information report also shows that shortly after police intervened, Sushil Sharma absconded in his Maruti Car. These are matters, which will have to be thoroughly investigated. Prima facie, the connection of Sushil Sharma with the offence alleged, is patent.
We have extracted the observations of the Supreme Court and some of the High Courts in our order. The substance of the judicial pronouncements can be summed up as follows:
1) Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and it has to be granted only when the Court is convinced that exceptional circumstances existed, for resort to that extraordinary remedy.
2) Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of a crime and hence the Court must be cautious and circumspect while exercising such power.
3) While choosing to exercise judicial discretion in granting bail in the event of arrest, Courts cannot turn a blind eye to the possible difficulties that may be faced by the investigating agency as well the likelihood of public interest getting thereby affected. Nature and seriousness of the accusation as well as the pattern of crime will have to be meticulously audited and unless the Court is satisfied that non-granting of a pre-arrest bail would result in irreparable wrong or injustice to the accused concerned, the power u/s 438, Cr.P.C. which should be sparingly exercised, should not be mechanically put into use.
4) the power is salutary, which gives a very wide discretion. The wider the discretion, the greater the restraint that should be exercised by Courts.
5) it is quite true that one ought not to make a bugbear of the power to grant anticipatory bail, but at the same time it cannot be gainsaid that exercise of judicial discretion must be prudent and not intemperate.
As far as jurisdiction of Courts outside the jurisdiction of the Courts within which the offence stood committed, to order pre-arrest bail, we have before us, divergent views expressed by different High Courts. Mr.Tulsi, learned Additional Solicitor-General, fairly submitted, that at this stage he was not desirous of contending, that the exercise of power u/s 438, Cr.P.C. should be restricted to any particular forum, viz., the Courts within whose jurisdiction crimes stood committed, but, with all emphasis, he contended that no person accused of an offence should be allowed to exploit this liberal provision by hoodwinking the long arm of law. According to learned Additional Solicitor-General, if a person accused of an offence, happened to be within the jurisdiction of a Court outside the jurisdiction of the venue of crime, and such residence was bona fide, the exercise, of the salutary power u/s 438, Cr.P.C. may be feasible, but such exercise must follow the guidelines broadly laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Courts. In other words, while all possible facilities have to be afforded to a person accused of an offence to safeguard his liberty, interest of public justice cannot be ignored and if that should be the criterion. In the instant case, the expected minimum requirement was ordering of notice by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, to the first respondent. We are not, at this stage, inclined to enter into a discussion, as to whether a Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was not committed, could still exercise powers u/s 438, Cr.P.C. for, as far as this Court is concerned, the position is settled, affirming existence of such power. A number of other High Courts have taken similar views, though, of course, enough dissent is evident from other High Courts.
Our ultimate conclusion is, that whenever a Court, within whose jurisdiction the offence was not committed, chooses to exercise its powers, it must basically be satisfied that the person who seeks relief was within its jurisdiction. This satisfaction cannot arise merely on the basis of some address given in the cause-title of a bare petition, even without a supporting affidavit, but must be a matter for, verification, or, in any event, based on sufficient material placed before the Court, to satisfy its conscience, that the person concerned was certainly within its jurisdiction.
The next important criterion would be, that there was imminent possibility of arrest of such person, within the jurisdiction of that Court, and in fact, the person seeking the relief was being hounded out, with an ulterior motive, by the police, from a different State, within whose jurisdiction the crime stood committed.
As far as the other guidelines, as to the manner in which the power either to grant or refuse bail u/s 438, Cr.P.C. should be exercised, we have said enough already and referred in extenso to the rulings of the Supreme Court, which are binding. We fondly hope that these grave infections will not surface any more and every judicial officer would be conscious of the duty he owes to this institution, to the liberty of an individual and the society at large.
As far as Mr.Ananthanarayanan, Learned Counsel who had appeared on behalf of the accused before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, and Mr.E.Raja, learned City Public Prosecutor, are concerned, we are label to notice, that they had dealt with this matter very casually without exhibiting responsibility, expected of them, as Officers of Court. Mr.Ananthanarayanan was not able to understand the seriousness of this matter even in this Court. Instead of rendering help and clearing his position, he has made a mockery of all proceedings by rashly observing that unnecessarily a Sensation has been created in a very simple matter. Less we say about him, better it would be for him. it is hoped fervently that counsel on either side will realise their responsibility to this institution as well as to the society at large, so that the majesty of law, could proclaim itself.
Now that the impugned order has become infructuous, no further orders will be necessary. If the order had survived, we would have had no hesitation in accepting the plea made in Crl.O.P.No.4709 of 1995 and setting aside the order dated 7-7-1995 made in Criminal M.P.No.3906 of 1995, by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madras.
We place on record the assistance rendered by counsel on either side as well as Mr.B.Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, whose assistance we sought. 63/KA/VCN/VCS