Panna Lal vs The Secretary to Government Haryana Local Government, Department and another

Tek Chand, J.—This is a writ petition under Articles 22b and 227 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ directing the quashing of order passed by the Secretary to Government, Haryana, Local Government Department, Chandigarh.

The facts giving rise to the writ petition are that Shri Panna Lal was one of the members of Municipal Committee, Dabwali, consisting of 13 Municipal Commissioners elected in the year 1964. The Municipal Commissioners are representatives of two political parties, one called the United Front and the other Congress, eight members belong to the former and the remaining five to the latter party. The petitioner is a Harijan and his son Luna Ram had submitted an application to the Dabwali Municipal Committee for the allotment of a small plot on tehbazari basis in order to enable him to set up a stall for selling vegetables so that he might earn his livelihood and maintain his family. In his application (Annexure A) there is a note that he has no connection with his father and that he was living separately. His application was recommended by five members who belong to the opposition group. On 31st of December, 1965, the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, by resolution No 4 sanctioned the allotment of ''five feet land near the Pyao to Luna Ram. On a complaint having been made to the Sub Divisional Officer, Sirsa, by some member of the Public, an enquiry was made through the President of the Municipal Committee to the circumstances in which the plot was allotted to Luna Ram. The President of the Municipal Committee on 16th February 1966 informed the Sub-Divisional Officer that the application of Luna Ram for the allotment of a plot on teh bazari basis had been recommended by 5 members of the Committee and it was considered on 31st of December, 1965 and that a small plot was sanctioned. It was also stated that neither the applicant had deposited any fee nor bad he taken possession of the plot (vide Annexure C). The Committee was advised by the Sub-Divisional Officer to reconsider the position and to cancel its resolution No. 4 of 31st December, 1965 (vide Annexure D). On 23rd of June, 1966, the President of the Municipal Committee informed the Sub-Divisional Officer that the resolution had not been implemented and the possession of the land had not been handed over to Luna Ram and that the matter of cancellation of the resolution would be considered at the next meeting. At its ordinary meeting of 5th of July, 1966, by resolution No. 7, the Municipal Committee cancelled its resolution No. 4 of 31st December, 1965. It was also mentioned that resolution had not yet been implemented.

On 29th of July, 1966, respondent No. 1 served a notice on the petitioner directing him to show cause why he should not be removed from the membership of the committee. The allegation against him was that the petitioner was present at the meeting of the Municipal Committee on 31st of December, 1965 when the application of Luna Ram was being considered and that in that meeting he had voted for the resolution sanctioning the allotment of the plot in his son''s favour. It was alleged that thereby the petitioner had contravened the provisions of rule 3-A of the General Rules, framed u/s 240 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Para 2 of the communication alleged that :

You flagrantly abased your position as member of the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, within the meaning of section 16(1) (e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. (vide Annexure H),

The petitioner submitted his explanation (vide Annexure I) in which inter-alia he said :

That resolution No. 4 vide which the plot was allotted to my son Luna Ram, was adopted by the Committee unanimously without there being any opposition to the resolution There was no discussion, whatsoever, on the resolution. In fact the position is that it was never brought to my notice that the resolution related to an application of my son for the allotment of the plot. It may be very likely that I was not present in the meeting when this particular resolution was adopted. Since the meeting held on 31st December, 1965 continued for several hours and adopted a number of resolutions, my attention was never directed by any member or the Municipal Secretary to the fact that the resolution related to the application of my son.

By notification (copy Annexure 1), the petitioner was removed from the membership of the Municipal Committee of Dabwali and was disqualified for election for a period of one year. Aggrieved from the above order of removal, the petitioner has come up in writ petition to this Court. The main reasons given for the issuance of a writ are that the petitioner had not at all abased his position much less ''flagrantly''. It was not even alleged that the petitioner had managed the passing of the resolution which was unanimous. His presence at the meeting when he was not even aware of the passing of the resolution was, if at all, only a technical breach and could not be called ''flagrant''. He also said that the resolution had never been implemented and there was no rival applicant in the field for the allotment of the plot. In the return filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, all that has been stated is that the presence of the petitioner in the meeting was a contravention of rule 3-A of the General Rules and actionable u/s 16(1)(e) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, and amounted to flagrant abuse of his position.

Rule 3/A framed u/s 240 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, runs as under :

3-A. No member of a Committee shall be present at or vote or take any other part in any proceeding of a committee or sub-committee relating to a matter in which he or either of his parents or the husband or wife as may be of any such dependent has a direct or indirect interest.

Section 16(1)(e) provides as under :

16(1) The State Government may, by notification, remove any member of committee-

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(e) if, in the opinion of the State Government he has flagrantly abused his position as a member of the Committee or has through negligence or misconduct been responsible for the loss, or misapplication of any money or property of the committee.

It is a settled rule of construction that effect must be given, where possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute. Effect has to be given to all its provisions and nothing is to be deemed superfluous or insignificant. The general words when construing statutes or statutory rules should receive a general construction. The words occurring in section 16(1)(e) which call for scrutiny are that a member has "flagrantly abused his position" as such.

"flagrantly" means glaringly, notoriously, scandalously. Literally flagrant means blazing, burning, flaming, glowing. In respect of an offence or a misconduct, it is used in the sense of glaring, notorious, scandlous, that is to say "flaming into notice". The framers of the statutory rules were drawing a distinction between a mere abuse of once position and a "flagrant abuse" to which the epithets of "enormous", "heinous" or "glaringly wicked" could be applied. A position is said to be abused when is may be put to a bad use; or for a wrong purpose. In the sense of abusing one''s position, the term has meaning varying in shades from irregular and improper use not necessarily with a bad motive to an intended or deliberate corrupt practice. The statutory rule as worded clearly suggests that abuse of one''s position, unless flagrant, would not result in removal of a member of the committee. The word "flagrantly" before "abused his position'' cannot be overlooked. It indicates a stress being laid upon the nature of abuse of position which must in the circumstances be glaring, notorious, enormous, scandalous or wicked. The explanation of the petitioner in this case was that there was no discussion on the resolution and the matter was not brought to his notice that the resolution related to his son''s application. It is conceivable that the petitioner while sitting at the meeting might have been so inattentive as not to have noticed the passing of a resolution particularly when it was not discussed and upon which all members were agreed. This explanation of the plaintiff has not been controverter in the reply of the respondent All that has been stated is that the petitioner was present and his presence at the meeting was a contravention of rule 3-A. It was also said that the petitioner had our signatures in the proceedings book. The petitioner has not denied his presence; and the signing of the proceedings book does not indicate anything more than that. No. discussion took place on the resolution which was passed unanimously. It cannot, therefore, be said that he participated in the deliberations of the resolution. He was not doubt physically present but if his statement is to be accepted and in the absence of rebuttal, there is no reason to reject his statement he can be said to be physically present and not mentally. Despite the fact that the members of the Municipal Committee represented different political points of view, the resolution in question was passed unanimously, and no voting on a unanimous resolution need take place. No doubt in the reply filed on behalf of the respondent, it was stated; that the petitioner flagrantly abused his position by participating in the meeting of the Committee held on 31st December, 1955, but mere iteration of the phrase is not sufficient for basing finding that in fact the petitioner''s conduct was such as could be deemed to amount to flagrantly abusing his position. These words are not a formula which, uttered, would amount to any incontrovertible finding that the petitioner''s conduct was sufficient opprobrious as to merit removal from membership of the Committee in accordance with section 16(1)(e). It is the function of the Court to construe the language of a statute, and apply it to the proved facts of a case, and then to see, if the conduct to which exception had been taken merited the use of the reproachful epithet. It was not the intention of the Legislature to permit the State Government to remove a member by simply styling his conduct to be a flagrant abuse of his position. What matters is not the label affixed on the conduct of the petitioner by the State as the opposite party, but whether his conduct, in the light of the established facts, was so odious as could reasonably warrant the use of the derogatory appellation. On the admitted or undisputed facts of the case it is open to the court to form its own judgment as to whether the State Government could justifiably style the petitioner''s conduct as a flagrant abuse of his position as a member of the Municipal Committee. The view formed by the State Government is not so sacrosanct as to defy judicial scrutiny. I find myself in agreement with the view expressed by Grover J. in Bhagat Ram Patanga v. the State of Punjab C.W. No 22 of 1963 C.W. N. 22 of 1963 cited with approval by Harbans Singh J. in Satya Dev. v. State of Punjab (1964) 66 P.L.R. 381 (385) to the following effect:

It may be that it is for the State Government to form the opinion whether a person has been guilty of flagrant abuse of his position as a member of the committee but if on the facts stated either in the order or in the show cause notice which preceded the order, if is apparent that those facts were altogether extraneous or were not germane or relevant to the provision of law under which action is taken, then the orders must be struck down.

The view that I have taken finds support from a number of decisions of this Court as well as of other courts. Reference may be made to Satya Dev v. State of Punjab and the cases cited therein. To the same effect is the decision of the Division Bench in State of Punjab v. Sugna Ram (1964) 66 P.L.R. 828.

For reasons stated above, the writ petition deserves to succeed and I would allow it. The order removing the petitioner from the membership of the committee as published in notification No. 3497-6 DULB-66/3695 dated Chandigarh the 10th October, 1966 is quashed. A writ of certiorari to 1he above effect is to issue. The petitioner is entitled to his costs which are assessed at two hundred rupees.