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Judgment
Ranjit Singh, J
The present appeal is filed by the appellant to impugn the judgment dated 7th May, 2004 passed by the Tribunal below allowing the OA of the Bank for recovery of Rs. 18,31,102.56 along with interest @ 12% p.a. with half yearly rest. The order passed in May 2004 is now challenged in May 2015 after expiry of 11 years. This appeal is accordingly is found to have been filed with delay of 3987 days. To explain this extra-ordinary inordinate delay, the appellants have filed an application (IA No. 398 of 2015) for condonation of delay.
In the application seeking condonation of delay it is averred that the appellants were advised to file an application for setting aside of the order dated 7th May, 2004 by their Advocate. Based on this advice, the appellants had filed Miscellaneous Application No. 15 of 2009 under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act for setting aside the order dated 7th May, 2004. Even this application was filed on 3rd December, 2008. The said application was dismissed by the Tribunal below on 20th July, 2012. Aggrieved against this order, the appellants filed Appeal No. 477 of 2014.
Vide its order dated 26th February, 2015 this Tribunal has held that the application filed by the appellants under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act was not maintainable. In this order, this Tribunal has observed that the only remedy available to the appellants was to file an appeal against the order passed in the OA which had not been filed till then. Faced with this situation, the appellants had sought permission to withdraw the appeal and accordingly the said appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on February 26, 2015.
On the basis as noticed above the appellants have pleaded that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would come to their rescue for exclusion of the time during which the appellants were prosecuting their lis in a bona fide manner in the Court without jurisdiction.
To explain the delayed approach in filing the application under Section 19(25) of RDDBFI Act, which was over four years, the appellants would plead that they are farmers and were not aware of passing of the order dated 7th May, 2004 till they learnt about it from the execution proceedings. It is then that they had filed an application under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act. Accordingly, prayer is made for condoning this delay as well.
There is virtually no explanation forthcoming to explain the delay in filing the application under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act which is for a period of over four years. The appellants have made this to look so simple that they were not aware of the order dated 7th May, 2015 passed in the OA. This is a case where the suit initially was filed before the High Court at Shimla which was transferred to Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh when Tribunals were constituted under the RDDBFI Act. The OA was decided in the presence of the Counsel, who appeared for the appellants. The appellants have not disclosed anything whether copy of this order was received by them or by their Counsel. Simply stating that they did not come to know of this order cannot be accepted as sufficient to explain the delay of over four years in making approach. This delayed approach is found legally not permissible and thus not bona fide. Merely because the case was pending till it was found to be not maintainable when order in this regard is passed cannot be taken as sufficient reason to explain this delay. Recovery of this huge amount as ordered in the year 2004 obviously still is pending. The prayer in the application under Section 19(25), RDDBFI Act was for deciding one issue which was earlier decided. This approach cannot be considered bona fide or legitimate one in support of the plea that the appellant was prosecuting the case with due diligence.
Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation the time during which a person was prosecuting with due diligence in Civil Court, whether in a Court of first instance or in appeal or revision, is to be excluded. The period can be considered for exclusion only once it is found that the appellants were prosecuting with due diligence the other proceedings. The application filed by the appellants was that one of the issues framed in the suit had not been considered and decided by the Tribunal below. This plea was rejected by the Tribunal below by pointing out that this issue had been dealt with in the impugned judgment. That being the factual position, it cannot be taken that the appellants were prosecuting this application with due diligence. This Tribunal, however, found this application to be not maintainable. Section 14 of the Limitation Act therefore, in my considered view, would not come to the rescue of the appellants.
True it may be that the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and that liberal approach is required to be adopted while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay. At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice. It may not be possible to lay general principle but, if there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its Counsel, there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. One has to keep in mind, as held in the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Anr., I (2010) CLT 333 (SC) : II (2010) SLT 205 : (2010) 5 SCC 459 that law of limitation is found on public policy and that the Legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the Legislature. To put to differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. The Court has observed in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., V (2010) SLT 790 : III (2010) CLT 201 (SC) : (2010) 8 SCC 685 that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation. The Court has further observed that the law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice has to be done to both the parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.
Applying the principle as noticed above, one may not have any hesitation to hold that there is no worthwhile explanation coming forward to explain the extraordinary inordinate delay from 7th May, 2004 till January 2009 when even the application under Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act was filed. While filing this application, the appellants are found to be utterly negligent and this action on the part of the appellants cannot be treated as bona fide exercise to claim relief from the Court of law. The approach made by the appellants was obviously misplaced and misconceived and as such not maintainable. Faced with this situation, the appellants had withdrawn the said challenge. In this background, they cannot now come forward to say that they were following the remedy in a bona fide belief and, thus, pray for condoning this delay by invoking the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The recovery, which had crystallized in the year 2004 cannot be permitted to be reopened after expiry of 11 years. In this manner, the appellants are found utterly negligent in making the present approach. I am of the considered view that no case for condoning this extraordinary inordinate delay is made out. The application seeking condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the appeal shall stand dismissed.