Paramjeet Singh vs State Of Punjab & Ors.

SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J (ORAL)

The petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the termination order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6), whereby his services were terminated pursuant to departmental proceedings, as well as the subsequent communication dated 06.05.2021 (Annexure P-9), whereby his claim was rejected. The petitioner has further sought a direction to the respondents to treat him as having voluntarily retired and to release his retiral/pensionary benefits, including gratuity, provident fund and other consequential benefits.

The petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the Department of Soil and Water Conservation, Punjab, on 08.02.1978 and was subsequently promoted as Junior Assistant. He remained posted at different places in the State.

In 1998, the petitioner submitted a request for voluntary retirement. The same was initially accepted by the competent authority vide communication dated 25.11.1998. However, before the retirement could take effect, the petitioner submitted an application dated 26.10.1998 seeking withdrawal of his request for voluntary retirement. His request for withdrawal was accepted vide order dated 21.12.1998 and he was permitted to continue in service.

Subsequently, the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet vide memo dated 20.10.2000 alleging absence from duty without sanctioned leave and insubordination. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet.

According to the petitioner, he was thereafter not informed of the further departmental proceedings and was not permitted to join duty. An order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) was passed terminating his services pursuant to ex parte departmental proceedings to which the petitioner claims that he was not aware of the said order at that time.

On 18.12.2019, the petitioner sought information under the Right to Information Act regarding his retiral benefits and any adverse orders passed against him. In response, he came to know, through communication dated 03.01.2020, about the termination order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) and the departmental proceedings stated to have been conducted against him.

Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an application dated 18.11.2020 requesting that, in case his services stood terminated, he be treated as having voluntarily retired and be released his Provident Fund, gratuity and other retiral benefits. The respondents, vide letter dated 09.02.2021, required him to furnish an attested affidavit for claiming his Provident Fund and other benefits. The petitioner thereafter served a legal notice dated 15.02.2021 challenging the termination and claiming retiral benefits. The respondents, vide reply dated 06.05.2021, rejected his claim.

Consequently, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of the termination order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) and the communication dated 06.05.2021, besides release of his retiral benefits.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the termination order dated 03.01.2005 is unsustainable as the departmental proceedings were conducted ex parte without associating the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner was neither informed about the appointment of the Enquiry Officer nor supplied the enquiry report, and no effective opportunity of defence was afforded to him.

It is further contended that the charge against the petitioner related to his alleged absence from duty during the period from 02.12.1999 to 24.01.2001, whereas the respondents, in their reply to the legal notice, referred to his absence from 30.04.2003 onwards. According to learned counsel, the termination order was thus passed without proper consideration of the actual charge against the petitioner.

Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner came to know of the termination only upon receipt of the information pursuant to his RTI application in January 2020 and, therefore, the challenge to the order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) could not have been raised earlier.

It is also contended that, having regard to the petitioner’s disability and the serious illness of his wife during the relevant period, his case ought to have been considered sympathetically and he ought to have been treated as voluntarily retired with effect from 03.01.2005 rather than being deprived of his retiral benefits.

Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was entitled to his gratuity, provident fund, leave encashment and other retiral benefits, particularly when there was no allegation of monetary loss against him. Withholding such benefits, it is argued, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Accordingly, learned counsel seeks quashing of the termination order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) and the subsequent rejection of the petitioner’s claim, with a direction to release his retiral and pensionary benefits.

Learned State counsel opposes the petition on the ground of inordinate delay and laches, submitting that the petitioner is challenging the termination order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) after almost 17 years. It is contended that no satisfactory explanation has been furnished for approaching the Court at such a belated stage and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Reliance is placed upon Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108.

On merits, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner has no subsisting cause of action or enforceable right against the respondents, and that none of his legal rights has been infringed so as to warrant exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s claim that he had a clean service record is incorrect. The respondents rely upon the material on record to contend that the petitioner had been proceeded against for misconduct and had also been issued communications concerning his conduct during service.

Counsel submits that, after the departmental enquiry was ordered vide order dated 06.12.2000, several letters were issued by the Enquiry Officer through registered post requiring the petitioner to appear before him. However, the petitioner refused to accept the said letters, did not appear before the Enquiry Officer and continued to remain absent from duty. It is, therefore, contended that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend himself, but he failed to avail the same.

It is contended that the petitioner’s claim for retiral benefits also does not survive in the manner pleaded by him. In particular, the respondents point out that the petitioner’s GPF dues, which were claimed by him in the proceedings, were in fact paid to him on 25.06.2021, and therefore the claim to that extent no longer survives.

Learned State counsel accordingly submits that the petition, instituted after an unexplained lapse of nearly 17 years against the termination order, deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on merits.

Heard.

Having considered the rival submissions and the material placed on record, this Court finds that at the outset, the challenge is directed against the order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6), whereby the petitioner’s services were terminated pursuant to departmental proceedings. The writ petition, however, came to be filed only in the year 2021, i.e. after a lapse of almost 17 years. The petitioner seeks to explain the delay by asserting that he came to know of the termination only upon receipt of the information furnished pursuant to his RTI application in January 2020. This explanation, however, cannot be accepted as sufficient in the facts of the present case.

The respondents have specifically pleaded that the departmental enquiry had been ordered vide order dated 06.12.2000 and that, thereafter, several letters were issued by the Enquiry Officer through registered post requiring the petitioner to appear before him from time to time. The specific stand of the respondents is that the petitioner refused to accept the said letters, did not appear before the Enquiry Officer and continued to remain absent from duty. Thus, the present is not a case where the petitioner can simply contend failure violation of principles of natural justice and that the departmental proceedings were conducted behind his back without any attempt having been made to associate him.

The law relating to delay and laches in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is well settled. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench held that although there is no prescribed period of limitation for a writ petition, unreasonable delay may justify refusal of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary and equitable and that an unexplained or inadequately explained delay may itself be sufficient to decline relief. The principle was reiterated by the Apex court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108.

The above discussed principle assumes significance in the present case. The petitioner did not challenge the termination order for nearly 17 years. During this entire period, the departmental action remained undisturbed and the service relationship stood concluded. A stale challenge to a concluded disciplinary action cannot ordinarily be revived merely by making a representation or seeking information at a much later stage. The Supreme Court has also recently reiterated that there is no fixed period of limitation for Article 226, but a litigant seeking extraordinary relief must approach the Court within a reasonable time, and a belated attempt to revive a stale cause of action can be declined on the ground of laches.

The petitioner’s reliance upon the RTI communication of January 2020 does not, in the circumstances, furnish a satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay. The respondents’ specific case is that notices were issued during the departmental proceedings through registered post and were not accepted by the petitioner.

Even on merits, the petitioner has failed to make out a case warranting interference with the termination order dated 03.01.2005. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that the departmental enquiry was conducted ex parte without affording him an opportunity to defend himself. The respondents, however, have specifically controverted this assertion. Their pleaded case is that, after the enquiry was ordered vide order dated 06.12.2000, several letters were issued by the Enquiry Officer through registered post requiring the petitioner to appear before him; the petitioner refused to accept the said letters, did not appear before the Enquiry Officer and thereafter continued to remain absent from duty.

In these circumstances, the mere fact that the enquiry ultimately proceeded in the absence of the petitioner would not, by itself, establish violation of the principles of natural justice. The record, as relied upon by the respondents, indicates that an opportunity to participate in the enquiry was extended to the petitioner, but was not availed of by him. A delinquent employee cannot take advantage of his own failure to participate in the proceedings and thereafter contend that the enquiry stood vitiated merely because it was ultimately conducted in his absence.

The petitioner has also sought to explain his absence by referring to the illness of his wife and to the alleged sanction of leave. The respondents have disputed this version and have specifically stated that the petitioner had remained absent for several days and even months. They have further relied upon the departmental communication dated 20.09.2000, whereby the matter concerning his absence was forwarded to the Conservator of Soils, Mohali for further action.

Thus, the question whether the petitioner’s absence was duly sanctioned or otherwise was a matter forming part of the departmental proceedings and cannot, at this stage, be re-appreciated as if this Court were exercising appellate jurisdiction over the disciplinary authority.

Significantly, the petitioner seeks to challenge a disciplinary action which attained finality in the year 2005. There is no material before this Court, apart from the petitioner’s assertion, which would justify reopening the entire departmental proceedings after such a prolonged lapse of time. The respondents have consistently maintained that the petitioner was afforded sufficient time and opportunity to defend himself after the enquiry was ordered, but he failed to avail the same.

The petitioner’s subsequent claim for voluntary retirement also cannot alter the legal consequence of the order of termination. His request is not for consideration of a subsisting application for voluntary retirement; rather, after the termination had already taken effect in 2005, he seeks to have the same substituted by voluntary retirement with retrospective effect. No legal basis has been demonstrated for such a course.

As regards the monetary claim, the respondents have specifically stated that the petitioner himself, in his application dated 18.11.2020, claimed GPF dues of ₹50,071/-, whereas the GPF amount of ₹57,683/- was subsequently paid to him on 25.06.2021. To that extent, therefore, no surviving cause remains.

Therefore, the petitioner’s case is not one where a subsisting service right has been promptly asserted but one where a concluded disciplinary action of the year 2005 is sought to be reopened in the year 2021. The explanation furnished for the delay is not sufficient, particularly when the respondents have placed material to show that the petitioner was called upon to participate in the enquiry and failed to do so. The equitable and discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 cannot be invoked to revive such a stale claim. The principle that delay defeats equity assumes greater significance where reopening the matter would require examination of events, departmental proceedings and records dating back almost two decades.

Consequently, the challenge to the order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-6) is liable to fail on the threshold ground of delay and laches. Even on merits, the petitioner has failed to establish that the departmental proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice or that the termination order suffers from any jurisdictional or legal infirmity warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed and termination order dated 03.01.2005 (Annexure P-5) and letter dated 06.05.2021 (Annexure P-11) stands upheld.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.