Pappu and Others vs Karnataka State Transport Authority and Others

Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J.—The petitioners have called into question the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal''s order, dated 28.2.2015 passed in Revision Petition No. 1397/2012 condoning the delay of 1066 days in filing the said revision petition.

Sri C.V. Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the long delay of 1066 days is condoned without referring to any objections raised by the petitioners in their arguments and in their statement of objections. He submits that the statute prescribes the limitation period of 30 days for filing the revision petition. He submits that the revision petitioner (respondent No. 2) operates the services on the road in question and that it can be safely presumed that it is aware of the order granting of the renewal of the counter signature in favour of the petitioners.

Sri C.V. Kumar in support of his submissions read out paragraph No. 9 of the Apex Court''s judgment in the case of Basawaraj and Others Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, , which reads as follows:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "Sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."

He has also placed his reliance on the Apex Court''s judgment in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, . Portions read out by him are extracted hereinbelow:

"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."

Sri H. Anantha, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Sri Hareesh Bhandary T, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submit that it is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 had no notice of the proceedings of the grant for the renewal of the counter signature in favour of the petitioners. They submit that the respondent No. 2 has already concluded its arguments on the main matter and that the case is set down for the reply arguments of the petitioners tomorrow.

The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. What weighs with the courts, appellate authorities and quasi-judicial bodies in considering the applications for the condonation of delay is not the length or duration of the delay; it is the sufficiency of the cause shown. Admittedly, the respondent No. 2 had had no notice of the proceedings for the grant of renewal of the counter signature. On its coming to know of the order passed in the said proceedings, it has taken the administrative approval and instituted the revision petition. In the process, there is a delay of 1066 days.

Condoning delay does not put the petitioners to any prejudice in any way. They have the right to resist the revision petition by taking the tenable defences. That the Tribunal has not referred to the various objections to the delay condonation application or on the ground that the impugned order could have been better and more detailed, this Court''s interference is not warranted.

In this regard it is profitable to refer to the Hon''ble Supreme Court''s decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, , wherein it is held that the Courts should adopt the liberal and justice-oriented approach. It is held therein that the Parliament has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression ''sufficient cause'' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Six principles enumerated by the Apex Court in the said case are as follows:

Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

"Every day''s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour''s delay, every second''s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

The considered view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition (supra) is reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of DHIRAJ SINGH AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127.

The Tribunal cannot be held to be at fault for condoning 1066 days'' delay in filing the revision petition by the respondent No. 2, as the respondent No. 2 had no notice of the proceedings for the grant of renewal of counter signature in favour of the petitioners.

These petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.