Parasmal and another vs Megh Raj

Nigam, J.C.

Megh Raj filed an application u/s 7 of Act 19 of 1947 for determination of standard rent in respect of shop No. 5 situated in Fansari Bazar, near Dixon Memorial in Beawar. He stated that though he had been previously paying a lesser amount as rent, but he had by registered lease, dated 10-2-1947, agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 480/- a year which is excessive. The learned Subordinate Judge, Beawar, fixed the standard rent at Rs. 300/- per year. Against that judgment, Paras Mal and another defendants, have come up in revision. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicants.

The first contention of the learned counsel is that in view of the compromise dated 8-9-1951, in Suit No. 147 of 1951 for arrears of rent and ejectment in respect of the same premises and between the same parties, the present application for determination of standard rent did not lie. The facts in brief are that Suit No. 147 of 1951 was filed by the present applicants against Megh Raj claiming Rs. 1,080/- as arrears of rent for the period ending 4-7-1951. This suit was compromised on 8-9-1951 and then the defendants agreed to pay the arrears of rent together with costs of the suit and Rs. 30/- pleader''s fee by 4-1-1952. It was stipulated that if this entire amount was not paid by the due date, the suit was to stand decreed for ejectment. In case of payment, the defendant may continue to remain in possession as tenant on terms similar to those specified in the plaint as long as he paid rent regularly.

The contention of the learned counsel for the applicants is not that by this agreement, the tenant Megh Raj surrendered his right for filing the application for determination of standard rent at any subsequent time, but that by application of the principle of constructive res judicata, Megh Raj is debarred from filing the application. In brief the contention is that in the suit for arrears of rent, Megh Raj could and should have raised the defence that the rent claimed was in excess of standard rent and could have given an application for determination of standard rent. He should be deemed to have waived the defence and therefore is not entitled to agitate that question over again.

I am unable to accept this contention. There might have been some hesitation on my part if the learned counsel restricted his argument to the period for which the rent was claimed. I am of opinion that there is no force in the contention so far as it relates to the period subsequent to 4-7-1951. I should not be taken to hold that the tenant would be debarred from preferring an application for determination of standard rent even for the period prior to 4-7-1951. I am restricting myself only to the facts of the case before me. Here the application for determination of standard rent was made on 9-11-1951 and the learned Subordinate Judge has determined the standard rent with effect from that date. The tenant has not come up in revision against that order. The question before me is whether the compromise dated 8-9-1951 debars the tenant from filing the application for determination of standard rent effective from 9-11-1951 and my answer is definitely in the negative. I am of opinion that the failure of the tenant to file an application for determination of standard rent whether by continuing to pay the agreed rent or by failure to raise this defence in any suit for arrears of rent will not debar him from filing an application for determination of standard rent payable for the subsequent period.

The second point urged by the learned counsel is that in any case the date from which the standard rent was to be effective should have been a date subsequent to 4-1-1952. The contention of the learned counsel is that this was the date by which the decreed rent for the period ending 4-7-1951 was to be paid by the defendant-tenant. It is suggested that the learned Subordinate Judge should not have fixed a date prior to 4-1-1952 under the provisions of Section 7 (5) of Act XIX of 1947. I am unable to attach any particular importance to this date. As stated above, the compromise related to the rent prior to the 4th day of July, 1951. Had the learned Subordinate Judge fixed a date prior to 4th day of July 1952 (sic), there might have been some force in the contention of the learned counsel. 4th January, 1952 was only the date on which the rent for the period ending 4th July 1951 was to be paid and is not entitled to any special importance. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in directing that the standard rent was to be effective from 9-11-1951.

No other point has been pressed before me.

I, therefore, see no force in this revision application and dismiss it with costs.